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Managing Stochastic Uncertainty in Dynamic Marketplaces
Jiaqi Lu
Firms’ operations management decisions are often complicated by various types of un-
certainties, ranging from micro level customer behavior to macro level economic conditions.
Operating in the presence of uncertainties and volatilities is a challenging task, one that
requires careful mathematical analysis and tailored treatment based on the uncertainty’s
characteristics. In this thesis we provide three distinct studies on managing stochastic un-
certainty in dynamic marketplaces. The first study considers agents’ dynamic interactions
in a large matching market. A pair needs to inspect for their compatibility in order to form
a match. We study a type of market failure called information deadlock that may arise when
pairs are only willing to inspect their most preferred prevailing partner. Under information
deadlock, a large fraction of agents wait in the market for long (if not forever) in spite of
there being opportunities remaining in their consideration sets. Using advanced tools in sta-
tistical physics and random graph theory, we derive how the size of the deadlock is affected
by the market’s primitives. We also show that information deadlock is prevalent in a wide
range of markets. Our second study tackles a service firm’s problem of choosing between a
safe service mode and a risky service mode when serving a customer who might probabilis-
tically churn. One key behavioral feature of the customer that we consider is named recency
bias — his happiness with the firm (that crucially determines his churn risk at the time)
depends more heavily on his more recent experience. We show, by solving a stochastic con-
trol problem, that the firm should be risk-averse when the customer is marginally satisfied
and risk-seeking when the customer is marginally unsatisfied. The optimal sandwich policy
can significantly outperform the naive myopic policy in terms of customer lifetime value.
Our third study deals with a dual sourcing problem under fluctuating economic conditions.
We model this via an underlying Markov modulated state-of-the-world which affects the
two suppliers’ cost structures, capacity limits and demands. We develop two approaches
to show how the optimal combined ordering strategy from the two suppliers, along with a
salvaging policy, can be efficiently computed, and characterize the relatively simple struc-
ture of the optimal policies. Interestingly, we find that the firm can, by exploiting the dual
sourcing options, benefit from increased environmental volatilities that affect the suppliers’
cost structures or capacity limits.
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Introduction
Firms constantly operate under various types of uncertainty.
A matching market is where participants search and match with a partner for mutual
benefit (e.g., dating/marriage market, job market). Typically, participants have their own
idiosyncratic preferences for potential match partners, which makes matchmaking for all
a challenging task. Moreover, in many situations, committing to a match requires costly
inspections, such as a series of dates as an antecedent to commit to a stable relationship,
or a probation period for a full-time employment contract. Only successful inspections can
lead to a match. It is also common practice that such inspections are selective, performed
only by pairs that already prefer each other a priori. To what extent do these inspections
hinder the matchmaking process? Will there be a market-wide congestion where many are
unable to move forward because they are unwilling to inspect? For matching platforms
naturally designed to increase connectivity (such as dating apps and job search websites),
do they really promote better market outcomes?
For other service firms such as investment managers, delivering an outstanding customer
experience throughout their dynamic interactions with the customer is also crucial. This
can determine how satisfied the customers are with the firm, and, hence, affect their churn
rate, which is an important metric used to assess a service firm’s success. However, things
are often volatile. For example, when the investment manager’s recommended portfolio
goes through a period of (market downturns) low or negative returns, customers who rely
heavily on recent experience may quickly lose faith and decide to leave. In situations like
this, the firm should be more careful in choosing the service mode’s risk profile (e.g., the
recommended portfolio’s volatility) based on the state of the current customer relationship,
since a few bad experiences can quickly drive a happy customer to abandon the firm. When
should the firm adopt a riskier strategy in serving the customer and when should it not?
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If there is a service mode option that generates high reward with no volatility, should the
firm stick with it? Is volatility always our foe?
Not only do service firms suffer from volatile “service” and uncertain customer behav-
ior, manufacturing companies and retail chains are also increasingly challenged by a more
volatile global economy. Manufacturing labor costs in China have risen sharply over the
past four years and are now more than double those in neighboring Vietnam and 35%
higher than those in Mexico. The USA, China and Europe are rapidly imposing, increas-
ing, decreasing or eliminating tariffs in their current trade wars. Commodity prices are
also increasingly volatile, as are logistical costs. There are, often, significant discrepancies
between theoretical capacity levels and actual ones, due to supply disruptions, pandemics,
quality problems, rationing schemes, etc.. How should onshoring/offshoring decisions be
made when the suppliers’ cost parameters, demand distributions and capacity levels fluc-
tuate with quickly changing environmental factors?
In this thesis, we study the aforementioned three problems in Chapter 1 – 3, respectively.
In Chapter 1, we study two-sided matching markets in which agents (e.g., workers) seek
out opportunities (e.g., jobs). Each agent considers a subset of the opportunities with an
ex ante complete preference ordering. Opportunities also have preference orderings over
agents that consider them. In order for a match to occur, however, agents must perform a
costly inspection to determine if they are actually compatible. We assume agents are only
willing to inspect an opportunity if they are each other’s most preferred remaining option.
We focus on a type of market failure called information deadlock, where a large fraction of
agents in the market don’t get matched for very long time, while maintaining non-empty
consideration sets, because they are waiting for each other to acquire information (inspect)
first. We analyze the information deadlock phenomenon in large random markets in which
the opportunity-to-agent ratio is α. Each agent-opportunity pair prevails independently
and with the same probability, so that, in particular all agent have a consideration set
of the same expected size K. Each inspection succeeds independently with probability p.
Preference rankings for each agent and fitness rankings for each opportunity, are uniformly
and independently generated among all possible permutations. Thus, the large random
market is fully characterized by α, K and p.
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An agent is considered stuck in deadlock if she has not been matched after T rounds
of inspections, where T = ω(1) grows with the number of agents N as T = o(logN).
Introduces tools from statistical physics such as the message passing algorithm to the field
of market design, we give specific characterization of the size of information deadlock (i.e.,
the fraction of agents who get stuck) using the market primitives, as the number of agents
goes to infinity. Our work suggests that the opportunity-to-agent ratio α is a key metric a
market designer should track to monitor the health of the marketplace. If the market is in
the information deadlock regime, the designer might try to avoid market failure by recruiting
additional opportunities (increase α) or encouraging agents to inspect opportunities even
when matches are not guaranteed. When able to influence or control K, the average size
of an agent’s consideration set, the market designer faces an interesting tradeoff: the larger
K, the larger the size of the information deadlock, as agents experience more competition
from other agents. On the other hand, as K decreases, the percentage of agents who
end up exhausting their consideration set without a match increases, as agents have fewer
opportunities to choose from.
In Chapter 2, we consider the following stochastic control problem. There is a service
firm (e.g., a financial advisor) and a customer. The firm, at any time, may choose between
a safe service mode and a risky service mode, which determines the drift and volatility of
the reward process. We assume the total reward is divided between the two players in fixed
proportions. The firm is an expected total reward maximizer. The customer, on the other
hand, is behavioral and is assumed to subject to recency bias. In particular, his happiness
state follows a goodwill model (see Nerlove and Arrow [1962]), which is an exponentially
weighted moving average of past rewards. Moreover, the customer’s churn rate at any time
is a function of his current happiness value. To balance algebraic hardness with stochastic
control tractability, we assume the customer’s hazard rate of churn is a simple step function
that decreases (from one) to zero if the happiness value is above some satisfaction threshold.
The optimal control policy we find is one of two types. It is either a myopic policy that
always uses the service mode with the higher immediate reward rate, or a sandwich policy
that uses the high-reward service mode for all happiness values except for an intermediate
happiness interval around the satisfaction threshold. Our solution demonstrates an interest-
3
ing risk-seeking region and a risk-averse region based on the customer’s current happiness
value. In particular, when the customer is currently marginally satisfied — his happiness
value is at or slightly above the satisfaction threshold — the firm should be risk-averse
and use the safe mode. This risk-averse region which characterizes for which happiness
values the firm should use the safe mode may vanish if the risky service mode’s average
reward far exceeds that of the safe service mode. On the other hand, if the customer is
currently marginally unsatisfied — his happiness value is slightly below the satisfaction
threshold — the firm should be risk-seeking and use the risky mode. Note that we find this
risk-seeking region always exists even when the safe mode provides much lower immediate
return, which contrasts the customary wisdom that a high volatility and low return option
is always dominated by a low volatility and high return option.
Interestingly, in another distinct dual services setting in Chapter 3, we also show that
some volatility, far from acting as a hindrance, may in fact be exploited to improve system
performance. In particular in Chapter 3, we analyze a dual sourcing periodic review model
with a salvage option, for a single item, with a finite or infinite planning horizon. Each
supply source has its own variable cost rate, fixed cost per order, lead time and capacity
limit for each period’s order. Additional costs include inventory carrying and backlogging
costs, where we assume that all shortages can be backlogged. Cost parameters, demand
distributions and capacity levels may fluctuate as a function of an underlying state-of-
the-world that captures the relevant macroeconomic, seasonal and political factors such as
the tariff percentages, labor cost index, etc. This state-of-the-world evolves periodically
in accordance with a finite state Markov chain. We also consider random supply risk that
emerges because of uncertain yields, disruptions such as fires, hurricanes and strikes, random
capacity levels, rationing with other companies, etc.. This is modeled by random supply
functions.
By solving the firm’s dynamic programming problem, we show how the optimal com-
bined ordering strategy from the two suppliers, along with a salvaging policy, can be effi-
ciently computed. We characterize the relatively simple structure of the optimal policies
and show how the optimal procurement decisions vary with the inventory information and
prevailing state-of-the-world. We also provide various comparison results. One of the main
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managerial insights we derive is that, under dual (or multi-) sourcing, increased volatility in
the environmental factors can sometimes improve system performance. For example, com-
pare a world in which the suppliers’ price points are independent of the state-of-the-world,
to one in which the regular supplier’s unit price fluctuates with the latter as a martingale,
assuming the same starting value. The expected optimal cost under volatile prices is shown
to be lower than under a deterministic price path. This is because we can effectively shift
procurement orders between the suppliers as the state-of-the-world emerges, and hence take
advantage of the ”good” state (when purchasing price is cheap) to bring down the total




When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a
Deadlock?
1.1 Introduction
Statistical physicists study the macroscopic phenomena that emerge when a large num-
ber of particles interact locally in simple ways. The underlying theory helps researchers
explain, for example, the evolving magnetization of “spin glasses” in response to tempera-
ture and time. The theory has been extended to other fields as well, helping explain and
engineer macroscopic phenomena in artificial intelligence (Pearl [1986, 1988]), computer
science (Mézard et al. [2002]), computer vision (Freeman et al. [2000]), digital communica-
tion (MacKay and Neal [1996], Frey and MacKay [1998], Richardson and Urbanke [2008]),
and neurobiology (Yedidia et al. [2005], Friston et al. [2017]), to name a few. In contrast,
market design research is conspicuous in that connections with statistical physics have been
little exploited so far.1 Marketplaces bring together agents, who interact with each other,
often in relatively simple ways. Yet it can be notoriously hard to predict the market-wide
or “macroscopic” outcome when many heterogeneous agents come together in a large mar-
ket. What can the powerful methodology developed for spin glasses and related areas teach
us about phenomena in marketplaces such as market clearing? Will a given market clear
smoothly? If not, how can we modify the market to promote market clearing?
In this chapter, we study two-sided matching markets in which agents (e.g., workers)
seek out opportunities (e.g., jobs). Each agent is interested in a given (constant-sized) subset
of opportunities, called her consideration set, and has a preference ordering over this set.
1However, note work in the area of “Econophysics” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Econophysics
which has attempted to explain phenomena and observational data in financial markets using statistical
physics ideas.
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Opportunities similarly have a preference ordering over all agents that consider them. In
order for a match to occur, however, agents must perform a costly inspection to determine
if the opportunity is actually feasible. We assume agents are only willing to inspect an
opportunity if: 1) it’s her favorite remaining option and, 2) conditional on a successful
inspection, the match is guaranteed (equivalently, she is the opportunity’s favorite remaining
agent). This behavior can intuitively lead to information deadlocks in which each agent is
waiting for others to inspect before deciding which inspections to perform herself. Our model
is loosely motivated by matching markets such as marriage/dating, labor markets, housing
markets, and others, where costly inspections are necessary prior to forming matches. These
markets often suffer from congestion (manifested as information deadlocks in our model)
in which agents struggle to find good matches even though consideration sets are relatively
large (see, e.g., Roth and Xing [1994], Arnosti et al. [2014], Horton [2019]). Can we obtain a
systematic understanding of which markets are likely to suffer from information deadlocks?
The concept of information deadlocks in matching markets was recently formalized by
Immorlica et al. [2020] in which specific examples were constructed to demonstrate the
phenomenon. See, for example, Figure 1.1, with three agents and two opportunities. The
first agent prefers the first opportunity, but this opportunity prefers the second agent.
Similarly, the second agent prefers the second opportunity which, in turn prefers the first
agent. Thus neither agent is willing to inspect until the other one does. This sort of
deadlock can extend to other agents, such as the third one in the example, if the involved
opportunities are their favorite. Thus deadlocks manifest as directed cycles and directed
paths leading into these cycles. These examples leave unresolved the question of whether
large deadlocks occur in “typical” markets.
We focus attention on random markets consisting of N agents and M = αN opportuni-
ties where each opportunity is in an agent’s consideration set independently with probabil-
ity K/M . Agent and opportunity preference lists are independent uniform random orders.
Each inspection succeeds independently with probability p. Using the tools of statistical
physics, we find, surprisingly, that a broad range of markets lie in an information deadlock
regime. The key parameter governing this distinction is α, the ratio between the sizes of








Figure 1.1: Stylized representation
of a deadlock in a market with three
agents and two opportunities. Di-
rected edges show the favorite poten-
tial partner of each participant, e.g.,
1′ is the most preferred opportunity
of agent 1.















Deadlock Size Under Different Opportunity-to-agent Ratios
Information Deadlock
Figure 1.2: Fraction of agents in information dead-
lock as a function of the opportunity-to-agent ra-
tio. We fix agents’ average degree K = 3 and
inspection success probability p = 0.3.
eration sets and an inspection’s success probability p, and growing the size of the market
N (and hence M), there is a set A of ratios of opportunities to agents. For markets with
ratios α ∈ A, a linear fraction Θ(N) of agents are stuck in information deadlocks with high
probability. For markets with ratios α 6∈ A, with high probability no information deadlock
occurs (see Figure 2.1). Thus, iteratively occurring guaranteed inspections suffice to clear
the market in the deadlock-free regime (α 6∈ A), but fail to in the information deadlock
regime (α ∈ A). We show numerically that the set A is a bounded subinterval [0, α∗] of the
real number line, suggesting that there is a phase transition between the deadlock and no-
deadlock regime. Our work suggests that the opportunity-to-agent ratio α is a key metric
a market designer might track to monitor the health of the marketplace. If the market is in
the information deadlock regime, the designer might try to avoid market failure by recruit-
ing additional opportunities or limiting the size of agents’ consideration sets or encouraging
agents to inspect opportunities even when matches are not guaranteed.
We emphasize that the emergence of a deadlock structure involving Ω(N) nodes is coun-
terintuitive in our random markets. Initially, each agent has an Ω(1) probability of being
able to proceed with a guaranteed inspection (because their favorite opportunity points
back at them with Ω(1) probability). Furthermore, as each agent has out-degree at most
one and constant average degree, the market lacks short loops. Thus the market consists
primarily of short directed paths. These directed paths would appear susceptible to disap-
pearing (rather than closing into directed cycles) as agents iteratively inspect opportunities.
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While disappearance of directed paths, i.e., market clearing, indeed occurs for α 6∈ A, we
find that, surprisingly, for α ∈ A these directed paths link up with other paths as the
process progresses, and a deadlock involving Ω(N) nodes emerges.
Our primary technical contribution is to demonstrate an application of statistical physics
tools, particularly message passing (see, e.g., [Mezard and Montanari, 2009, Chapter 14]),
to market design. Doing so requires us to overcome technical challenges resulting from
the cyclic dependence inherent in matching processes. In message passing algorithms (e.g.,
belief propagation), nodes in a graph pass “messages” to their neighbours. Each message
from i to j in the graph is iteratively updated (according to some predefined rule) based on
the (recent) messages received by i from its neighbours except for j itself. Density evolution
then tracks the distribution of messages from one iteration to the next. The “self-exclusion”
property of message updates facilitates direct (iterative) computation of the distribution
of messages on trees, simply based on the message passing rule and the (distribution of)
the node degrees. This computation also applies asymptotically to large random graphs
(e.g., Erdos-Renyi graphs), since they are locally treelike. The limiting message densities
as the number of iterations grows throws light on “macro” phenomena such as whether a
graph contains a “giant” connected component (see Appendix A.3 for a heuristic derivation
of the giant component regime using message passing). In our setting, whether and when
a match (i, j) is formed under the partner search and matching process depends on the
history of both potential partners; and in turn the history of i and j depends on whether
inspection (i, j) was already performed. Given this apparent cyclical dependence, it is a
priori unclear that our partner search process can be viewed through the lens of message
passing. Somewhat surprisingly, we are able to construct a message passing algorithm
which tracks the partner search process and possesses the key self-exclusion property. This
algorithm facilitates our characterization of whether information deadlock occurs, and its
size in markets which suffer from deadlock.
Related work. Immorlica et al. [2020] introduced the notion of information deadlock
in matching markets where information acquisition is costly, provided specific examples
of markets with unavoidable deadlocks, and suggested that if one side of the market has
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large capacities, then deadlock can be circumvented by providing estimated “cutoff ranks”
to participants. Note that in our setting, in contrast, participants on both sides have
capacity one, so cutoff ranks cannot be estimated. More importantly, a main contribution
of the present chapter is to demonstrate that deadlocks occur in a wide range of markets,
even when the consideration graph lacks short loops. In the interest of tractability, our
model makes some simplifications relative to that of Immorlica et al. [2020] (e.g., inspection
outcomes are assumed to be binary).
There is a substantial literature in economics on games between agents (or markets) in
which information acquisition is costly; a classical example is the work of Grossman and
Stiglitz [1980] which shows informationally efficient asset markets are impossible, a finding
which bears some spiritual resemblance to the information deadlock phenomenon. Another
example of work that is loosely related is the literature on contest design (Ghosh and
Kleinberg [2016], Zheng et al. [2011], Sheremeta [2011]), where the quality of submissions
depends on effort put in by participants (this effort could be towards information acquisition
or other aspects), and the designer aims to encourage higher effort by participants. Hatfield
et al. [2018] discusses designing markets to incentivize optimal investment by participants,
while Pakzad-Hurson [2019] brings together crowdsourcing and market design (for matching
and other markets).
Two recent works by Peski [2017, 2020] have identified intriguing connections between
matching markets and statistical physics concepts: roughly, under certain assumptions,
equilibria in matching markets minimize a certain “free energy” function, or, equivalently,
maximize a certain utility-plus-entropy function. This characterization is pleasantly sur-
prising, given that individual agents are each concerned with maximizing their own utility
(and yet end up optimizing some global function).
Finally, we would like to highlight the successful applications of the various message
passing algorithms in numerous applications. A famous area of application is the design of
error-correcting codes that achieve near Shannon limit performance, such as turbo codes
(Berrou et al. [1993]) and low-density parity-check codes (Gallager [1962]). Mézard et al.
[2002], by drawing connections with spin glass theory, is able to push the boundary for
algorithmic hardness towards the actual theoretical barrier in solving satisfiability problems
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using novel algorithms such as survey propagation (a message passing algorithm). Other
message passing algorithms (Feige et al. [2006], Pearl [1982]) are also studied and applied
in solving satisfiability problems.
1.2 A Matching Market
Consider a matching market that consists of N agents and M opportunities. Denote by I
the set of agents and J the set of opportunities. Each agent (she) wants to take at most
one opportunity (it) from her consideration set and each opportunity can only be grabbed
by at most one agent. We use an undirected bipartite graph G = (I,J , E) to describe the
considerations sets of all participants, where the edge set E includes all agent-opportunity
pairs (i, j) such that the opportunity j ∈ J is in the consideration set of agent i ∈ I.
Moreover, we denote by N (i) := {j ∈ J : (i, j) ∈ E} the consideration set of agent i,
and N (j) := {i ∈ I : (i, j) ∈ E} the set of agents considering opportunity j, which we
call the consideration set of opportunity j. Prior to matching and inspections, an agent i
has preference ranking i over opportunities in her consideration set N (i). Similarly, an
opportunity j has prior fitness ranking j over its consideration set N (j). Therefore, we
can describe the initial status of the market via (G, (i,∀i ∈ I), (j , ∀j ∈ J )). As the
market progresses, the status evolves due to elimination of some edges and some agents
(preference rankings remain unchanged). We write Gt = (It,Jt, Et) for the status at time
t and Nt(i), Nt(j) for the corresponding consideration sets.
An agent i needs to inspect an opportunity j to determine compatibility before the match
(i, j) can be formed. Inspections are costly and succeed independently with probability p
(else they fail). We assume agents only perform an inspection when it’s guaranteed.
Definition 1.1. Agent i’s inspection of opportunity j is guaranteed at time t if
• agent i has no preferred opportunity in its consideration set: for all j′ such that j′ i j,
j′ 6∈ Nt(i)
• and opportunity j has no fitter agent in its consideration set: for all i′ such that
i′ j i, i′ 6∈ Nt(j).
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Partner Search (PS)
Initialize the market: agents I0 ← I; opportunities J0 ← J ; potential pairs E0 ← E ; time t← 1.
while |It−1| > 0 do
Initialization: It ← It−1; Jt ← Jt−1; Et ← Et−1
while ∃ a guaranteed inspection (i, j) ∈ Et−1 do
Perform guaranteed inspection (i, j).
if inspection (i, j) succeeds then
The pair matches and leaves the market: It ← It \ {i},Jt ← Jt \ {j}, Et ← Et \ {(i′, j′) : i′ =
i OR j′ = j}.
else
The pair is removed from the set of edges, but the agents remain: Et ← Et \ {(i, j)}.
end if
end while
Eliminate agents i and opportunities j with empty consideration sets: It ← It \ {i},Jt ← Jt \ {j}.
Advance time: t← t+ 1.
end while
Figure 1.3: The Partner Search process. Preference/fitness rankings remain unchanged
throughout.
Since guaranteed inspections require the pair to be each other’s favorite remaining partner,
we may assume that if the inspection succeeds, the pair indeed matches and leaves the
market. We assume that at any point in time agents have enough information to determine
whether their potential inspections are guaranteed.
We describe the market dynamics by a process called partner search which iteratively
conducts guaranteed inspections and updates consideration sets to remove matched pairs
of agents or edges that fail inspections (see Figure 1.3). At the end of the t-th round of
partner search, It is the set of remaining agents with nonempty consideration sets. We
say that agents in It are waiting (to find a partner) in the residual market at time t. For
notational convenience, if the algorithm terminates at time t, define It′ = It for all t′ > t.
The sets (It)t=1,2,... then form a (weakly) decreasing sequence. The market has not fully
cleared at time t as long as It 6= ∅. We are concerned with the size of this group |It| at
time t.
We analyze the number of waiting agents in a sequence of Erdos-Renyi random markets.
Denote by GN (α,K, p) a random market (I,J , E , (i, ∀i ∈ I), (j , ∀j ∈ J )) with |I| = N
agents and |J | = M = αN opportunities. Each agent-opportunity pair (i, j) is in E
independently with probability K/M . Therefore, each agent i ∈ I has a consideration set of
size |N (i)| distributed according to Binomial(M,K/M) N→∞−−−−→ Poisson(K). Also, for each
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opportunity j, |N (j)| is distributed according to Binomial(N,K/M) N→∞−−−−→ Poisson(K/α).
Each inspection succeeds independently with probability p. Preference rankings i for
each i ∈ I and fitness rankings j for each j ∈ J are independent uniformly random
permutations of elements in N (i) and N (j), respectively. We will hold α, K and p fixed
while letting N →∞.
We aim to understand which markets suffer from an information deadlock, namely, a
large fraction of agents waiting for a long time. For a random market GN (α,K, p), define
ΛtN (α,K, p) = |It| to be the number of agents who have not cleared at time t. Clearly
ΛtN (α,K, p) is a random variable. We say a market suffers from information deadlock if the
following holds.
Definition 1.2. A sequence of markets, parameterized by (α,K, p), suffers from an infor-






|ΛtN (α,K, p)− λN | ≤ o(N)
)
= 1.
In the next section, we will characterize limN→∞ Λ
t
N (α,K, p)/N for some large t. In par-
ticular, we identify a broad range of markets where information deadlock occurs with high
probability.
1.3 Statement of Main Result
In this section, we identify a set A(K, p) of values of α that characterizes in which markets
is there an information deadlock up to o(logN) time2 as N →∞: if α ∈ A(K, p), then with
high probability (w.h.p), a non-vanishing fraction of agents wait in the residual market; on
the other hand, if α /∈ A(K, p), then w.h.p., only a vanishing fraction of agents wait. To
facilitate the statement of our main result, we start by defining a certain vector sequence.
2For technical reasons, we characterize the residual graph as limt→∞ limN→∞ and not limN→∞ limt→∞.
Numerics strongly suggest our characterization applies to the latter case as well.
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Definition 1.3. For any (α,K, p) ∈ R+ × R+ × (0, 1), let u0 = 1, y0 = ν0 = 0 and define

























Also define3 λ(α,K, p) := limt→∞Kwtqt.
The sequence (at, rt, wt, qt, yt, νt, ut)t≥1 in Definition 1.3 is closely related to the prob-
abilistic description of a representative agent’s “local information” at time t in the large
market limit. For example, pick any opportunity j in an agent i’s initial consideration set.
At time t, at is the probability that j can no longer possibly be taken by any fitter agent,
rt is the probability that j has been taken by some other fitter agent and is not available to
agent i, and wt is the probability that j is still available to i but does not yet see i as most
fit. The interpretations of (qt, yt, νt, ut) are slightly more involved and will be discussed in
detail in Section 1.4.1. We also highlight from Definition 1.3 that the fraction of agents
who wait in the large market limit will prove to be λ(α,K, p).
The next definition characterizes markets where information deadlock happen.
Definition 1.4. Consider the value λ(K, p) as defined in Definition 1.3. For any K and
p, define set
A(K, p) = {α ≥ 0 : λ(α,K, p) > 0} .
Now we are ready to state the main result.
Theorem 1.1. Consider a sequence of markets GN (α,K, p) indexed by N and the cor-
responding ΛtN (α,K, p), for some sequence of t also implicitly indexed by N . Consider
A(K, p) in Definition 1.4 and λ(α,K, p) in Definition 1.3. Then the following statements
are true.4
3By Corollary 1.1 in Section 1.4.1, the limit limt→∞Kwtqt exists.
4Formally speaking, in our theorem statement, the o(N) term refers to a function f(N) that is o(N).
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• (Information Deadlock Regime) If α ∈ A(K, p), i.e., λ(α,K, p) > 0, then for any





|ΛtN (α,K, p)− λ(α,K, p)N | ≤ o(N)
)
= 1,





ΛtN (α,K, p) ≤ o(N)
)
= 1.
The information deadlock regime is where, with high probability (w.h.p.), a positive
fraction of agents wait in the market for a long time, and Theorem 1.1 moreover identifies
this fraction to be nearly λ(α,K, p). The deadlock-free regime is where, w.h.p., only o(N)
agents get stuck in the market for a long time. Numerical evidence (see Figure 2.1 and
Section 3.6.3) shows that the size of the information deadlock λ(α,K, p) decreases in α and
p, and increases in K, and there is a phase transition with a sharp threshold α∗ ∈ (0,∞)
between the information deadlock and deadlock-free regimes. We state this observation in
the next conjecture.
Conjecture 1.1. The value λ(α,K, p) in Definition 1.3 is a decreasing function of α and p,
and an increasing function of K. For any given K > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1], limα→0+ λ(α,K, p) >
0 whereas λ(α0,K, p) = 0 for some α0 <∞.
An immediate “corollary” from Conjecture 1.1 is that there exists a function α∗(K, p) ∈
(0,∞) which is increasing in K and decreasing in p, such that the set A(K, p) in Definition
1.4 can be described by A(K, p) = [0, α∗(K, p)). As α grows, there are more opportunities
to go around, and the same consideration set size K for agents, so less agents end up
stuck. As p grows, guaranteed inspections succeed more often and hence “peel” the market
more effectively, resulting in less agents being stuck. As K grows, agents consider more
opportunities, but the the total number of opportunities are unchanged, hence the market
gets more congested.
The most surprising implication of Theorem 1.1 and subsequent numerical evidence
is the existence of a sizeable information deadlock regime α ∈ A(K, p). As discussed in
Section 1.1, this a priori seemed unlikely in random markets, given the apparent fragility
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of the structure required for information deadlock to occur (“cycles” of participants waiting
for each other and “directed paths” of waiting agents which end in such cycles). In the next
section and beyond we explain why information deadlock nevertheless arises for α ∈ A(K, p):
roughly, directed paths of waiting agents join each other as partner search progresses and
become longer, causing deadlock.
1.4 Proof of Main Result
The key to proving Theorem 1.1 is to (rigorously) compute the limiting probability of a
representative agent waiting in the large market limit. In order to achieve this, there are
three crucial steps. First, we show the local weak convergence of a representative agent’s
neighborhood in the market (up to any finite depth) to a tree generated from a marked
“bipartite” branching process. This allows us to view a representative agent’s neighborhood
as “locally tree-like” (up to any depth which is o(logN)). Second, we construct a message
passing (MP) algorithm that passes messages between agents and opportunities iteratively.
The key “self-exclusion” property of the MP algorithm is that the message a node i passes
to a neighboring node j at any time does not depend on what i received from j. Inspections,
matches, and whether an agent is still waiting can be inferred from the messages at any given
time, allowing us to “track” what happens in the partner search process. The properties
identified in the first two steps imply that the progress of partner search in a random market
corresponds to the progress of MP on a marked random tree. Accordingly, the third and
final step studies the density evolution of message distributions on the random tree, yielding
the probability the root agent is waiting at any given time in the large market limit.
1.4.1 Local Structure
In this section, we establish that the local neighborhood of any agent in the large market
limit looks like a tree generated from a Poisson branching process. Classic random graph
theory already suggests the local weak convergence of a bipartite Erdos-Renyi graph, which
describes the consideration graph of the market, to a corresponding bipartite Galton-Watson
tree. We extend this result by, for both structures, embedding participant preference (fit-
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ness) rankings as well as “latent” inspection outcomes on edges. The latent inspection
outcomes fully determine the inspection dynamic of a given initial market. We incorporate
this information so that we can compare the two networks as well as their dynamics.
To begin with, we define the distance between any two nodes as the number of opportu-
nities on the shortest path connecting them. Then, naturally, the distance-r neighborhood
of an agent i ∈ GN (α,K, p) is the subgraph (including the preference/fitness rankings and
latent inspection outcomes) spanned by all nodes within distance r from i. We denote by
Br(i) the distance-r neighborhood of agent i. We compare this neighborhood to a subtree
of a marked Galton-Watson tree, defined below.
Definition 1.5. A marked Galton-Watson (GW) tree T (α,K, p) is a random tree with
agent and opportunity nodes constructed as follows:
• The root is an agent node.
• Each agent node has independent Poisson(K) number of opportunity children nodes.
• Each opportunity node has independent Poisson(K/α) number of agent children nodes.
• Each agent (opportunity) node ranks its neighboring opportunity (agent) nodes ac-
cording to independent uniform random permutations.
• Each edge has a latent inspection outcome associated with it, which is independent
Bernoulli(p).
The depth-r tree Tr is the distance-r neighborhood of the root agent node in T . The next
lemma establishes that in large markets, Br(i) and Tr are the “same” with high probability.
Lemma 1.1. Fix any (α,K, p). Take a sequence of markets GN (α,K, p) and a sequence
of r = o(logN) implicitly indexed by N . Also take a depth-r tree Tr generated from the
Poisson branching process in Definition 1.5. Consider any agent i ∈ GN (K,α, p) and its
distance-r neighborhood5 Br(i). Then there exists a coupling between Br(i) and Tr such that
P(Br(i) 6= Tr) ≤ o(1).
5We suppress notational dependence of Br(i) on N .
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To see the importance of Lemma 1.1, consider the stylized deadlock structure as shown
in Figure 1.1 in Section 1.1. If a number of agents end up waiting forever, then the final
deadlock structure must consists of cycles of nodes pointing to their most preferred (most fit)
and paths pointing to cycles. Note that the cycles which make up the core in the deadlock
structure must be derived from cycles in the original consideration graph G. Therefore a
market where almost all nodes belong to small sized trees will at most have trivial size
deadlock. This happens w.h.p. in the large market limit when the corresponding branching
factor K2/α of the branching process T is less than one, i.e., when α > K2. This provides
a heuristic argument for the absence of deadlock for any α > K2.
1.4.2 Message Passing
To investigate what happens when α < K2, the description of the initial market at time 0
alone is not enough. Namely, we need to be able to also understand the residual market
after several rounds of the partner search process. For this purpose, we construct a message
passing (MP) algorithm — a powerful machinery developed in statistical physics and allied
areas — with the accompanying density evolution technique to gain a macroscopic view of
the residual market.
As its name suggests, the MP algorithm passes messages, iteratively over time, between
agents and opportunities that are connected in the prior consideration graph E . The direc-
tion of the message is important. For any (i, j) ∈ E , we denote by m(t)i→j to represent the
message passed from agent i to opportunity j at time t and m̂
(t)
j→i as the message from op-
portunity j to agent i at time t. As will become clear, the key property of the MP algorithm
is that the message i passes to j at time t does not depend on the message i received from j,
but only depends on the messages i received from all other neighboring nodes in N (i)\{j}.
Therefore, iteratively updating the messages for t time periods, the messages an agent i
receives at time t only depend on her distance-t local neighborhood Bt(i). Observe that if
Bt(i) = Tt, then each message she receives at time t comes from independent subtrees. This
allows us to iteratively compute the marginal distribution of messages at time 1, 2, ..., t, and
hence understand her state from the messages she receives. The technique of iteratively
computing the marginal distribution on a tree is density evolution.
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Message Passing (MP)
Input: (I,J , E , (i, ∀i ∈ I), (j , ∀j ∈ J )) with corresponding inspection results εij ∼
Bernoulli(p), ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Initialize the messages: m
(0)
i→j = U, m̂
(0)
j→i = W for all (i, j) ∈ E .
t← 1
do





A if for all i′ j i,m(t−1)i′→j = N;
R if for some i′ j i,m(t−1)i′→j = Y, and m
(t−1)





















ij = 1 and εij = 1;
N if I
(t)




j′→i = A and I
(t)




while some message changed
Figure 1.4: The Message Passing algorithm.
Our MP algorithm (see Figure 1.4) has a ternary alphabet for both agent-to-opportunity
messages, Y, N and U (interpreted as Yes, No and Unsure, resp.), and opportunity-to-agent
messages, A, R and W (interpreted as Accept, Reject and Waitlist, resp.). The message
a node sends to its neighboring node updates itself over time, based on the messages it
receives from all other neighboring nodes. All messages are initialized to U (or W). Then
some messages change to Y or N from U (or A or R from W) at some point in time,
indicating a change in the sender’s availability or in its top preference over the receiver.
In particular, consider an opportunity-to-agent message m̂
(t)
j→i ∈ {A, R, W}. A means
opportunity j ruled out all fitter agents than i. R means j matched with some fitter agent
than i and is not available to i. W means j is still available to i but does not yet see i
as fittest. Then based on the messages agent i receives during the tth iteration of MP,
she decide which of their connected opportunities are inspection ready for them. Inspection
ready (I
(t)
ij = 1) means agent i ruled out all preferred opportunities than j. Similarly, agents
send messages to neighboring opportunities. Consider m
(t)
i→j ∈ {Y, N, U}. Y means agent
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i will match (will inspect and will succeed) with j if j also sees her as most fit. N means
one of the following two cases is true. In case one, i matched with a preferred opportunity
than j and is not available to j. In case two, i will inspect j and will fail if j also sees her
as most fit. X means i is still available to j but does not yet see j as most preferred. Note
that once a message is changed to Y, N, A, or R, it stays the same thereafter.
A reader might notice that the progress of “time” in MP is different from that in PS.
In fact, MP advances faster than PS. Also, although it might appear that some messages
inherit future information such as “will inspect and will fail”, we show next that the MP
algorithm truthfully describes the progress of an accelerated partner search (APS, Figure
1.5) which does not see into the future. We use the term “best” to capture both most
preferred and most fit. We say an agent i is waiting after t′ rounds of APS if i ∈ IAPSt′ .
Accelerated Partner Search (APS)
Initialize the market: IAPS0 ← I; J APS0 ← J ; NAPS0 (i) ← N (i), ∀i ∈ I0; NAPS0 (j) ← N (j), ∀j ∈ J0.
Eliminate agents and opportunities with empty consideration set.
t′ ← 1
while ∃ an agent i with a nonempty consideration set NAPSt′−1 (i) do . round t′
[Phase 1.] Each opportunity j ∈ J APSt′−1 makes an offer to its best agent i1 in the consideration set
NAPSt′−1 (j). Agent i1 rejects the offer if i1 /∈ IAPSt′−1. She does nothing if j is in her consideration set NAPSt′−1 (i1)
but not the best one. She inspects j if it’s the best in NAPSt′−1 (i1). If the inspection succeeds, she accepts
the offer and the pair is matched. If the inspection fails, i1 rejects the offer and j makes a second offer
to its second best agent i2 in NAPSt′−1 (j). i2 then acts according to the same rules as did i1. j stops only
when its offer is accepted, or when it does not hear back from the agent, or when j reaches the end of
its consideration set. Then we update the consideration set of j by removing all agents who rejected its
offer and call it NAPSt′ (j). Also update J APSt′ by removing all opportunities who are matched and all
opportunities with an empty consideration set.
[Phase 2.] Each agent i ∈ IAPSt′−1 finds her best opportunity j1 ∈ Jt′ in her consideration set NAPSt′−1 (i)
and inspects j1 if she received an offer from it. If the inspection succeeds, the pair is matched. If the
inspection fails, i goes to her second best opportunity j2 ∈ J APSt′ in NAPSt′−1 (i). i stops searching only when
she is matched, or when her next best opportunity in J APSt′ did not make her an offer. Then we update
the consideration set of i by removing all opportunities that failed the inspection and all opportunities
that are not in J APSt′ and call it NAPSt′ (i). Also update IAPSt′ by removing all agents who are matched and
all agents with an empty consideration set.
t′ ← t′ + 1
end while
Figure 1.5: The Accelerated Partner Search process. Preference/fitness rankings remain
unchanged throughout.
Lemma 1.2 (MP tracks APS). The MP algorithm tracks the accelerated partner search
(APS) process in the following sense. Conduct MP and APS on the same initial market
(I,J , E , (i, i ∈ I), (j , j ∈ J )) with latent inspection outcomes (εij , (i, j) ∈ E). Consider




j→i =A and I
(t′)
ij =1. Also i is waiting iff there exists some j ∈ N (i) such that
m̂
(t′)
j→i =W and I
(t′)
ij =1.
Next we establish a technical lemma that brings together PS and APS and states that
PS is fast. We add superscript PS to the consideration sets during the course of PS. Define
NAPSt (i) = ∅ (NPSt (i) = ∅) if i is matched or removed by t in APS (PS).
Lemma 1.3. For any sequence of times t = tN = ω(1), there is a sequence of times
t′ = t′N = ω(1) such that, if we conduct both PS and APS on the same initial market and
same latent inspection outcomes, then, w.h.p.,
∣∣{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) ⊆ NAPSt′ (i)}∣∣ ≥ N − o(N).
1.4.3 Density Evolution
Next we establish that we can calculate the marginal distribution of messages after any
rounds of MP on a marked GW tree T (α,K, p), and that the distribution is given by
Definition 1.3. To understand the evolution of MP on the marked GW tree (Definition 1.5),
we note that the messages i receives come from independent and identically distributed
subtrees. This is because, in the MP algorithm, the message i receives from j only depends
on the messages it previously received from its other neighbors N\{i}, and the messages
are iteratively updated. Similarly, the messages an opportunity j ∈ N (i) receives also
come from independent and identically distributed subtrees. Therefore, we can iteratively
compute the marginal distribution of messages at iteration 1, 2, ..., t from depth t, t−1, ..., 1
of the marked GW tree. This technique is called density evolution. The next lemma
formalizes this result.
Lemma 1.4. Conduct MP on a random marked GW tree T (α,K, p). Then the messages
the root agent node receives from neighboring opportunities at any t ≥ 1 are ex-ante i.i.d.
with the following distribution: A w.p. at, R w.p. rt, and W w.p. wt, where (at, rt, wt) are
as in Definition 1.3.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1.4, together with the observation that messages are
monotone in time (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1) is:
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Corollary 1.1. Consider wt and at as defined in Definition 1.3. Fix any (α,K, p). Then
wt is decreasing in t, at is increasing in t, and hence both limt→∞wt and limt→∞ at exist.
Also, the limit lim
t→∞
Kwtqt exists.
We have thus established the three key steps to prove Theorem 1.1. All proofs can be
found in Appendices A.1 and A.2. Next we give numerical evidence suggesting a phase
transition at α∗ ∈ (0,∞) and showing the monotonicities of λ(α,K, p) and A(K, p).
1.5 Numerics
We present numerical observations in this section. First of all, we are interested in the
size of the deadlock (the fraction of agents who get stuck) under various market primitives.
As Theorem 1.1 establishes, this is described by λ(α,K, p) in Definition 1.3, hence can be
computed easily using Matlab. Figure 1.6 presents the results.





































Figure 1.6: Deadlock size λ∗ under different primitives. In the left figure we fix the in-
spection success probability p = 0.3. In the right figure we fix the agents’ average degree
K = 3.
The left figure plots the size of the deadlock λ(α,K, p) over opportunity-to-agent ratio
α ∈ (0, 2] for different values of agents’ average degree K while fixing the inspection success
probability p = 0.3. It shows that the size of the deadlock is increasing in the agents’ average
degree K. This is because when agents’ consideration sets grow larger (when the size of
market is unchanged), it’s more likely to have congestion (multiple agents compete for the
same opportunity). The right figure plots λ(α,K, p) over α ∈ (0, 2] for different values of
p, while fixing K = 3. It shows that the size of the deadlock decreases in the inspection’s
success probability p. This is because compared with a failed inspection, a successful
inspection “peels” the market to a greater extent, and hence reduces market congestion
more. Also, both figures in Figure 1.6 show that the size of the deadlock decreases with the
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opportunity-to-agent ratio α. The results suggest a phase transition with a sharp threshold
α∗(K, p) between the information deadlock regime and the deadlock-free regime. Finally,
notice that the information deadlock regime is prevalent under various reasonable market
primitives. For example, consider a market where the number of agents equals the number
of opportunities. Each agent, on average, connects to three opportunities. In this case,
if each inspection has equal chance to succeed or fail, then w.h.p., more than 30% agents
will stuck in an information deadlock if they only wish to perform guaranteed inspections.
These agents still have options to go to but are unwilling to do so. This number gets even
worse if agents on average are connected to more opportunities, or if the inspection is more
likely to fail, or if there are less opportunities in the market.
1.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we investigate in which markets there is an information deadlock, where
a large number of agents wait for each other to acquire information first. We look into
random markets with three key primitives: the opportunity-to-agent ratio α, the agents’
average degree K, and an inspection’s success probability p. We also impose a behavioral
assumption on agents’ inspection decisions that only guaranteed inspections are performed.
An inspection becomes guaranteed when the pair both considers each other as their best
available option. We study the limit as the number of agents N goes to infinity, and give
specific characterization of the fraction of agents stuck in information deadlock. This char-
acterization is made possible via a technique called message passing. Numerical evidence
demonstrates a phase transition with a sharp threshold α∗(K, p) in the opportunity-to-agent
ratio as a function of the agents’ average degree K and an inspection’s success probability p,
that separates the information deadlock regime and the deadlock-free regime. In particular,
for larger values of α, a vanishing fraction of agents stuck in information deadlock, whereas
for smaller values of α, a strictly positive fraction remains stuck for a long time. We also
numerically show that the deadlock in the latter case (deadlock regime) will not be resolved
over time just by guaranteed inspections.
Note that our technique, in particular the MP algorithm, not only applies to characterize
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Figure 1.7: Fraction of agents in deadlock, singlehood, and matched in markets with
opportunity-to-agent ratio α = 1, inspection success probability p = 0.3, and varying
values of agent average degree K.
the size of information deadlock, but also other metrics that a platform operator would like
to track. For example, Figure 1.7 plots, in large markets with opportunity-to-agent ratio
α = 1, inspection success probability p and varying values of agent average degree K, the
fraction of agents stuck in information deadlock in the blue curve. The red curve plots
the fraction of agents who exhaust their consideration sets without finding a match, called
singlehood. The orange curve plots the fraction of the remaining agents, i.e., those who get
matched. We can observe a key trade-off in choosing the agent average degree K: larger K
induces more competition and hence intensifies information deadlock (as in the blue curve),
whereas smaller K, by limiting the size of agents’ consideration sets, also limits the available
options agents have, hence increases singlehood (as in the red curve). In order to promote
better matching outcome in the market, the platform operator should choose a moderate
level of K that balances the two types of market inefficiencies.
Before closing, we want to make another interesting observation. Take any agent node
from the initial market and consider what happens after t′ rounds of APS. We can identify
a directed path that starts from i, where each node j on the path points to its (her) favorite
one in current consideration set NAPSt′ (j). If j prefers the one pointing to j, then this path
reaches its end at j. Clearly, if this path ends up in a cycle, then the starting node i will
wait indefinitely. We can examine this directed path in the limiting network — the marked
GW tree. Through the lens of MP and DE, we are able to characterize that after t′ rounds
of APS, the continuation probability (i.e., the branching factor) of the directed path from
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one agent to the next agent (through one opportunity between them) is wt′/wt′−1. This
ratio is found to be bounded away from 1 in the deadlock-free regime, indicating that paths
remain small and then disappear as lim
t′→∞
wt′ → 0. On the other hand, in the information
deadlock regime, the ratio wt′/wt′−1 goes to 1, indicating that paths join each other and
become longer over time, hence causing the deadlock.
Our technology can only rigorously track PS up to time o(logN) but numerics indicate
that the deadlock (of the same limiting size) persists even if PS is run to convergence.
Proving this fact can be an interesting open problem. Another direction to pursue is to
obtain systematic market design insights using our characterization.
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Chapter 2
Managing Churn via Service Mode Control
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a stochastic control problem motivated by customer management
applications. When a service firm is repeatedly serving a customer whose churn risk relies
heavily on his recent experience, what service mode should the firm use? Specifically, if
there is a risky service mode that generates volatile outcome, should the firm prefer it less
or more than a safe service mode that always produces stable outcome, when the latter, in
the long run, is not sufficient to satisfy the customer. For example, an investment man-
ager that recommends an aggressive portfolio may quickly drive a customer away due to
recent market suffering, even if its expected return is high. On the other hand, a conserva-
tive portfolio, while being safe during market turbulence, is still not good enough for the
customer if he’s looking for more return. Similar tradeoff between a risky service mode
and a safe service mode is also prevalent in other subscription-based businesses such as
recommendation systems, where safe prescriptions over time may bore the customer, and
risky prescriptions are likely to surprise the customer in either good or bad way. Through
solving a stylized stochastic control problem, we show when should the firm deviate from
the myopically superior (in terms of expected immediate reward) service mode in order to
maximize customer lifetime value. In particular, the firm should most of the time use the
service mode that generates a higher expected return except for two situations. When the
customer is currently not at a flight risk but may soon become one following a few bad
experiences, the firm should be risk-averse and use the safe mode. Also, when the customer
is currently at a flight risk but may quickly not be one after a few good experiences, the
firm should be risk-seeking and use the risky mode to serve him.
Our model contains two agents, a service firm and a customer. Note that we assume a
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separation of the control at an individual level. This allows the firm to prescribe different
service strategies for different customers based on their churn probability. At each point in
time, the firm chooses a service mode: Risky or Safe. The Safe mode generates rewards at
a constant rate, while the Risky mode produces Brownian rewards with a drift that can be
either higher or lower than the Safe mode. We assume the rewards accrue to both the firm
and the customer according to some fixed proportion, so that both parties care about the
rewards. The firm is patient and rational and wants to maximize the long-term rewards
produced by its interaction with the customer. Meanwhile, the customer is assumed to be
subject to recency bias. More precisely, the customer’s happiness follows a goodwill model
that weighs recent experiences more heavily, which we model as an exponentially weighted
moving average of recent experiences (as in Nerlove and Arrow Nerlove and Arrow [1962]).
As a result, the customer’s happiness evolves according to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
with parameters determined by the service mode currently being used by the firm. The
customer departs stochastically, and has a hazard rate of leaving that is a function of his
happiness (throughout the text, we use male pronouns to refer to the customer). The
hazard rate is assumed to be a step function where the customer quits with positive hazard
rate if the happiness is below a given satisfaction threshold and with zero hazard rate if the
happiness is at or above the threshold1
The optimal policy we find (Theorem 2.1) is of one of two kinds: it is either the myopic
policy, which always chooses the superior mode (superior in terms of instantaneous reward
rate) regardless of customer happiness, or a sandwich policy that chooses the inferior mode
in an intermediate happiness interval and the superior mode elsewhere. The emergence of
the sandwich policy as the optimal one in a large part of the parameter space is interesting.
In particular, when the Safe service mode is myopically superior, the optimal policy is al-
ways of sandwich type, where the firm utilizes the Risky mode when the customer happiness
is slightly below the customer satisfaction threshold. This is in contrast with the customary
wisdom that a high volatility and low return option is dominated by a low volatility and
1In Appendix B we provide robustness checks regarding several model assumptions. In particular, in
Appendix B.2–B.5, we consider mixed strategies, geometric Brownian reward process, switching cost, and
alternative hazard rate functions, respectively. We show that our main insights are preserved.
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high return option. (We discuss this case further under “Technical contributions” below.)
When the Risky mode is superior, the optimal policy is either myopic (Risky always) or of
sandwich type, where the firm utilizes the Safe mode when the customer happiness is at or
slightly above the customer satisfaction threshold. The deviation from the myopic policy
is more substantial in cases where the alternative service mode has a similar instantaneous
reward rate, and in cases where the difference in riskiness is larger. Also, numerical inves-
tigations reveal a very substantial customer lifetime value (CLV) improvement compared
with a myopic policy that doesn’t internalize the service mode’s impact on the customer’s
probabilistic churn, in a large part of the parameter space. For example, we see CLV
increases of 100% or more in many cases (see Figure 2.5 in Section 2.4.2).
This chapter is novel in several ways. We are the first to study service mode control
using the framework of stochastic control. The benefit is obvious. We can capture the
customer’s happiness state evolution under recency bias by a well-understood Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. We can obtain closed-form solutions that offer clear structural insights2
regarding when should the firm be risk-seeking or risk-averse depending on the customer’s
happiness state. The optimal interval policy we obtain differs from previously studied
policies: we establish sandwich policies that are non-monotone. The stochastic control
problem we solve is also novel and challenging. To reduce algebraic hardness when solving
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, we purposely let the safe mode’s volatility be
zero, and choose the hazard rate function to be a step function with a discontinuous jump.
The cost of doing this is losing the C2 property of the value function, and invalidating
the usual sufficient conditions for the processes to be well-defined semimartingales. We
built upon a very recent advance in stochastic processes (Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins and
Spiliopoulos [2017]) to be able to modify and apply classic stochastic control methodologies
to our setting. Moreover, to solve algebra (while verifying optimality of the derived policy
by showing nonpositivity in Condition 4 of Proposition 2.2; see Section 2.5.1), we crucially
draw upon L’Hospital-type rules for monotonicity (Pinelis Pinelis [2006]) and Chernoff-
2We expect the optimal policy to be messier and challenging to interpret under alternate modelling
approaches where time, customer happiness and/or rewards are discretized, though the analysis may be
simpler.
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type bounds for the error function (Chang Chang et al. [2011]) to establish properties of
functions involving the error function (see Lemma 2.5 in Section 2.5.2). In general, our
analysis showcases a way to balance algebraic hardness with stochastic control tractability.
This method can potentially be applied to other stochastic control applications where the
verification step is too challenging.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses related literature. Section 2.3
sets up the model, with main results presented and discussed in Section 2.4. The key steps
to proving the main results, including the optimality conditions and the verification steps,
are in Section 2.5. Proofs of lemmas and propositions are in Section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
The most closely related paper to ours is Aflaki and Popescu Aflaki and Popescu [2014].
That paper studies a relationship between a service firm and a customer who might abandon
its service. The service firm aims to maximize the value it obtains from the relationship,
and its control is the service effort level at each point in time. Increasing the service level
is costly to the firm but increases the customer’s likelihood of staying in the system. As in
our method, they use a goodwill model to model happiness (they also study a habituation
model we do not consider). They find that an optimal effort policy leads to stationary effort
and happiness levels. The two key differences between our model and theirs is that our
model is stochastic (happiness is a deterministic function of effort in Aflaki and Popescu)
and that our control is the firm’s service mode rather than its effort level. That is, the
firm cannot simply increase its effort when the customer is unhappy, but it can choose to
increase/decrease the risk level of its service.
Goodwill models were first introduced in a seminal paper by Nerlove and Arrow Nerlove
and Arrow [1962]. That paper aimed to study the dynamic impact of advertising on de-
mand. Nerlove and Arrow’s goodwill model had two important properties: it captured the
fact that advertising has persistent effect on demand but that, at the same time, the effect
of advertising disappears exponentially fast. We make the same assumption regarding how
consumer happiness responds to past quality of service. Goodwill models have been vali-
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dated empirically (Zeithaml Zeithaml [2000]) and have the support of celebrated behavioral
economics experiments that show that individuals overweigh recent experiences (Kahneman
et al. Kahneman et al. [1997]). Goodwill models (and their variants) have been used in
operations and marketing to model how customers respond to past fill rates (Gaur and Park
Gaur and Park [2007], Adelman and Mersereau Adelman and Mersereau [2013], Liu and
van Ryzin Liu and van Ryzin [2011]), how customers recall service experiences (Ho et. al.
Ho et al. [2006], Das Gupta et al. Das Gupta et al. [2015]), and how customers learn about
prices (Ovchinnikov and Milner Ovchinnikov and Milner [2012]).
In terms of methodology, we build on techniques from the stochastic control literature.
We assume that consumer happiness is a continuous-time stochastic process that is affected
by the firm’s choice of service mode at each point in time. This is a departure from the
discrete time modeling of Aflaki and Popescu Aflaki and Popescu [2014]. Moving from
discrete time to continuous time increases the technical complexity of this chapter, but
it improves it in that it allows us to obtain crisper theorems. To solve our stochastic
control model, we use a “smooth pasting” technique that matches the value function and
its derivatives at happiness values where the optimal service mode changes. To prove the
optimality of the policy we obtain, we use the verification technique that is typical of the
stochastic control literature (Borkar Borkar [1989], Mirică Mirică [1992], Radner and Shepp
Radner and Shepp [1996], Touzi Touzi [2002], and Ata et al. Ata et al. [2005]). We also
build on ideas and results from recent papers on stochastic calculus, such Strulovici and
Szydlowski Strulovici and Szydlowski [2015]’s sufficient conditions for a value function to
be twice continuously differentiable (which our models do not quite satisfy because the
Safe service mode has zero volatility), and Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos
[2017]’s characterization of Markov processes with spatial delays.
A concurrent work by Johari and Schmit Johari and Schmit [2018] studies the problem
of learning about a customer who may abandon. A customer leaves the first time the firm
does not meet her expectations, and the firm tries to balance the risk of customer departure
with rewards earned. The focus of the paper, including the model and results, are quite
different from the present chapter.
Our chapter assumes the firm has full information about the customer’s happiness state
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and his churn propensity. In the marketing literature, latent customer relationship dynamics
can be approximated using hidden Markov models (see Netzer et al. Netzer et al. [2008]and
Ascarza et al. Ascarza et al. [2018]). The firm can then optimize decisions by solving a
partially observable Markov decision process (see Montoya et al. Montoya et al. [2010]).
estimate model parameters and customer happiness in our setting.
It is worthwhile to contrast our results with Radner and Shepp Radner and Shepp [1996],
a paper that uses somewhat similar mathematics to study optimal dividend control given
bankruptcy risk. Radner and Shepp find that firms should use increasingly risky policies
(with increasing reward rate) the more cash they have on hand. In contrast, we find that
the optimal policy in many cases is a sandwich policy where risk-taking is a non-monotonic
function of the state. A key driver of this difference is that unsatisfied customers in our
model quit according to a hazard rate while, in Radner and Shepp, a firm without cash
goes bankrupt immediately. Based on our findings, we believe that if Radner and Shepp
[1996] allowed bankruptcy to happen according to some hazard rate when cash drops to
zero and below, their optimal policy would exhibit a similar risk-seeking behavior below
the bankruptcy threshold.
Atar and Lev-Ari Atar and Lev-Ari [2018] study a scheduling control problem for mul-
ticlass single server queue with abandonment. They identify an asymptotically optimal
workload-dependent dynamic index rule. The HJB equation in the heavy traffic limit is
similar to ours, but with two important distinctions. In Atar and Lev-Ari [2018], the coeffi-
cient of the value function’s second derivative, i.e., the volatility term, is a constant. In our
chapter, the volatility depends on the control being employed. Also, the coefficient of the
value function in Atar and Lev-Ari [2018] is a constant, whereas in our chapter this term is a
discontinuous function of the state. As a result, unlike in Atar and Lev-Ari [2018], classical
solutions (C2) to our HJB equation do not exist. We employ recent advances in stochastic
processes Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017] and L’Hospital-type rules for monotonicity Pinelis
[2006] to establish our verification method. The optimal policy we find has a very different
structure from the interval policy found to be optimal in Atar and Lev-Ari [2018]. The
intervals established in our case is not monotone: in some situations, the firm chooses the
same service mode for both high and low states, separated by an intermediate range where
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the firm chooses the complementary service mode.
2.3 The Model
We study a continuous-time model of one firm repeatedly interacting with one customer.
The firm has two alternative service modes, a Risky mode R and a Safe mode S. At any
given time t ≥ 0, the firm chooses service mode ut ∈ {R,S} which determines the drift µut
and volatility σut of the reward process. The firm is able to switch between two service
modes over time. The reward Yt accrues according to the following stochastic differential
equation:
dYt = µutdt+ σutdBt, (2.1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F, P ) with
F = (Ft)t≥0 and Y0 = 0. We are interested in cases where the expected rewards are positive.
Therefore, we assume µR > 0 and µS > 0. We call the service mode with higher drift the
(myopically) superior mode. Namely, the Risky mode is the superior mode if µR > µS and
the Safe mode is the superior mode if3 µR < µS . Likewise, we call the service mode with
lower drift the (myopically) inferior mode. We assume the Safe mode has no volatility, i.e.,
σS = 0.
We think of the rewards as accruing to both the customer and the firm, in the sense that
both players seek higher rewards. The firm is rational and aims to maximize the total reward
generated from its interaction with the customer over time. We give a precise description
of the firm’s objective in Eq. (2.8) below. The customer, meanwhile, is assumed to be
unsophisticated in the sense that he adaptively learns from past experience but is subject
to recency bias (as in a goodwill model, à la Nerlove and Arrow Nerlove and Arrow [1962]
and Aflaki and Popescu Aflaki and Popescu [2014]). We describe the customer at each
point in time via Ht, a one-dimensional state that we term happiness. To model recency
bias, we model customer happiness as an exponentially weighted moving average of recent
3If µR = µS , both service modes classify as superior. Section 2.4 provides discussion for this boundary
case.
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rewards. That is, the customer happiness follows a stochastic differential equation:
dHt = dYt −Htdt, (2.2)
where H0 = x is the initial customer happiness. This implies that the customer happiness
at time t is equal to




Thus, customer happiness would follow an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (O-U) process if the firm
were to select the same service mode over the entire time horizon (for the Safe mode,
the O-U process is degenerate, since σS = 0). The value Ht can be interpreted as the
customer’s unsophisticated prediction at time t of the reward rate he expects to get in the
future, and Eq. (2.2) captures that the customer iteratively modifies this happiness by the
difference between the realized reward dYt and the predicted reward Htdt. There is no
private information in our model, so the firm is able to observe the history of customer
happiness and rewards. Note that Ft contains all information of the reward process Yt and
the happiness process Ht up to time t, since (ut)t≥0 and (Bt)t≥0 are both adapted to F.
The firm cares about customer happiness because the customer is likely to quit the
system if he is unhappy. We model customer abandonment via a hazard rate function Q(·)
which acts on the current happiness:
Q(Ht) , 1{Ht < q}, (2.4)
where q is the customer’s satisfaction threshold (or happiness threshold) such that the
customer does not quit the system when his happiness is above or equal to it. The customer
is called satisfied when his happiness is above q, borderline satisfied at q, and unsatisfied
below q. The literature on managing customer churn has considered different hazard rate
functions, such as logit functions (Rust et. al. Rust et al. [2004]) and exponential functions
(Berger and Nasr Berger and Nasr [1998]). The step function in Eq. (2.4) can be thought
of as the limit of logit functions and is chosen for the sake of tractability.
We denote the customer lifetime by T . The hazard rate assumption implies that the
customer survival probability St at time t is equal to




More formally, we let z be a uniform random variable over [0, 1] independent of4 F and let
the lifetime T be defined as
T , inf
{
t ≥ 0 : e−
∫ t





0 Q(Hs)ds is a Lebesgue integral that measures the amount of time up to t that the
customer happiness process has spent in the unsatisfied zone.
Throughout this chapter, we make the following assumptions on the model primitives.
Assumption 2.1. 1. The Safe mode’s volatility is zero, i.e., σS = 0.
2. The happiness threshold q is greater than the Safe mode’s drift µS, i.e., q > µS.
Assumption 2.1.1 is made for technical convenience when solving for the optimal value
function (see Proposition 2.3 in Section 2.5.3 and its proof in Section 2.6). Assumption
2.1.2 ensures that the customer lifetime is finite5.
We now formally describe the firm’s problem. We are interested in policies that only
depend on past history.
Definition 2.1 (Admissible policy). A policy π, which defines a mapping from Ft to the
action space {R,S} for all t ≤ T , is admissible if the firm’s action process (ut)t≥0 (by
following this policy) is adapted to the filtration F, takes value in {R,S}, and is such that
the stochastic process (Ht)t≥0 is an F-adapted semimartingale specified uniquely in law.6
We denote the space of admissible policies by Π. For a given starting happiness x
and a given admissible policy π ∈ Π, the happiness process (Hx,πt )t≥0 is uniquely specified
in law by Eqs. (2.2) and (2.1). Similarly, for a given initial happiness x and a given
4Formally, from here on we consider the product probability space (Ω,F ,F, P )⊗ ([0, 1],B, U), where B
is the σ-algebra of Borel sets of [0, 1], U denotes the uniform probability measure on [0, 1], and z ∈ [0, 1] is
the “state of the world” in the second component probability space.
5Proposition 2.1 in Section 2.4 formalizes that the expected lifetime is finite under a big class of admissible
policies. Also in Theorem 2.1 (in Section 2.4) we establish that there exists an optimal policy in that big
admissible policy class. This also means that no other admissible policy can produce a larger customer
lifetime value. Therefore the expected lifetime value as well as the expected lifetime must be finite for any
admissible policy.
6Note that the happiness process (Ht)t≥0 uniquely determines the reward process (Yt)t≥0 and survival
probability (St)t≥0, as per Yt = Ht −H0 +
∫ t
0





admissible policy π ∈ Π, the abandonment time T x,π is a properly defined random variable,
as specified by Eq. (2.6). When clear from context, we suppress the superscript and denote
these quantities simply by Yt, Ht, St, and T . The firm’s objective is to maximize the
customer lifetime value (CLV) it earns from interacting with the customer. For a given
starting happiness value x and policy π, the CLV is equal to







∣∣∣ H0 = x]
(2.7)
where we used (2.1). The firm wants to find a policy that maximizes the CLV. The optimal
CLV given a starting happiness value x is given by
V ∗(x) = sup
π∈Π
V (x, π) . (2.8)
This completes our definition of the firm’s problem. (Note that in our definition of admis-
sible policies, the policy does not have access to z, and hence does not know whether or
not the customer has already left. This assumption clearly has no impact on the CLV since
rewards stop accruing after T , and is made for technical convenience.)
We say a policy is stationary Markov if it is a time-invariant mapping from the current
happiness state to the service mode π : R → {R,S}. Given that the platform is facing
a stationary Markov control problem, one would expect there to be a stationary Markov
optimal control policy, and indeed in Section 2.3 we will formally establish that this is the
case. Note that under a stationary Markov policy π, we can write ut = π(Ht), and the CLV
in Eq. (2.7) can be restated7 as







∣∣∣H0 = x] . (2.9)
Observe from Eq. (2.9) that the expectation is with respect to the probability space
(Ω,F ,F, P ) only, and the customer lifetime T does not play any role here.
7The second integral in Eq. (2.7) has zero expectation since the integrand is bounded. By
the Dominated Convergence Theorem and then the tower property, we can write V (x, π) as




















µπ(Hs)P (1{s < T} | Fs)ds









∣∣∣ H0 = x]. The last
step follows from Eq. (2.5).
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Formal specification of our stochastic processes. Our setting presents some atypical
technical features as a result of our assumption that the volatility under the Safe mode σS
is zero. However, we are able to formally specify the stochastic processes for reward and
happiness resulting from a broad set of control policies by drawing on the work of Salins
and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017] on Markov processes with spatial delay. In
Lemma 2.1 below we establish admissibility for this set of control policies, which we call
interval policies. First we give the definition of interval policies.
Definition 2.2 (Interval policy). A policy π is an interval policy if it is stationary Markov
(that is, the corresponding action process is a function of current happiness ut = π(Ht))
such that it divides the happiness real line into a countable number of alternating Risky
and Safe intervals, and such that the Safe mode is adopted at each boundary point between
intervals.
Recall the definition of admissible policies earlier in this section. The firm’s action
process under an interval policy as defined in Definition 2.2 is clearly adapted to the filtration
F and takes value in {R,S}. If we can show the corresponding happiness process is an F-
adapted semimartingale specified uniquely in law, we can conclude an interval policy is
admissible. The next lemma formally establishes this result, and further deduces that we
can apply the Itô-Tanaka formula to the happiness process (Ht)t≥0 under an interval policy.
Lemma 2.1. If π is an interval policy, then for any starting happiness x, the process
Hx,πt defined by Eq. (2.2) is an F-adapted semimartingale specified uniquely in law. Hence
interval policies are admissible. Let (ut)t≥0 be the corresponding action process. Assume f
is a function that is continuously differentiable on R and twice continuously differentiable
on R \ E for some countable set E. Then f(Ht) is also an F-adapted semimartingale, with8















8We define f ′′(Hs)1{Hs /∈ E} to be zero if Ht ∈ E .
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In fact, the Itô-Tanaka formula Eq. (2.10) holds for the happiness process under any
admissible policy, since by definition of admissibility Ht is a semimartingale.
The next proposition establishes that under interval policies, the expected customer
lifetime and the expected customer lifetime value (CLV) are both finite.9
Proposition 2.1. For any x ∈ R and any interval policy π with a finite number of intervals,
both the customer lifetime and the CLV are finite, i.e., E[T x,π] <∞ and V (x, π) <∞.
Recall our assumption that µS < q. To prove Proposition 2.1, we only need to show
that the happiness process eventually will spend enough time in the unsatisfied zone (below
q), where the customer churns at hazard rate 1. Intuitively speaking, this is true since
the happiness process Ht drifts toward µS < q deterministically under the Safe mode, and
moves stochastically over the entire real line under the Risky mode. The proof is formalized
in Section 2.6.1.
Discussion of model assumptions. We briefly discuss specific assumptions in our
model. Our model assumes that customer happiness is an exponentially weighted mov-
ing average of recent rewards with the window size parameter w = 1; that is, rewards from
∆t time ago are given a weight (1/w) exp(−∆t/w) for w = 1 in determining happiness. If
instead a customer uses an exponentially weighted moving average with arbitrary window
size w ∈ (0,∞), then we can rescale time to ensure that Eq. (2.2) still holds, so our assump-
tion w = 1 is without loss of generality. However, having fixed the scaling of time thus,
we notice that Eq. (2.4) represents a specific assumption that the height of the step in the
hazard rate function is 1. This assumption enables us to obtain analytical results for our
stochastic control problem, but numerical results demonstrate that our structural insights
hold for other step height values as well (see Appendix Section B.5). Also note that we
apply a separate treatment for each customer in this chapter. This allows us to personalize
service mode control based on the customer’s latent characteristics such as his satisfaction
threshold, his recency bias window, and his hazard rate of churn as a function of his happi-
9In fact, if any stationary Markov policy (not necessarily an interval policy) is admissible, the associated
CLV is finite. This follows from our main result (Theorem 2.1 below) which says that an interval policy is
optimal, since we do not restrict admissible policies to be interval policies.
37
ness state. This decoupling of the problem implicitly assumes that no capacity constraints
are present, and that customers are not taking each other’s experiences as inputs for their
own behavior.
2.4 Analysis of the Model
In this section, we solve the firm’s optimization problem posed in Eq. (2.8) and describe
the structure of an optimal policy. We find that there is an optimal policy that achieves
the optimal CLV that is a simple interval policy. In particular, the optimal policy will be
an interval policy that consists of at most three intervals.
In Section 2.4.1, we present the structure of an optimal policy. In Section 2.4.2, we state
some formal comparative statics results and use numerics to understand both the structure
of the optimal policy (including comparative statics) as well as the CLV increase from the
optimal policy relative to the myopic policy. We find that the benefit can be very large.
2.4.1 Structure of an Optimal Policy
In our main theorem of this section, we prove that there exists an optimal policy where
the firm should always use the myopically superior service mode except (possibly) for some
intermediate customer happiness levels. In fact, we show that regardless of which service
mode is the superior one, the firm should choose the Safe service mode if the customer
happiness level is in some region (possibly empty) [q, θb] just above the happiness threshold
q, and choose the Risky service mode if the customer happiness level is in some nonempty
region (θG, q) just below q (see Figure 2.1 for a stylized representation), where θb and θG
are functions of the model primitives µR, µS , σR and q. The values θb and θG are defined
in Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 below (proofs in Section 2.6). We name the happiness region
[q, θb] where the firm should always use the Safe mode the risk-averse region. Likewise, we
name (θG, q) where the firm should always use the Risky mode the risk-seeking region. We






Risky mode Safe modeSuperior mode Superior mode
Happiness value𝑞𝜃𝐺 𝜃𝑏
Figure 2.1: Stylized representation of the firm’s optimal policy as per Theorem 2.1.

















+ µS = 0.
Then, the set Θ ∩ (µS ,∞) contains a single element, which we label θb.
From Lemma 2.2, note that the risk-averse region [q, θb] is bounded only if the Risky
mode is superior µR > µS . Moreover, in a subset of cases where it is bounded, the risk-
averse region is in fact empty; this occurs if θb < q.
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)
contains exactly one element,
which we label θG.
Observe from Lemma 2.3 that the risk-seeking region (θG, q) is always nonempty. It
is bounded only when the Safe mode is the superior mode µS > µR. In fact, for any
drift values such that µS < q and µR 6= µS , exactly one of the two regions [q, θb] and
(θG, q) is bounded, while the other is unbounded. The bounded region corresponds to the
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intermediate happiness level where the firm should use the inferior mode. Everywhere else
(including the other, unbounded region) the firm should use the myopically superior service
mode. In the special case of µR = µS , both the risk-averse region and the risk-seeking
region are unbounded, and they partition the entire happiness real line. We postpone a
description of how we arrive at the above θb and θG until just before Section 2.4.2.
Safe mode Risky mode
𝑞 𝜃$
Risky mode
Happiness value𝜃# = −∞
Figure 2.2: Optimal policy when µR > µS .
Risky mode Safe modeSafe mode
𝑞𝜃# 𝜃$ = ∞ Happiness value
Figure 2.3: Optimal policy when µR < µS .
We are now ready to formally state our first theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Fix µR, µS, σR and satisfaction threshold q (recall Eq. (2.4)) such that
µS < q. Consider the firm’s problem as presented in Eq. (2.8). Let θb be as defined in
Lemma 2.2 and let θG be as defined in Lemma 2.3. Then there is an optimal policy where
the firm chooses the Safe mode on [q, θb], the Risky mode on (θG, q), and the superior of the
two modes elsewhere.10 Also, the customer’s expected lifetime and the CLV are finite under
the optimal policy (hence the CLV is finite under any admissible policy).
In the optimal policy described in Theorem 2.1, the firm chooses the Safe mode on
[q, θb], the Risky mode on (θG, q), and the superior mode elsewhere (see Figure 2.1). Now
let us take a closer look at this policy under different cases of µR and µS . When the Risky
service mode is the superior one (µR > µS), the optimal policy uses the Risky mode for
all happiness values below q. Moreover, depending on the value of θb (see Lemma 2.2),
the risk-averse region [q, θb] might degenerate to an empty set. This happens if θb < q, in
10Note that if µR = µS then θG = −∞ and θb = +∞, so the specified policy uses Risky on (−∞, q) and
Safe on [q,∞). In µR 6= µS then there is a unique superior mode. Hence the policy is uniquely specified in
all cases.
40
which case the optimal policy becomes a myopic one where the firm always uses the Risky
service mode (see Figure 2.2). On the other hand when θb ≥ q, the risk-averse region [q, θb]
is nonempty and bounded, and the optimal policy is a sandwich policy, i.e., an interval
policy with three exactly intervals, where the firm uses the Safe mode for happiness values
in [q, θb] just above the happiness threshold (see Figure 2.2), and the Risky mode elsewhere.
In the other case where the Safe mode is the superior one (µR < µS), the optimal policy
uses the Safe mode for all happiness values (weakly) above q. Meanwhile, the risk-seeking
region (θG, q) is always nonempty and bounded (see Lemma 2.3). Therefore in this case the
firm’s optimal policy is always a sandwich policy (see Figure 2.3), where the Safe mode is
used everywhere except for happiness levels in (θG, q) just below the happiness threshold.
When customer happiness value is in this region, the firm should switch to the Risky service
mode.
In the special case of µR = µS , we have θb = ∞ and θG = −∞. In this case both the
Risky mode and the Safe mode are superior, and the optimal policy becomes a particular
myopic one, where the firm uses the Risky mode for happiness values on (−∞, q) and the
Safe mode on [q,∞].
Establishing the optimal control is essentially equivalent to determining the value func-
tion V ∗ (see Eq. (2.8)). A classical technique for determining a continuous-time, continuous-
space value function V ∗ such as ours is called the verification technique, which involves first
obtaining a candidate value function and subsequently proving its optimality. There are
many papers in the literature that use the verification technique for solving stochastic
control problems, including Borkar (1989), Mirică (1992), Radner and Shepp (1996), and
Touzi (2002). We cannot immediately use a method from the literature for two reasons.
First, our problem involves stochastic abandonment rather than deterministic discounting.
Second, as will become clear, the value function V ∗ in our problem does not satisfy the
standard smoothness condition, which is that V ∗ should be twice continuously differen-
tiable everywhere. We modify the standard approach from the literature in order to create
a methodology that works for our problem. More details are provided in Section 2.5.
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Trade off between immediate payoffs and customer lifetime. Observe that except
for the possible optimal myopic policy when µR > µS , in all other cases, the firm’s optimal
policy exhibits a risk-averse region just above the happiness threshold. In this region, the
firm should use the Safe mode even if it generates lower immediate rewards. Consider
the optimal sandwich policy for µR > µS . When x ∈ (q, θb), the firm uses the inferior
service mode. If the optimal policy is sacrificing rewards in the short run, it must be that
it confers some long-term benefits. The intuition is that when the happiness level is close
to the unsatisfied zone, the Safe mode prolongs customer lifetime by delaying entry into
the unsatisfied zone, compared with the Risky mode. When the volatility σR is high, the
mean first passage time into the unsatisfied zone from above will be longer under the Safe
mode than under the Risky mode. Therefore, using the Safe mode in the risk-averse region
just above q serves to delay the inevitable — entry into the unsatisfied zone — when the
volatility of the Risky mode is high.11 A preference for low volatility in relatively low states
is familiar from other settings, for example Radner and Shepp Radner and Shepp [1996].
Perhaps more unexpected is the existence of a risk-seeking region. In particular, sur-
prisingly, no matter by how much the Risky mode is inferior to the Safe mode, there is some
happiness region below the happiness threshold q in which the firm should use the Risky
mode. This challenges the customary idea that a high volatility and low return combination
should be dominated by a low volatility and high return one. In fact, it turns out that the
Risky mode outperforms the Safe mode in that region via its ability to push the customer
out of the unsatisfied zone (with positive probability) when his happiness is below but close
to the threshold q, thereby extending his lifetime. We highlight that the risk-seeking region
is always non-empty, regardless of model primitives.
An immediate consequence of the sandwich policy featuring both a risk-averse region just
above the happiness threshold and a risk-seeking region just below it is that, surprisingly,
once it enters the unsatisfied zone, the customer happiness will never again reemerge above
the happiness threshold q (see Figure 2.4). Recall that by assumption, µS < q, so that
switching to the Safe mode when the happiness process hits q from below leads to negative
11In Theorem 2.2 later, we show that θb is increasing in σR, holding other primitives fixed.
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drift dHt/dt = µS − q, and so the happiness process immediately drops back into the
unsatisfied zone. This might seem counterintuitive. After all, we want the customer to
stay satisfied with the firm, to prolong his lifetime. However, the optimal (sandwich) policy
seems to advise us to keep his happiness low and prevent him from being satisfied. How
can such a policy maximize customer lifetime value? Remember that the myopic policy
always produces the maximum payoff rate. Therefore we can deduce that the reason for a
non-myopic policy to be optimal must be that the customer lives longer under this policy.
In other words, the customer spends more time in the satisfied zone under this policy.
Counterintuitively, the optimal sandwich policy indeed increases the customer’s time spent
in the satisfied zone even after he enters the unsatisfied zone. This occurs because it causes
the customer happiness to spend a positive measure of time exactly at the borderline satisfied
level of q.
Time spent at the boundary
Figure 2.4: Sample path of the happiness process under the optimal sandwich policy: µS =
8, µR = 9, σR = 10, q = 10. Here, the risk-averse region where the optimal sandwich policy
uses the Safe mode is [10, 22.1].
Comparison to a reflected Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Again consider the case
µR > µS . As in Section 2.3, let us consider the happiness process as an infinite horizon
stochastic process. That is, let us ignore the customer abandonment at time T x,π and
continue to track the evolution of Hx,πt under policy π. Assume that the optimal policy is
a sandwich policy and consider a starting happiness level x ≤ q, so that the happiness level
never exceeds q for any time t. At first sight, the happiness process appears to be the well-
understood reflected O-U process reflected from above at q (Reed et al. Reed et al. [2013]).
However, this is not the case. The reflected O-U process and the reflected Brownian motion
43
both spend a measure zero of time at the reflecting boundary. In our process, the time
spent at the reflecting boundary has a positive measure with probability one. While this
process is less well known, such a delayed reflected process was first introduced by Skorokhod
Skorokhod [1961] and was recently shown to be a semimartingale by Salins and Spiliopoulos
Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017]. The measure of time spent by a delayed reflected process at
a reflection boundary is proportional to the local time of the process at the boundary, and
the constant of proportionality is the inverse of the drift at the boundary. In our setting,
the drift is −(q − µS) under the Safe mode at the threshold happiness q. The standard
reflected O-U process corresponds to a negative infinity drift at the reflecting boundary.
The switching thresholds of the sandwich policy. We now turn our attention to the
values of θb and θG, as defined in Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3. We provide here a very informal
argument to explain how these values arise. We present the key ideas used to build a formal
proof in Section 2.5, with the details of the argument deferred to Section 2.6.
Suppose µR > µS . The value of θb can be established informally by comparing the
value functions of two stationary Markov policies which make different decisions only on a
tiny interval of happiness values. Intuitively, the optimal policy should choose the Risky
mode for a sufficiently high levels of happiness, given that the Risky mode is myopically
superior. We want to find the happiness level θb > q below which the firm should switch
to the Safe mode. Let x be some starting happiness level and let ∆x be some value such
that x−∆x ≥ q. Consider two stationary policies, πS and πR, that both choose the Risky
mode above x and make identical decisions for values of happiness below x −∆x (for our
argument, it does not matter what decisions the policies make below x −∆x; we are only
concerned with the expected reward accumulated in the period it takes for the happiness
to drop from x to x−∆x). Within the interval [x−∆x, x], the two policies choose different
modes, with πS choosing the Safe mode and πR choosing the Risky mode.
We now compare across the policies π ∈ {πS , πR}, the incremental value V (x, π)−V (x−
∆x, π) the policy π generates from happiness being x rather than x −∆x, which is equal
to the reward (per unit ∆x) accumulated by the policy while the happiness falls from x to
x − ∆x. This is fairly easy to compute: it is simply the product of the expected reward
44
rate and the expected first passage time of an O-U process from x to x − ∆x. Note that
the happiness reaches x−∆x in finite time with probability 1, and the customer does not
depart before this occurs. Define the marginal value of happiness as
m(x, π) , lim
∆x→0
V (x, π)− V (x−∆x, π)
∆x
.
If there exists a level of happiness x ≥ q such that m(x, πS) ≥ m(x, πR), then at happiness
x, the firm weakly prefers the Safe action, assuming it uses the Risky action above it. In
fact, θb can be determined by finding x such that the marginal benefits of these two policies
are equal; that is
m(θb, πS) = m(θb, πR).
Lemma 2.2 encodes this condition in terms of model primitives and tells us that it uniquely
specifies θb.
Similarly, to derive the value of θG, the conditions in Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12) come from
guessing a sandwich policy that uses the Risky mode in (θG, q) and the Safe mode elsewhere
and equating the marginal value of happiness (i.e., the slope of the value function) just to
the left and right of θG. As evidenced by the complexity of the definition of θG, matching
marginal values in the unsatisfied zone is a harder task here than in the satisfied zone.
The extra difficulty arises from having to account for the customer abandonment risk while
computing first passage times.
2.4.2 Comparative Statics and Numerics
In the previous section, we constructed an optimal policy that is either the myopic policy
(superior mode everywhere) or a sandwich policy (superior mode everywhere except for
some intermediate happiness range). In this section, we explore how the optimal policy
and the optimal CLV depend on model primitives. There are two findings we highlight in
this section: (1) the improvement in CLV under the optimal policy compared to the CLV
under the myopic policy can be very large; (2) an increase in volatility of the Risky mode
substantially increases the CLV in some cases.
We first look at some numerical examples regarding CLVs under the optimal policy
versus under the myopic policy. Theorem 2.1 tells us that the myopic policy is not always
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optimal. Figure 2.5 below shows how much improvement in CLV the optimal policy provides
over the myopic policy for µR = 5, q = 6, initial happiness q (as an example), and for
different µS and σR. The figure shows that the magnitude of improvement can be very
large, especially when the Safe mode is the superior mode. Also, as the Risky mode’s
volatility increases, the improvement in CLV gets larger.
It is interesting to investigate how the optimal policy varies with problem primitives.
Figure 2.6 below shows that both the risk-seeking region described by value θG, and the risk-
averse region by value θb vary monotonically in µS , holding µR, σR and q fixed. In the plot,
the horizontal coordinate is the Safe mode’s drift µS (a problem primitive), and the vertical
coordinate is the customer’s current happiness value (the “state” of the customer). For each
µS (a fixed location on the horizontal axis), Theorem 2.1 gives us the optimal policy. The
shading in the figure is used to represent when the firm should use the Risky mode under
the optimal policy. Therefore, the boundaries between the shaded and unshaded areas are
the switching thresholds between the two service modes. The top right unshaded block with
a left-pointing tail corresponds to the risk-averse region in the optimal policy. The bottom
left shaded block with a right-pointing tail corresponds to the risk-seeking region in the
optimal policy. The plot shows that when µS increases, the size of the risk-averse region
increases and the size of the risk-seeking region decreases. We further show the impact of
σR on the size of the sandwich in Figure 2.6. It is not surprising that as σR increases, both
the risk-averse region and the risk-seeking region get larger. This is because the firm wants
to avoid volatility in the risk-averse region and seek it in the risk-seeking region.
We formalize our monotonicity results in the next theorem. To prove these results, we
naturally investigate the corresponding derivatives (for example, dθbdµS can be computed from
the definition of θb in Lemma 2.2), and draw upon L’Hospital-type rules for monotonicity
Pinelis [2006] (see Lemma 2.5, which is applied throughout the proof of Theorem 2.2). The
proof is in Section 2.6.
Theorem 2.2. Denote by V ∗ the optimal value function. Consider θb and θG defined in
Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. Then if the Risky mode is superior, i.e., µR > µS,























Figure 2.5: The ratio of CLV under the op-
timal policy to CLV under the myopic pol-
icy (on a logarithmic scale) versus µS , for
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Safe mode's drift μS








Figure 2.6: The optimal sandwich policies for
different model primitives. Fix µR = 5, q = 6.
The horizontal axis corresponds to the value
of µS , and the vertical line marks the happi-
ness value. The two curves are the switching
boundaries between the Risky mode and Safe
mode.
2. the value θb is strictly decreasing in µR, and for any x ∈ R, V ∗ is increasing in µR;




On the other hand, when the Safe mode is superior, i.e., µS > µR,
4. the value θG is decreasing in σR.
Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 2.2 show that a higher mean reward rate makes the corre-
sponding service mode more attractive (so the risk-averse region, where the Safe mode is
used, is larger if µS is larger, and smaller if µR is larger) and improves the overall CLV.
Part 3 and 4 show that the greater the volatility of the Risky mode, the larger the size of
both the risk-averse region and the risk-seeking region in the optimal sandwich policy. In
part 3 we also show that the marginal value of customer happiness in the satisfied zone is
lower when the Risky mode is more volatile. This is due to the fact that the mean first
passage time to the unsatisfied zone is smaller (or unchanged if x ∈ (q, θb)) when the Risky
mode is more volatile.
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2.5 Proof of Theorem 2.1
To start with, the HJB equation (formally derived in the proof of Proposition 2.2, see














for all x ∈ R where V ′′ exists. We cannot deduce that Eq. (2.13) has a twice continuously
differentiable solution, since Q(x) is discontinuous and the second order term can be zero.
In fact, the value function of this problem is never twice continuously differentiable at q. We
shall conclude, by the end of this section, that V ∗ is continuously differentiable everywhere
on R, and twice continuously differentiable everywhere on R \ E , with E containing the
switching boundaries and q. In this section, we first state a proposition containing the
optimality conditions for verifying the value function (see Proposition 2.2). In Section
2.5.2, we build a key lemma (Lemma 2.5) about properties of the error function erf(x) (see
the beginning of Section 2.4.1 for its definition) and its complement erfc(x) , 1 − erf(x).
This key lemma helps with constructing a candidate value function (see Proposition 2.3)
that satisfies the optimality conditions established in Proposition 2.2.
2.5.1 Optimality Conditions
The following proposition provides conditions for optimality.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose a function V̄ : R→ R satisfies
1. the function V̄ is non-negative;
2. the function V̄ is continuously differentiable on R and twice continuously differentiable
on R \ E for some countable set E;
3. the function V̄ ′ is bounded;
4. for any x ∈ R for i = S and for any x ∈ R \ E for i = R, the following inequality
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holds12




′′(x) + µi ≤ 0; (2.14)
5. for some interval policy π̄ (see Definition 2.2) such that π̄(y) = S for all y ∈ E, the
process V̄ (Hx,π̄t ) is an F-adapted semimartingale, and for all x ∈ R it holds that




′′(x) + µπ̄(x) = 0. (2.15)






∣∣Hx,π̄t ∣∣) e− ∫ t0 Q(Hx,π̄s )ds] = 0. (2.16)
Then, the function V̄ is the value function V ∗, and π̄ is an optimal policy.
The formal proof is in Section 2.6. We now provide a short summary of the proof of
Proposition 2.2. Conditions 1–4 imply that the function V̄ is an upper bound of the optimal
value function V ∗. This is established by constructing a stochastic process














u )dudY x,πs , (2.17)
and showing V̄ (x) ≥ lim supt→∞ EX
x,π
t ≥ V (x, π) for any admissible policy π ∈ Π. Note
that Condition 3 serves to ensure that the local martingale component of Xx,πt is a martin-
gale and hence has zero expectation. Conditions 5 and 6 further imply that the bound is
tight under the interval policy π̄, i.e., V̄ is the optimal value function and the optimal policy
is π̄. In particular, we use Condition 5 to show that V̄ (x) = lim supt→∞ EX
x,π̄
t . We then







s )ds = 0
and hence lim supt→∞ EX
x,π̄
t = V (x, π̄).
Proposition 2.2 tells us that if an interval policy π̄ together with a function V̄ satisfies
the stated conditions, then π̄ is optimal among the class of all admissible policies Π (not
just among interval policies), and V̄ = V ∗. With Proposition 2.2 in place, our task is to
find V̄ and π̄ satisfying conditions 1–6 there. The following lemma shows that Condition 6
is satisfied by any interval policy with a finite number of intervals. Note that the sandwich
policy is an interval policy with three intervals.
12For any x including x ∈ E , we define 1
2
σ2S V̄
′′(x) , 0 consistent with σS = 0.
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Lemma 2.4. For any starting happiness level x ∈ R and any interval policy with a finite












This lemma implies that the policy described in Theorem 2.1 satisfies Condition 6 in
Proposition 2.2.
2.5.2 Properties of the error function
To prove Lemmas 2.2 – 2.3 and to further solve for and verify the optimal value func-
tion require deep understanding of the error function erf(x) and its complement erfc(x).
Lemma 2.5 in this section establish the limit, sign, and monotonicity of complicated func-
tions involving erf(·) and erfc(·). To achieve this, we draw upon existing literature on the
Chernoff-type bound (see Chang et al. Chang et al. [2011]) and asymptotic expansion (see
Ren et al. Ren and MacKenzie [2007]) for the erfc(·) function, as well as “L’Hospital-type
rules for monotonicity” (see Pinelis Pinelis [2006]).




−t2dt and its complement erfc(x) ,
1− erf(x). They satisfy the following properties:
1. ex
2
erfc(x)(1 + 2x2)− 2x√
π
≥ 0 for any x ∈ R;
2. ex
2








erf(x) > − 1√
π
for all x ∈ R.
5. Fix α ∈ R. Let r(x) , (x+ α)ex2erfc(x). The following statements are true:
(i) If α > 0, r(x) is first increasing then decreasing on (−α,∞); and if α ≤ 0, r(x)
is increasing on (−α,∞).
(ii) Fix any 0 < β < 1. Then r(x) = β√
π
has a unique root (denote by x0) on
(−α,∞). Moreover, r(x) < β√
π
on (−α, x0), r(x) > β√π on (x0,∞).
(iii) If α = 0, then r(x) < 1√
π




erfc(x) is monotonically decreasing in x.









(1 + Cerf(x)) is non-decreasing in x, where C ∈ [−1, 1] is some constant.







is increasing in x.
















10. Consider q > 0 and θ < q. Then eq
2
q − eθ2θ − eθ2+q2θq
√
π (erfc(θ)− erfc(q)) ≥ 0.













12. Consider q > 0 and θ < q. Then θ(1+2q2)−eq2−θ2q(1+2q2)+2eq2q(1+q2)θ
√
π (erf(q)− erf(θ)) ≤
0.
13. Consider a > 0 and x ∈ (a− 1a , a). Then 2−2ax+2x
2+
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14. Consider a > 0 and x ∈ (a− 1a , a). Then 2−2ax+2x
2−
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15. Consider a > 0 and x ∈ (a− 1a , a). Then 2−2ax+2x
2+
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16. Consider a > 0, θ ∈ (a− 1a , a), and x ∈ (θ, a]. Then 2(a− x)
(




2−θ2 (1− aθ + θ2) (1−2ax+2x2)+ex2√π (a− 3θ + 2aθ2 − 2θ3) (1−2ax+2x2) (erf(θ)− erf(x)) ≤
−2 + 2a2 − 2aθ.
Lemma 2.2 follows from property 5(ii) (proofs in Section 2.6). Properties 9 – 11 are
used to prove Lemma 2.3. The rest are used in the verification step (proof of Proposition
2.3). We give the proofs of properties 1 – 3, 5 and 8 here. In particular, properties 5 and
8 rely on utilizing the L’Hospital-type rules for monotonicity (Pinelis Pinelis [2006]). The
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proof of property 4 is quite standard, as well as the rest of the proofs which utilize the first
five properties. They can be bound in Appendix B.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.5 (Part I). We first prove 1. The Chernoff-type lower bound for the







−βx2 ,∀β > 1.













2(1−β(x))(1 + 2x2)− 2x
)
= 0.
Properties 2 and 3 follow immediately from the asymptotic expansion in Ren & MacKen-





(1 + o( 1
x2
)).
We now prove 5. First consider (i). Clearly r(−α) = 0. Also from properties 2 and 3,
r(∞) = 1√
π
follows easily. Let f(x) , erfc(x), g(x) , e
−x2
x+α , so that r(x) =
f(x)
g(x) . Consider









Case 1: α > 0. ρ′(x) > 0 on (−α,−α + 1α), and ρ
′(x) < 0 on (−α + 1α ,∞). Hence
ρ(x) first increases then decreases on (−α,∞). Also both f and g vanish at ∞. Using the
“L’Hospital-type rule for monotonicity” (Pinelis [2006] Proposition 4.3), r(x) first increases
then decreases on (−α,∞).
Case 2: α ≤ 0. ρ′(x) > 0 on (−α,∞). Hence ρ(x) increases on (−α,∞). Again, both
f and g vanish at ∞. Using the “L’Hospital-type rule for monotonicity” (Pinelis [2006]
Proposition 4.1), r(x) also increases on (−α,∞).
We have proved (i). Observe that since r(−α) = 0 and r(∞) = 1√
π
, (ii) – (iii) simply















erfc(−x) + 2e−x2x and g(x) ,
√
πxerfc(−x) + e−x2 . Consider
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g′(x) = 0. Therefore we can apply the “L’Hospital-type
rules for monotonicity” (Pinelis Pinelis [2006] Proposition 4.1) on r1(x) and r(x) to get the
desired result.
2.5.3 Verification step
Next we find a candidate optimal value function by solving the HJB equation (2.13). Ob-
serve that Conditions 4–5 in Proposition 2.2 imply V̄ and π̄ solve the HJB equation (2.13).
We obtain a candidate value function by the following informal reasoning. First of all, we
conjecture that the superior mode should be used myopically for sufficiently large and suffi-
ciently small happiness values. This is a straightforward conjecture since the only possible
reason to use the inferior mode is to prolong customer lifetime, but this benefit (if there
is such a benefit) is minimal when the customer’s happiness value is far away from the
happiness threshold q. In particular, when the happiness state is far below, there is almost
no chance to escape the unsatisfied zone before the customer departs. On the other hand,
when the happiness state is far above q, it descends slower under the superior mode. Thus
inspired, we start by solving Eq. (2.15) for a control policy that always uses the superior
mode, while asking for continuity of V ′ at q and boundedness of V ′ everywhere. Next,
we check at which x values the superior mode achieves the maximum in the LHS of the
HJB equation (2.13). We then update our policy by retaining the superior mode at such
happiness locations and replacing it with the inferior mode at the complementary locations
where the inferior mode achieves the maximum. For the updated policy, we compute the
updated V by solving Eq. (2.15) again, while satisfying the boundary conditions — con-
tinuity of V ′ as well as boundedness of V ′ everywhere. Having computed the updated V ,
we again update the policy, and so on. This policy iteration process leads to a monotone
improving sequence of V and associated policies, and it can be carried on until convergence.
In our case, we find a final candidate value function and candidate policy via at most one
update from the initial myopic policy. The candidate value function that we denote by W ∗
is defined in Proposition 2.3, where we also verify that it satisfies not only the HJB equation
(2.13), but all conditions in Proposition 2.2.
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Proposition 2.3. Let W (x,C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) be defined as
W (x,C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) =

V1(x,C1) if x ≤ θG;
V2(x,C2, C3) if θG < x < q;
V3(x,C4) if q ≤ x ≤ θb;
V4(x,C5) if x > max{q, θb},
where q is the happiness threshold (see Eq. (2.4)), θb is as defined in Lemma 2.2, θG is as




+ µS ; (2.18)












R + µR; (2.19)
V3(x,C4) = C4 + µS log(x− µS). (2.20)
























4 , and C
∗
5 (defined explicitly in the proof of this propo-
sition) such that W ∗(·) , W ( · , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 ) together with the policy specified in
Theorem 2.1 satisfies all conditions in Proposition 2.2.
The proof of this proposition is in Section 2.6. Note that verifying the conditions in
Proposition 2.2 is a challenging task, the hardest component being to show non-positivity
Eq. (2.14) of parametric functions involving four free parameters (µS , µR, σR, q) plus a
variable x representing the happiness level. We achieve this by decomposing the function
of interest into different pieces and showing non-positivity for each piece, utilizing the
properties established in Lemma 2.5).
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is now immediate.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The main part of the theorem (the structure of the optimal pol-
icy) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.3. The upper bound on the value function
(see Proposition 2.2 Conditions 1-4) is a bound on the CLV under any admissible policy. A
bound on expected customer lifetime under any admissible policy also follows using Wald’s
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identity, since the expected reward rate is at least min(µS , µR) at every instant while the
customer is alive.
2.6 Other Proofs
2.6.1 Proofs of the Model
To prove Lemma 2.1, we first establish a technical lemma, which will also be used later in
the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Lemma 2.6. Fix any admissible policy π ∈ Π and starting happiness level x ∈ R. Let Ht be
the corresponding happiness process as defined in Eq. (2.3) and let ut be the corresponding
action process. For y ∈ R, denote by LH(t, y) the symmetric local time of Ht at y. Then for
any t ≥ 0 and any y ∈ R, it holds that LH(t, y) <∞ almost surely. Let E be any countable
set in R. Then for any t ≥ 0 it holds that
∫ t
0 1{Hs ∈ E & us 6= S}ds = 0 almost surely.
Proof. By the definition of local time (see Definition A.1 in Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins
and Spiliopoulos [2017]), we have LH(t, y) = |Ht−y|−(x−y)−
∫ t
0 sign(Hs−y)(µus−Hs)ds−∫ t
0 sign(Hs−y)σusdBs, which implies EL
H(t, y) ≤ E|Ht|+ |y|+ |x|+ |y|+
∫ t
0 (µR+E|Hs|)ds.
If we take expectations on both sides of Eq. (2.3), one can easily see that EHt ≤ x+ µRt.
Therefore the above inequality implies that ELH(t, y) < ∞, and hence LH(t, y) < ∞
almost surely. To complete the proof it remains to show the occupation time
∫ t
0 1{Hs ∈
E & us 6= S}ds = 0, or equivalently,
∫ t
0 1{Hs ∈ E}(dHs)
2 = 0 almost surely. This is
indeed true, since if otherwise, there exists y ∈ E such that with positive probability we
have
∫ t
0 1{Hs = y}(dHs)
2 > 0 ⇒ LH(t, y) = ∞, where the implication follows from the
definition of local time. But this contradicts LH(t, y) <∞ almost surely.
Next we prove Lemma 2.1. Note that we would have been able to use Salins and
Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017] directly to specify the happiness process for any
interval policy except for one wrinkle — Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos
[2017] assumes that the volatility of the stochastic process is bounded below by a positive
constant everywhere. So the strategy we adopt is to use Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins
and Spiliopoulos [2017] to specify the happiness process during the time intervals when
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it is in the closure of a Risky piece, and to combine this specification with the obvious,
deterministic trajectory converging exponentially at rate 1 to µS when the happiness is in
the interior of a Safe piece.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We specify the happiness process for any interval policy induc-
tively on the number of pieces of intervals. The simplest case is where there is just one
piece: If the policy is to use the Risky mode everywhere, the happiness process is simply an
O-U process with parameters µR and σR. If the policy is to use the Safe mode everywhere,
the happiness process is deterministic and converges exponentially at rate 1 to µS .
Now let us consider the case where the policy has a Risky piece and a Safe piece. One
possible case (among four possibilities, we will consider the other three cases below) is that
the policy uses the Risky mode on (−∞, θ) and the Safe mode on [θ,∞) for some θ > µS .
Now if the happiness starts at x > θ, there is an initial deterministic transient








where the happiness decays exponentially at rate 1 from x to θ under the Safe mode,





. After this transient, the happiness process resembles
a reflected O-U process with parameters µR and σR that lives in (∞, θ) and is reflected
downwards at θ, but with a crucial difference. The reflected O-U process spends a measure
zero of time at the reflecting boundary. In our process, the time spent at the reflecting
boundary has positive measure with probability one, conditioned on the customer happiness
being q at some time. While this process is less well-known, such a delayed reflected process
was introduced by Skorokhod Skorokhod [1961], and shown to be a semimartingale by Salins
and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017]. The measure of time spent by a delayed
reflected process at a reflection boundary is proportional to the local time of the process
at the boundary, and the constant of proportionality (termed the delay parameter in Salins
and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017]) is the inverse of the drift at the boundary.
In our setting the drift is negative with magnitude θ − µS under the Safe mode at the
boundary happiness θ, and hence the delay parameter is 1/(θ − µS). Having established
this connection, we rely on Theorem 3.4 from Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins and Spiliopoulos
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[2017] to conclude that the distribution of the happiness process for [t0,∞) can be defined
as the law of the unique solution (guaranteed to exist) of the SDE and local time pair
dHt = (µR −Ht)1{Ht < θ}dt+ σR1{Ht < θ}dBt − LH(dt, θ) ,






1{Ht = θ}ds ,
where LH(t, θ) is the symmetric local time of the happiness process at θ. And being a
(weak) solution to an SDE, the happiness process is guaranteed to be a semimartingale.
Notice that we also obtain a unique specification of (the distribution of) time spent at the
boundary: this will be helpful when the boundary is exactly at q, so that time spent at the
boundary is identical to time spent in the satisfied zone. For example, integrals such as∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds will be meaningful even when the boundary is at q; this integral will simply be
the time spent away from the boundary inside the unsatisfied zone (since the hazard rate
there is 1, whereas it is 0 in the satisfied zone). As a result, we can, in fact, conclude that
(Ht)t∈[0,t̄] and (St)t∈[0,t̄] are semimartingales adapted to (Ft)t≥0 for any t̄ < ∞, since the
survival probability process St = e
−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds is uniquely specified in terms of the happiness
process.
Now we discuss the other three cases for one Risky and one Safe piece along similar
lines. In the interest of space, we focus on the happiness process Ht and skip Yt and St,
though they are immediate to specify.
• If the policy uses the Risky mode on (−∞, θ) and the Safe mode on [θ,∞) for some
θ ≤ µS : If the happiness starts at x ≥ θ, then it decays exponentially at rate 1 towards
µS as per Eq. (2.22) for all t ∈ [0,∞). If the happiness starts at x < θ it follows an O-U
process with parameters µR and σR until the (finite w.p. 1) time at which it hits θ, after
which it remains in the Safe piece forever and decays exponentially at rate 1 towards µS .
• If the policy uses the Safe mode on (−∞, θ] and the Risky mode on (θ,∞) for some θ ≤ µS :
this is analogous to the case discussed at length above. The trajectory is deterministic
upwards inside the Safe piece, whereas it is a delayed reflected O-U process inside the
Risky piece with upward reflection with delay parameter 1/(µS − θ) at the boundary θ.
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• If the policy uses the Safe mode on (−∞, θ] and the Risky mode on (θ,∞) for some
θ > µS : this is analogous to the first bullet with a deterministic trajectory for all time
inside the Safe piece, and an O-U process in the Risky piece such that after the first
instant when it hits the boundary θ, the happiness thereafter remains within the Safe
piece forever.
At this point, it is straightforward to see how the construction extends inductively to
any countable number of pieces with the Risky pieces being open.
Since Ht is a semimartingale, we can apply the Itô-Tanaka formula (see Theorem A.3
in Salins & Spiliopolous Salins and Spiliopoulos [2017]) for any function f that is continu-
ously differentiable on R and twice continuously differentiable on R \ E for some countable














H(t, y), where f ′r and f
′
l are the right and left derivatives of f , and L
H(t, y) is the
symmetric local time of Ht at value y. Since f is continuously differentiable everywhere on
R, and since local time LH(t, y) < ∞ almost surely by Lemma 2.6, we can conclude that∑
y∈E(f
′
r(y) − f ′l (y))LH(t, y) = 0 almost surely. Therefore, from the above equation and










′′(Hs)1{Hs /∈ E}σ2usds. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Towards the proof of Proposition 2.1, we start with the definition of a reflected O-U
process for reader’s reference. This is from Reed et al. Reed et al. [2013], Definition 3.1
(we fix γ = 1 in that definition).
Definition 2.3 (Reflected O-U Process). Let B = (Bt : t ≥ 0) be a standard Brownian
motion, and let σ > 0, and θ ∈ R. We say that the process Z is a (σ, θ) reflected O-U
process starting from x ≥ 0, if the following four conditions are satisfied.
1. Zt = x+ θt−
∫ t
0 Zsds+ σBt + Lt for t ≥ 0,
2. Zt ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0,




0 1{Zt > 0}dLt = 0.
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 2.7. Let Xt be a (σ0, θ0) reflected O-U process on [0,∞) starting from x > 0. Also
define the unreflected process Yt starting from y ≤ x:




Then Xt ≥st Yt and Xt ≥st Y +t for all t ≥ 0, where ≥st is the usual stochastic order and
Y +t , max(Yt, 0).
Proof of Lemma 2.7. If Xt ≥st Yt then Xt ≥st Y +t follows easily since Xt ≥ 0. Let
B = (Bt : t ≥ 0) be a standard Brownian motion and let Xt = x+θ0t−
∫ t
0 Xsds+σ0Bt+Lt,
Yt = y + θ0t−
∫ t
0 Ysds+ σ0Bt, where Lt is the local time processes as defined in Definition
2.3. It suffices to show Xt ≥ Yt for all t ≥ 0.
Suppose there exists t > 0 such that Xt < Yt. Then by continuous paths there exists
0 ≤ s < t such that Xs = Ys, and 0 ≤ Xu < Yu for all s < u < t. By definition, we have
Xt − Yt = Xs + θ0(t− s)−
∫ t





s (Yu−Xu)du+(Lt−Ls) > Lt−Ls. Observe the last inequality
follows from Xs = Ys and Yu > Xu ≥ 0 for all s < u < t. Also the last term is nonnegative
since Lt is nondecreasing. This is a contradiction with Xt < Yt.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The time customer happiness spends in the unsatisfied zone
prior to the customer’s departure is exponentially distributed and has a finite expectation,
given that the hazard rate of customer departure is 1 in the unsatisfied zone and zero in
the satisfied zone. We want to show the time customer happiness spends in the satisfied
zone also has finite expectation. Our approach will be to show that the long-run average
ratio of time in satisfied zone to time in unsatisfied zone is finite (or zero).
Case (i): Policy π uses the Safe mode somewhere in [µS , q). First, consider the
case where there the policy π uses the Safe mode at some happiness value in [µS , q), i.e., the
set {x ∈ [µS , q) : π(x) = S} is nonempty. Define l , max{x ∈ [µS , q − ε] : π(x) = 0} where
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ε ∈ (0, (q−µS)/2) is chosen to be small enough that {x ∈ [µS , q−ε] : π(x) = 0} is nonempty.
If the starting happiness x ≤ l, then it is easy to see that the happiness level never rises
above l, hence the customer is always unsatisfied and we are done. So suppose x > l. Let
τ be the first time at which the happiness reaches l. We will show that Eτ <∞. This will
complete our proof for this case, since the happiness will never rise above l thereafter.
It is easy to bound the total time spent in the interior of Safe intervals of policy π prior
to τ , since the happiness process decays exponentially towards µS at such happiness values,
and these happiness values exceed q− ε > µS + ε by definition of l. It remains to bound the
total time spent traversing Risky intervals of π above l, including the time spent on delayed
reflections at the upper boundary of such intervals (at the lower boundary of a Risky interval
above l, the process enters a Safe interval and never again returns to the Risky interval).
But this bound is also easy, since the happiness process inside each Risky interval is merely
a (σR, µR) O-U process, possibly with a delayed reflecting upper boundary (if the interval
has an upper boundary) b where the drift is −(b − µS). Any standard (unreflected) O-U
process has first passage times with finite expectation (see Thomas Thomas [1975]). Also
the fraction of time a delayed reflected O-U process spends at its reflecting boundary is
bounded away from one. Hence using the fact that the unreflected O-U process dominates
the reflected O-U process as per Lemma 2.7, we conclude that the time for our reflected
O-U process to reach the lower end of the Risky interval (or l, whichever is larger) has finite
expectation. Hence, we have shown Eτ <∞.
Case (ii): Policy π uses the Risky mode everywhere in [µS , q). In this case, policy
π has a Risky interval (a, b) that contains [µS , q). By the argument above, the time taken to
enter this Risky interval has finite expectation. Having entered this interval, the happiness
process remains within the closure of this interval, and is simply a (σR, µR) delayed reflected
O-U process with drift −(b − µS) < 0 at the upper boundary and drift µS − a > 0 at the
lower boundary. This process has a steady state distribution Ward and Glynn [2003] with
positive measure everywhere in (a, b) and atoms at a and b. Since a < µS ⇒ a < q, it
follows that the happiness process spends a positive fraction of its time in the unsatisfied
zone in the long run. This completes our proof.
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2.6.2 Proofs of the Main Result
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Define α , µR−µSσR , β ,
µS
µR
, z , θ−µRσR . Then we have α > 0 and




. Then our goal is to show that r(z)
has a unique root on (−α,∞). This is true by property 5(ii) in Lemma 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Let a , µS−µRσR , b = µS − µR, q̂ ,
q−µR
σR






































Observe that Fsmall(θ̂) corresponds to the LHS of Eq. (2.11), multiplied by a factor of 2.




since q > µS > µR). Then proving this lemma is equivalent to showing that exactly one
of the following two cases is true: (1) Fsmall(θ̂) has a unique root on [a, q̂) and Fbig(θ̂) has
no root on
(
a− 1a , a
)
; (2)Fsmall(θ̂) has no root on [a, q̂) and Fbig(θ̂) has a unique root on(
a− 1a , a
)
.













−a3 > 0. Since a > 0, for θ̂ > a −
1
a , we have













− µSb(q̂−a) . Therefore, if we can show that both
Fsmall(θ̂) and F̂big(θ̂) ,
Fbig(θ̂)
1−a2+aθ̂
are strictly decreasing functions of θ̂ on (a− 1a , q̂), then we
are done. In fact, one can check that F ′′small(θ̂) = 2q̂e
q̂2−θ̂2 > 0. Thus, F ′small(θ̂) < F
′
small(q̂) =
−1 < 0 for θ̂ ∈ (a− 1a , q̂), and hence Fsmall(θ̂) is strictly decreasing for θ̂ ∈ (a−
1
a , q̂).
It remains to show that F̂big(θ̂) is strictly decreasing in θ̂ for θ̂ ∈ (a − 1a , q̂). We have





2 ·f(θ̂, a), where f(θ̂, a) = eθ̂
2
(











q̂(a − θ̂). We want to show that F̂ ′big(θ̂) ≤ 0 for θ̂ ∈ (a −
1
a , q̂). Observe that
61
3− 2a2 + 2aθ̂ > 0 since θ̂ > a− 1a and a > 0. Therefore, we only need to show f(θ̂, a) > 0
for θ̂ ∈ (a− 1a , q̂). In fact,
∂f
∂x2
(θ̂, a) = 2eq̂
2







for θ̂ < q̂ by an application of Lemma 10. Thus, since a > 0, if we can show f(θ̂, 0) > 0
















Proof of Proposition 2.2. To show that a function V̄ as described in Proposition 2.2 is
the optimal value function V ∗, we will first show that it is an upper bound for V ∗, and then
show that the bound is tight.
To show that V̄ is an upper bound for V ∗, it suffices to show V̄ (x) ≥ V (x, π̂) for ∀x ∈ R
and for any admissible policy π̂ ∈ Π. Now fix any x ∈ R and any π̂ ∈ Π. Define a process
Xt, t ≥ 0 by









where Ht is the happiness process under policy π̂ with H0 = x, and Yt the corresponding
cumulative reward (conditional on no quitting) up to time t. Next we will rewrite Xt in
integral form.
Since V̄ is continuously differentiable everywhere and twice continuously differentiable
almost everywhere except for a countable set E (Condition 2 in the proposition) and since
Ht is a semimartingale under the admissible policy, we can apply the Itô-Tanaka formula
to obtain that V̄ (Ht) = V̄ (x) +
∫ t
0 V̄








E}V̄ ′′(Hs)σ2usds is also a semimartingale (see Eq. (2.10), denote ut the corresponding action
process under policy π̂).
Since both V̄ (Ht) and e
−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds are semimartingales (the latter follows from the
fact that Ht is a semimartingale), we can then apply the multidimensional Itô formula on
semimartingales to the function g(V̄ (Ht), e
−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds) = V̄ (Ht)e
−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds and rewrite Xt
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Since V̄ ′ is bounded (Condition 3 in the proposition) and σus ∈ {0, σR}, the two stochastic
integral terms in the above equation have bounded integrands hence have zero expectations.
Now take expectations on both sides of Eq. (2.25) and write 1 as 1{Hs /∈ E} + 1{Hs ∈
E & us = S}+ 1{Hs ∈ E & us = R}, we get:

















−Q(Hs)V̄ (Hs) + V̄ ′(Hs)(µR −Hs) + µR
)
1{Hs ∈ E & us = S}
+
(
−Q(Hs)V̄ (Hs) + V̄ ′(Hs)(µR −Hs) + µR
)
1{Hs ∈ E & us = R}
]
ds








−Q(Hs)V̄ (Hs) + V̄ ′(Hs)(µR −Hs) + µR
)
1{Hs ∈ E & us = R}ds
= V̄ (x). (2.26)
The inequality results from a direct application of Condition 4. The last step follows
from the fact that −Q(Hs)V̄ (Hs) + V̄ ′(Hs)(µR − Hs) + µR is bounded for Hs ∈ E , and∫ t
0 1{Hs ∈ E & us = R}ds = 0 almost surely by Lemma 2.6. Since Eq. (2.26) holds for any
t ≥ 0, in particular it also holds in the limit:
lim sup
t→∞
EXt ≤ V̄ (x). (2.27)
We will now show lim sup
t→∞












0 Q(Hv)dvµusds as t→∞. It follows from Eq. (2.9) that

















Take expectations on both sides of Eq. (2.24) and let t→∞, we get
lim sup
t→∞









+ V (x, π̂) ≥ V (x, π̂) , (2.29)
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where we used Eq. (2.28) and that V̄ in non-negative (Condition 1 in the proposition).
Combining Eqs. (2.27) and (2.29), we obtain the desired result V̄ (x) ≥ V (x, π̂) for ∀x ∈ R
and any admissible policy π̂ ∈ Π. That is, V̄ is an upperbound of the optimal value function
V ∗.
Now it remains to show this upper bound is tight, i.e., the inequalities in Eqs. (2.27)
and (2.29) are binding under policy π̄ (π̄ defined in Condition 5). By Condition 5 of the
proposition, the inequality in Eq. (2.26) is binding under policy π̄ (where ut = π(Ht)).
Hence its limit, Eq. (2.27) is also binding under policy π̄. On the other hand, by Condition


















+ V (x, π̄) =
V (x, π̄). Combining this inequality with Eq. (2.29), we have that the inequality in Eq.
(2.29) is binding. Therefore we have proved that V̄ is the value function V ∗ and that π̄ is
an optimal policy.








= 0 for the de-


























































First consider Eqs. (2.30) and (2.32). Since (Eq. (2.5)) P (T > t|Ft) = e−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds , we
have LHS of Eq. (2.30) equivalent to lim
t→∞









= lim supt→∞ E
[
P (T > t|Ft)2
]
= lim supt→∞ P (T > t)
2 = P (T >
∞)2, both of which are zero since by Proposition 2.1 the customer lifetime under interval
policies with finite intervals is finite in expectation.
It only remains to show Eq. (2.31).
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Fix any starting happiness value x ∈ R and any interval policy with finite intervals.


































Take expectation to H2t , we can remove both stochastic integral terms since the their
integrands are both bounded. Note that µus ≤ µ , max{µS , µR} and σus ≤ σR for any



















= x2e−2t + µ2(e−2t + 1− 2e−t) +
σ2R(1− e−2t)
2
+ 2xµ(e−t − e−2t).






≤ µ2 + σ
2
R
2 < ∞, and hence Eq. (2.31)
is true. Therefore we have proved Lemma 2.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The policy associated with the W function belongs to the
policy types in Lemma 2.4. Therefore by Lemma 2.4, Condition 6 of Proposition 2.2 is
satisfied. Also one can check that for any C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 in R, W (·, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)
and the corresponding policy satisfies Condition 5. Moreover W (·, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) is
twice continuously differentiable everywhere except possibly at θG, q and θb. Therefore to
prove Proposition 2.3 we only need to show Conditions 1–4 are satisfied, where Condition
2 only concerns continuous differentiability at θG, q and θb.
First consider the case µR ≥ µS . By the definition of θG in Lemma 2.3, we know that
when µR ≥ µS , θG = −∞. Therefore the function W as defined in Proposition 2.3 reduces
to:
W (x,C2, C3, C4, C5) =

V2(x,C2, C3) if x < q;
V3(x,C4) if q ≤ x ≤ θb;
V4(x,C5) if x > max{q, θb},
(2.33)
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where θb is as defined in Lemma 2.2 and V2(x,C2, C3), V3(x,C4), V4(x,C5) as defined in the
statement of Proposition 2.3. For easier writing, we introduce the following notations:
Bi(x, V ) , −Q(x)V (x) + (µi − x)V ′(x) +
1
2
σ2i 1{x /∈ E}V ′′(x) + µi, for i = R,S; (2.34)
δ(x, V ) , BR(x, V )−BS(x, V ) = (µR − µS)V ′(x) +
1
2
σ2R1{x /∈ E}V ′′(x) + µR − µS ,
(2.35)
where E is the set of values at which V ′′ doesn’t exist. Want to find C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 such
that W ∗(·) ,W (·, C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 ) satisfy the following statements:
Statement 2.1. W ∗(·) is non-negative;
Statement 2.2. W ∗(·) is continuously differentiable at q and θb;
Statement 2.3. W ∗(·) has bounded first derivative;




2 )) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ (−∞, q),
Statement 2.5. δ(x, V3(x,C
∗
4 )) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ (q,max{q, θb}),
Statement 2.6. BS(x, V4(x,C
∗
5 )) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ (max{q, θb},∞).
Statements 2.1–2.3 correspond to Conditions 1–3, respectively. Also Statements 2.4–2.6







Observe that the first derivatives of V3(·, C4) and V4(·, C5) does not depend on C4 and C5.

































































































dz if θb ≥ q
. (2.38)
We define V ∗2 (·) , V2(·, C∗2 , C∗2 ) , V ∗3 (·) , V3(·, C∗4 ) , V ∗4 (·) , V4(·, C∗5 ) and W ∗(·) ,
W (·, C∗2 , C∗2 , C∗4 , C∗5 ). It’s easy to verify that Statement 2.2 is satisfied, that is, V ∗2 (q) =
V ∗4 (q), V
∗′
2 (q) = V
∗′
4 (q) if θb < q, and V
∗















4 (θb) if θb < q.
Now consider Statement 2.3. Since we have just proved that W ∗
′
(·) is continuous in R,
to show that W ∗
′
(·) is bounded, it suffices to show
∣∣∣∣ limx→−∞W ∗′(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞ and ∣∣∣ limx→∞W ∗′(x)∣∣∣ <
∞. This is equivalent to showing
∣∣∣∣ limx→−∞V ∗′2 (x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞ and ∣∣∣ limx→∞V ∗′4 (x)∣∣∣ <∞. By definition
of V ∗2 and V
∗































































From Lemma 2, both limits are 0.
It only remains to prove Statements 2.1, 2.4–2.6.
Proof of Statement 2.4. For x ≤ q, substitute V2(x,C∗2 , C∗2 ) (see Proposition 2.3 for V2 and
Eq. (2.36) for C∗2 ) into δ(x, V2) (see Eq. (2.35) for δ(x, V )), we get δ(x, V
∗









′′(x) + µR − µS . Want to show δ(x, V ∗2 ) ≥ 0 for any x < q. Compute
V ∗2
















































By property 1, and property 5(iii) in Lemma 2.5, the terms in both parenthesis above are
non-negative. Therefore, if we can show C∗2 > 0, then both V
∗
2
′(x) and V ∗2
′′(x) are non-
negative, which implies (since µR ≥ µS) δ(x, V ∗2 ) ≥ 0 for x ≤ q. The next claim establishes
this result.
Claim 2.1. The value C∗2 as defined in Eq. (2.36) is strictly positive.

















































if θb ≥ q,
Since q > µS , the numerators in both cases are positive. In fact the denominator, which is
the same for both cases, is also positive by an application of property 5(iii) in Lemma 2.5.
Hence C∗2 > 0.
Proof of Statement 2.6. The case µR = µS is trivial, since θb =∞ by Lemma 2.2. Suppose
µR > µS . By the definitions of BS(·, ·), V4(·, ·), and C∗5 (see Eqs. (2.34), (2.21) and (2.38)),


















Observe that the RHS of the above equation is the same as the LHS of the equation in
Lemma 2.2. Therefore BS(θb, V
∗




Proof of Statement 2.5. By the definitions of δ(·, ·), V3(·, ·), and C∗4 (see Eqs. (2.35), (2.20),
and (2.37)), for any x ∈ (q,max{q, θb}), δ(x, V3(x,C∗4 )) becomes
δ(x, V ∗3 ) =




If µR = µS , then δ(x, V
∗





































2(µR−µS) , then this means δ(x, V
∗
3 ) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ (q,max{q, θb}). Let
α = µR−µSσR , β =
µS
µR
, and θ̂b =
θb−µR
σR
. We can equivalently show
θ̂b ≤
α(β − 2) +
√
α2β2 + 2β(1− β)
2(1− β)
. (2.39)
By Lemma 2.2, we have θ̂b > −α and θ̂b satisfies (θ̂b + α)eθ̂
2
b erfc(θ̂b) − β√π = 0. Using
property 6 in Lemma 2.5 we deduce Eq. (2.39).




2 ) > 0 if C
∗
2 > 0. By
Claim 2.1, we have C∗2 > 0, which implies that W
∗(x) > 0 for all x ≤ q. In particular,
W ∗(q) > 0. Also by definition of V3(·, ·) (see Eq. (2.20)), V3(x,C∗4 ) increases in x on [q,∞).
Therefore by continuity of W ∗ at q, we have W ∗(x) > 0 for all x ≤ max{q, θb}. Similarly
V4(x,C
∗
5 ) increases in x as well (see Eq. (2.21) in Proposition 2.3), hence by continuity of
W ∗ at θb, we have W
∗(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
Next we prove the proposition for the other scheme, µR < µS . By the definition of θb
in Lemma 2.2, we know that when µR < µS , θb = ∞. Therefore in this case, the function
W as defined in Proposition 2.3 reduces to:
W (x,C1, C2, C3, C4) =

V1(x,C1) if x ≤ θG
V2(x,C2, C3) if θG < x < q;
V3(x,C4) if x ≥ q,
where V1(x,C1), V2(x,C2, C3), V3(x,C4) are as defined in the statement of Proposition 2.3.







G(·) ,W (·, CG1 , CG2 , CG3 , CG4 )
satisfy the following statements:
Statement 2.7. WG(·) is non-negative;
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Statement 2.8. WG(·) is continuously differentiable at q and θG;
Statement 2.9. WG(·) has bounded first derivative;
Statement 2.10. BR(x, V1(x,C
G
1 )) ≤ 0 for any x < θG;




3 )) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ (θG, q);
Statement 2.12. BR(x, V3(x,C4)) ≤ 0 for any x > q.
Statements 2.7–2.9 correspond to Conditions 1–3, respectively. Also Statements 2.10–


















0 if θG ≥ µS ;
−b2(a−θ̂G)3
a(1−a2+aθ̂G)


































if θG < µS ,
(2.42)
and




3 )− µS log(q − µS). (2.43)
Also define V G1 (·) , V1(·, CG1 ), V G2 (·) , V2(·, CG2 , CG3 ) and V G3 (·) , V3(·, CG4 ). It’s easy to

















(q) = V G3
′
(q).
Next consider Statement 2.9, i.e., want to show WG
′
is bounded everywhere. By State-
ment 2.8, WG
′




























(x−µS)2 = 0, since C
G
1 is a
constant. Hence, we have proved Statement 2.9.
It only remains to prove Statements 2.7, 2.10–2.12.
Proof of Statement 2.10. By the definitions of BR(·, ·), V1(·, ·), and CG1 (see Eqs. (2.34),













if θG < µS ,
where f(z) = (a− θ̂G)3(1−a2 +az)−(a−z)3(1−a2 +aθ̂G). Note that a > 0 and θ̂G > a− 1a
imply 1− a2 + aθ̂G > 0. Also x < θG < µS , hence to show BR(x, V G1 ) ≤ 0 we only need to
show f(x−µRσR ) ≤ 0 for x < θG, or equivalently, f(z) ≤ 0 for z < θ̂G, where θ̂G ∈ (a−
1
a , a).
Observe that f(θ̂G) = 0 and f
′(z) = a(a− θ̂G)3 + 3(1−a2 +aθ̂G)(a− z)2. In fact, f ′(z) > 0
since θ̂G < a and 1− a2 + aθ̂G > 0. Therefore f(z) ≤ f(θ̂G) = 0 for z < θ̂G.
Proof of Statement 2.7. If we can show WG
′
(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R, then Statement 2.7 easily
follows since lim
x→−∞
WG(x) = µS > 0. Now we show W
G′(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R is true.
Lemma 2.3 implies that θ̂G > a − 1a (recall that a =
µS−µR
σR
), i.e., 1 − a2 + aθ̂G > 0.
Then one can check to see that V G1
′
(·) ≥ 0 on (−∞, θG] (see Proposition 2.3 for V1 and Eq.




(·) ≥ 0 on [q,∞). Therefore it only remains to show V G2
′








3 erf(z)) ≥ 0 for z ∈ (θ̂G, q̂). Recall the definition of CG2 in
Eq. (2.41) and apply properties 4, 13 – 15 in Lemma 2.5, we can get CG2 > 0. Therefore we

































if θG < µS ,
and





















if θG < µS .
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∈ (−1, 1). This is also true if θG < µS , since 1 − a2 + aθ̂G > 0 and properties 13
– 15 in Lemma 2.5 together imply CG3 + C
G
2 > 0 and C
G
3 − CG2 < 0. Since C ∈ (−1, 1),




(1 + Cerf(z)) is increasing in








θ̂2G(1 +Cerf(θ̂G)) ≥ 0. Since C =
CG3
CG2




















if θ̂G ∈ (a− 1a , a).
Tt remains to show F (θ̂G) ≥ 0. If θ̂G ≥ a this is trivial. Suppose θ̂G ∈ (a − 1a , a). By
properties 13 – 15 in Lemma 2.5, the above denominator is nonnegative. The statement
follows.
Proof of Statement 2.11. By definitions of BS(·, ·), V2(·, ·, ·), CG2 and CG3 (see Eqs. (2.34),
(2.19), and (2.41) – (2.42)), for any x ∈ (θG, q), BS(x, V2(x,CG2 , CG3 )) becomes
BS(x, V
G
2 ) = −V G2 (x) + (µS − x)V G2
′
(x) + µS .
Since lim
x→−∞
WG(x) = µS and W
G′(·) ≥ 0 on R, it follows that if θG ≥ µS , then BS(x, V G2 ) ≤
0 for all x ∈ (θG, q). It only remains to consider the case where θG < µS . Similarly, for all
x ∈ (µS , q), the desired result BS(x, V G2 ) ≤ 0 easily holds. Consider the remaining region







1− a2 + aθ̂G





F (z) = 2(a− z)
(




1− aθ̂G + θ̂2G
)





a− 3θ̂G + 2aθ̂2G − 2θ̂3G
)






Since θG < µS , then θ̂G ∈ (a − 1a , a) where a > 0, and hence 1 − a
2 + aθ̂G > 0. Also
we know b = µS − µR > 0. Therefore to complete the proof, we only need to show
F (z) ≤ −2 + 2a2 − 2aθ̂G for all z ∈ (θ̂G, a]. Applying property 16 in Lemma 2.5, we obtain
the desired result.
Proof of Statement 2.12. For any x > q, we have Q(x) = 0 and hence (see Eq. (2.34) for

























Since x > q > µS > 0 and b > 0, it is clear that BR(x, V
G
3 ) ≤ 0. The result hence
follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We first prove the monotonicity results when µR > µS . Consider
the parts regarding θb. Define function



















By Lemma 2.2, F (µS , µR, σR, θb) = 0. Moreover, by evaluating the function r(·) from
property 5(ii) in Lemma 2.5 at (x − µR)/σR with parameters α = (µR − µS)/σR and β =
µS/µR, we obtain that F (µS , µR, σR, x) < 0 for all x ∈ (µS , θb), and F (µS , µR, σR, x) > 0
for all x ∈ (θb,∞). Hence to prove θb is strictly decreasing in µR, it suffices to show that
∂F
∂µR
(µS , µR, σR, x) > 0 for all x > µS . Similarly, to show θb is strictly increasing in µS and
σR, it suffices to show
∂F
∂µS
(µS , µR, σR, x) < 0 for all x > µS and
∂F
∂σR
(µS , µR, σR, x) < 0 for
all x > µS . We have the partial derivatives:
∂F
∂µR



































































Fix any x > µS . Apply change of variable x̂ ,
x−µR
σR
. By property 5(iii) in Lemma 2.5, we
get ∂F∂µR (µS , µR, σR, x) > 0. Also
∂F
∂µS
(µS , µR, σR, x) < 0 since erfc(·) ≥ 0. Finally, property
1 in Lemma 2.5 implies ∂F∂σR (µS , µR, σR, x) < 0. This completes the proof of monotonicity
regarding θb.
Next, we show monotonicity results of the value function and its first order derivative.
We already know the functional form of the value function. Hence, we can check the partial
derivatives with regard to model parameters directly. Consider the monotonicity of V ∗





Let θLb and θ
H




S , respectively. Also,
denote the corresponding value functions by VL and VH . We have just proved that θb is




b . There are three cases based on the location of
q: (1) θLb < θ
H
b < q, (2) θ
L
b < q ≤ θHb , (3) q ≤ θLb < θHb . In the first case, the myopic
policy is optimal for both µLS and µ
H
S , hence the value functions VL and VH are identical.
In the second case, VL is the value function for the myopic policy regardless of the value
of the Safe mode drift. Hence, VL ≤ VH by the optimality of VH under Safe mode drift






, i.e., V ′L(x) < V
′
H(x) on [q, θ
L




H(q). As a result,
VL(x) < VH(x) for x < q (see Eq. (2.19)). By continuity, VL(q) < VH(q). Therefore
VL(x) < VH(x) (see Eq. (2.20)) for q ≤ x ≤ θLb since V ′L(x) < V ′H(x) for q ≤ x ≤ θLb
















for q ≤ x ≤ θHb . Hence V ′L(x) ≤ V ′H(x) (see Eqs. (2.20)
and (2.21)) for θLb < x ≤ θHb , which implies VL(x) < VH(x) for θLb < x ≤ θHb . Finally, for




H(x), therefore VL(x) < VH(x) since VL(θ
H
b ) < VH(θ
H
b ).
We have just proved that the value function is increasing in µS . Next, we will similarly
prove the monotonicity of the value function in µR. Consider two valid values for the
Risky mode drift µLR < µ
H









respectively, and denote VL and VH as the corresponding value functions. We have proved




b . Again, there are three cases based on
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the location of q: (1) θHb < θ
L
b < q, (2) θ
H
b < q ≤ θLb , (3) q ≤ θHb < θLb . First consider case
(1). In both the high Risky reward and low Risky reward scenarios, the myopic policy is
optimal. Apply property 5(iv) in Lemma 2.5 to V ′L(x) (see Eq. (2.21)) for x ≥ q, we obtain
that V ′L(x) < V
′








VH(x), we can get VL(x) < VH(x) on R.
The explicit expression for V ′L(x) and V
′












































. Observe that q̂L > q̂H







Herfc(q̂H) by property (iv) in Lemma
2.5, to show V ′L(x) < V
′
























L q̂Lerfc(−q̂L) + 1√π
)






. By the chain rule,






with respect to µLR is −
G′(yL)
σR
, which is de-











L q̂Lerfc(−q̂L) + 1√π
)
with respect to µLR is non-negative.
Now consider case (2). Here, the myopic policy is optimal in the low Risky reward
scenario but suboptimal in the high Risky reward scenario. We just showed that the value
function corresponding to the myopic policy in the low Risky reward scenario, VL, is lower
than the value function corresponding to the myopic policy in the high Risky reward sce-
nario. By optimality, the latter must be lower than the optimal value function in the high
Risky reward scenario, VH . Hence, VL ≤ VH .
Now consider case (3), where for both low Risky reward scenario and high Risky reward
scenarios, sandwich policies are optimal. By property 5(iv) in Lemma 2.5, we have V ′L(x) <
V ′H(x) for x > θ
L




H(x) on [q, θ
H
b ]. We only need to consider x < q and
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θHb < x ≤ θLb . For the latter, we can refer to the definition of θLb in Lemma 2.2 and property














for x ≥ θHb , which implies
V ′L(x) ≤ V ′H(x) for x ∈ [θHb , θLb ] (see Eqs. (2.20) and (2.21)). For the former, we will now
show V ′L(x) < V
′



















. Therefore to show V ′L(x) < V
′
H(x) for x < q, it is










L q̂Lerfc(−q̂L) + 1√π
)
is increasing









H(x) on R, we obtain VL(x) < VH(x) on R, i.e.,
the monotonicty with regard to µR.
Next we show monotonicity results of the first order derivative of the value function for
x ≥ q. Consider two valid Risky volatility values σLR < σHR . Let θLb and θHb be as defined in
Lemma 2.2 for σLR and σ
H
R , respectively, and denote VL and VH as the corresponding value




b . Again, there
are three cases: (1) θLb < θ
H
b < q, (2) θ
L
b < q ≤ θHb , (3) q ≤ θLb < θHb . In case (1), for x ≥ q,
we have



















































By property 1 in Lemma 2.5, f̂(σLR) ≥ 0, which implies that
∂f(σLR,x)
∂σLR
≤ 0, i.e., V ′L(x) ≥ V ′H(x)
for x ≥ q. Similarly, in case (2), we have V ′L(x) ≥ V ′H(x) for x ≥ θHb . Hence, we only


















for x ≥ θLb , which implies V ′H(x) ≤ V ′L(x) for x ∈ [q, θHb ] (see Eqs.
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(2.20) and (2.21)). In case (3), by the same analysis in case (1), we have V ′L(x) ≥ V ′H(x) for
x ≥ θHb . Moreover V ′L(x) = V ′H(x) for q ≤ x < θLb . Hence, we only need to consider when


















for x ≥ θLb ,
which implies V ′H(x) ≤ V ′L(x) for x ∈ [θLb , θHb ] (see Eqs. (2.20) and (2.21)).
Next we prove the monotonicity result when µS > µR. First we want to show that θG
is monotonically decreasing in σR. Recall the definition of θG in Lemma 2.3. We already
know that θG is the unique root of either of two monotone strictly-decreasing functions (see
Fsmall(·) and F̂big(·) in the proof of Lemma 2.3) on (µS − σ
2
µS−µR , q). Therefore if we can
show the two function values are decreasing in σR, then we are done. Consider a fixed value
of θ such that θ ∈ (µS − σ
2

















































− 3 · θ − µR
σR





























− 3 · θ − µR
σR















Want to show that f ′small(σR) and f
′


















g1(θ̂, q̂, a) =
µS
(µS − µR)(a− q̂)
− 2q̂(1 + 2q̂2)eq̂2−θ̂2 + 2θ̂(1 + 2q̂2)









To show f ′small(σR) ≤ 0, it suffices to show g1(θ̂, q̂, a) ≤ 0 for q̂ > a > 0, θ̂ ∈ (a −
1
a , q̂).
Since µS > µR > 0 and q̂ > a > 0, we have
µS









g1(θ̂, q̂, a) < −
1
q̂








Observe that the RHS of the above inequality only depends on θ̂ and q̂, hence we denote
it by ḡ1(θ̂, q̂). It suffices to show ḡ(θ̂, q̂) ≤ 0. If θ̂ ≤ 0, then this is true, since q̂ > 0 ≥ θ̂
and erf(·) is an increasing function. On the other hand, if θ̂ > 0, since θ̂ < q̂, it must be
that θ̂ ∈ (0, q̂). In this case, we have ∂
2ḡ1
∂θ̂2
(θ̂, q̂) = −4eq̂2−θ̂2 q̂
(
3 + 2q̂2 − 2θ̂2
)
< 0, and hence
∂ḡ1
∂θ̂








(q̂, q̂) = 2 > 0.
Therefore ḡ1(θ̂, q̂) < ḡ1(q̂, q̂) = −1q̂ < 0.
Now it only remains to show f ′big(σR) ≤ 0. Since fbig(σR) is only relevant to the value




























2 − aθ̂ + 1
a− q̂
− a+ 3θ̂ − 6aθ̂2 + 6θ̂3 − 2q̂2
(





6aθ̂ − 6θ̂2 − (1 + 2q̂2)
(









− 6aθ̂2 + 6θ̂3 − (1 + 2q̂2)
(





To show f ′big(σR) ≤ 0, it is equivalent to show h1(θ̂, q̂, a) ≤ 0 for q̂ > a > 0, θ̂ ∈ (a−
1
a , a).
Observe that a2 − aθ̂+ 1 > 0 since θ̂ < a and a > 0. Also a− q̂ < 0 and µSµS−µR > 1. Hence





h1(θ̂, q̂, a) <
a2 − aθ̂ + 1
a− q̂
− a+ 3θ̂ − 6aθ̂2 + 6θ̂3 − 2q̂2
(





6aθ̂ − 6θ̂2 − (1 + 2q̂2)
(









− 6aθ̂2 + 6θ̂3 − (1 + 2q̂2)
(





Denote the RHS of the above by h̄1(a). If we can show h̄1(a) ≤ 0 then we are done. Next
we will show h̄1(·) is monotone decreasing on (0, q̂). Since q̂ > a > 0 and q̂ > a > θ̂, we
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have h̄′′1(a) = −
2(1+q̂(q̂−θ̂))
(q̂−a)3 < 0, which implies
h̄′1(a) = −1− 6θ̂2 − 2q̂2(1 + 2θ̂2) +


































We will now show ĥ1(θ̂) < 0 for θ̂ < a < q̂. First one can verify that ĥ1(q̂) = − 1q̂2 <
0. Therefore we will only show ĥ′1(θ̂) ≥ 0 for θ̂ < q̂. Since θ̂ < q̂ and that erf(·)










< 0. On the other hand, if θ̂ > 0, then for θ̂ ∈ (0, q̂),
we have ĥ′′′1 (θ̂) = 8e
q̂2−θ̂2 q̂
(
5 + 2q̂2 − 2θ̂2
)
> 0, which implies that ĥ′′1(θ̂) < ĥ
′′
1(q̂) =
−12 < 0. Therefore ĥ′1(θ̂) is monotone decreasing for θ̂ < q̂, and we have ĥ′1(θ̂) =
1
q̂ + e
q̂2−θ̂2 (12q̂ + 8q̂3)− 12θ̂ − 8q̂2θ̂ − 8eq̂2 q̂(2 + q̂2)θ̂√π (erf(q̂)− erf(θ̂)) > ĥ′1(q̂) = 1q̂ > 0,
which is what we want in order to have ĥ1(θ̂) < 0 for θ̂ < a < q̂, and thus h̄
′
1(a) < 0. Recall
that we want to show h̄1(a) ≤ 0 so that f ′big(σR) ≤ 0. Since we now know that h̄′1(a) < 0
for a ∈ (θ̂, q̂), we have
h̄1(a) < h̄1(θ̂)
= 2θ̂(1 + 2q̂2)− 1
q̂ − θ̂













where the last step follows from property 12 in Lemma 2.5. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
Sourcing in an Increasingly Volatile World: Offshoring, Onshoring or
Both?
3.1 Introduction
The global economy is increasingly volatile, forcing companies to continuously revisit their
sourcing decisions and associated procurement strategies. Manufacturing labor costs in
China have risen sharply over the past four years and are now more than double those in
neighboring Vietnam and 35% higher than those in Mexico. The USA, China and Europe
are rapidly imposing, increasing, decreasing or eliminating tariffs in their current trade
wars. Commodity prices are also increasingly volatile, as are logistical costs. There are,
often, significant discrepancies between theoretical capacity levels and actual ones, due to
supply disruptions, pandemics, quality problems, rationing schemes, etc.
Manufacturing companies and retail chains often have access to two alternative supply
sources for component parts, product modules, finished goods or supply materials. One
source is typically low cost but has longer lead times, whereas the other provides quicker
response but at a higher price. The sources may be capacitated, and their capacity limits
may be different.
Which of the two sources is more attractive depends heavily on the difference between
the variable sourcing costs; however, this difference may fluctuate, heavily, due to the
above mentioned sources of volatility. The purchaser may select one of the two sources as
her exclusive supplier. Alternatively, it may either be necessary, because of capacity limits,
or it may be desirable to opt for a dual sourcing strategy which, at all times, or, under
some fluctuating conditions, procures from both sources. In the latter case, the challenge is
to determine how much of the total procurement volume to allocate to the two sources and
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how inventory information should be used to make these allocation decisions, dynamically.
The same dilemma arises when a firm has two (or more) assembly plants in different parts
of the world, with different costs, lead times and capacities to service its customer base.
These strategic and tactical dilemmas appear, in particular, when deciding between
offshoring and onshoring. The trend towards onshoring had already taken root in the past
decade, but the COVID19 pandemic has and will continue to accelerate this trend and
the realization that single sourcing results in highly vulnerable supply chains. National
industrial policies are reinforcing these trends. For example, the US’ most recent Executive
Order on Preserving Essential Medicines (August 4, 2020) mandates both “Maximizing
Domestic Production in Procurement”, as well as (Section 2(ii)) “dividing procurement
requirements among two or more manufacturers”.
The benefits of dual sourcing over single sourcing are often very significant, even in
a world with stable cost, demand and capacity structures. See Allon and Van Mieghem
[2010a], Allon and Van Mieghem [2010b] and Federgruen et al. [2019] and the references
therein. Not surprisingly, they are even more extensive in settings with fluctuating costs,
demand and capacity patterns, and uncertain yields.
Some volatilities arise because of randomly changing environmental factors, such as
fluctuating economic conditions (currency and interest rates, tariffs, labor cost indices,
consumer confidence index, etc.), seasonal patterns and uncertain market conditions, at
different stages of a product life-cycle. These may have a major effect on demand. For
such situations, the Markov chain approach provides a natural and flexible alternative for
modeling the demand process. In such an approach, environmental factors are represented
by a “state-of-the-world” modeled to fluctuate according to a Markov chain. The random
demand faced in any given period has a distribution determined by this state-of-the-world.
Markov-modulated demand processes also allow for parsimonious ways to represent de-
mands that are correlated across time, contrary to the vast majority of inventory theory
which, primarily for analytical tractability, assumes independence across time. Cost param-
eters and capacity levels may, similarly, fluctuate as a function of the state-of-the-world.
Other volatilities affect the actual outputs resulting from random supply processes. Sup-
pliers may only deliver a random fraction of the orders placed. This type of supply risk
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emerges because of uncertain yields, disruptions such as fires, hurricanes, strikes, sabotages
and terrorist attacks, or a random fraction of a production batch clearing quality standards.
In other settings, the capacity levels are random, because of uncertain availability of ma-
chines, human operators, or critical components or raw materials. A third example arises
when the supplier’s capacity is shared with other independent companies, and orders are
rationed.
In most supply chain settings, volatility is the prime driver of increased operating costs
or reduced service levels or sales volumes. One of the main managerial insights derived
in this chapter is that, under dual (or multi-) sourcing, increased volatility in the envi-
ronmental factors, far from acting as a hindrance, may, in fact, be exploited to improve
system performance, by effectively shifting procurement orders between the suppliers, as
the state-of-the-world emerges. The potential for such exploitations increases with the
available capacity levels.
In this chapter we analyze a dual sourcing periodic review model, for a single item, with
a finite or infinite planning horizon, in which cost parameters, demand distributions and
capacity levels may fluctuate as a function of an underlying state-of-the-world that captures
the relevant macroeconomic, seasonal and political factors such as the tariff percentages,
labor cost index, etc. This state-of-the-world evolves periodically in accordance with a finite
state Markov chain.
Each source has its own variable cost rate, fixed cost per order, lead time and capacity
limit for each period’s order. Additional costs include inventory carrying and backlogging
costs, where we assume that all shortages can be backlogged. Leftover inventory at the end
of each period can either be carried over to the next period, incurring an inventory holding
cost, or be salvaged, incurring variable salvage revenues, possibly in combination with a
fixed cost that is independent of the amount salvaged. All demand distributions, variable
cost and revenue rates and capacity levels may depend on the state-of-the world.
Our first contribution is to show how the optimal combined ordering strategy from the
two suppliers, along with a salvaging policy, can be efficiently computed. To this end,
we develop two approaches: The first is a dynamic programming approach in which net
aggregate orders (= order with regular supplier + order with expedited supplier − salvage
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quantity) are determined considering the expected cost under an optimal allocation among
these three inventory levers.
The second approach determines the ordering decisions, in each period, and for each
state of the world, in two stages, resulting in a sequence of nested triplets of one-dimensional
value functions. More specifically, we show that an optimal policy first determines the size of
an order with the expedited supplier, or the size of any salvage quantity, based, exclusively,
on the regular full inventory position and the prevailing state-of-the-world. Thereafter,
any order with the regular supplier is determined as a function of the adjusted inventory
position, again in combination with the prevailing state-of-the-world.
We use both approaches to characterize the relatively simple structure of the optimal
policies and show how the optimal procurement decisions vary with the inventory infor-
mation and prevailing state-of-the-world. We first treat the problem assuming all supply
processes are deterministic. Thereafter, we extend our results to allow for a broad class of
random supply processes, including random proportional or affine yields, random capacity
limits, rationing schemes and others. The above results apply to the special case where the
lead times of the two suppliers differ by a single period. As has been known for the sim-
plest of settings, under arbitrary lead time combinations, optimal procurement decisions
no longer depend on single inventory measures. However, our structural results suggest
effective heuristics for general lead time combinations.
We also provide various comparison results. For example, in the spirit of showing that
volatility of the environmental factors may be exploited to the firm’s benefit, we compare a
world in which the suppliers’ price points are independent of the state-of-the-world, to one
in which, say, the regular supplier’s unit price fluctuates with the latter as a martingale,
assuming the same starting value. The expected optimal cost under volatile prices is shown
to be lower than under a deterministic price path. More generally, define a price scheme
as the vector of unit prices charged by a supplier in the different states-of-the-world. We
introduce a partial volatility order on the space of price schemes, all with a given expected
price value, such that the expected total costs in every state and period is lower under the
more volatile price scheme.
When the states-of-the-world are ranked in increasing [decreasing] order of a supplier’s
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unit prices [capacity levels], we provide sufficient conditions that ensure that expected
optimal costs in every period and starting inventory position increase with the state-of-
the-world. When comparing two different transition probability matrices for the state-of-
the-world, we derive sufficient conditions under which the expected optimal costs in every
period and starting inventory position are larger under one matrix versus the other.
Many studies have addressed dual or multi-sourcing in settings where suppliers are dif-
ferentiated in terms of their prices, capacity levels and reliability, as expressed by random
yield distributions. Another dual sourcing literature stream considers suppliers differenti-
ated (at most) by their ordering cost structure, capacity levels and lead times. Both of
these literature streams assume that all cost parameters, demand and yield distributions,
when applicable, are deterministically known rather than fluctuating based on external
environmental factors. A third set of papers addresses Markov-modulated parameters and
distributions but only in single sourcing settings. The objective of this chapter is to analyze
dual sourcing for suppliers that are differentiated along any or all of the above dimensions,
and in a world where cost parameters, capacity levels and demand or supply distributions
are affected by a fluctuating external state of the world.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a literature
review. In Section 3.3 we introduce our general model and notation, however with deter-
ministic supply processes, i.e., an order placed is guaranteed to be received after a given
lead time. Section 3.4 develops our two approaches for an efficient determination of a com-
bined procurement strategy. In Section 3.5, we identify the structural properties of the
optimal strategies. Our theoretical comparison results and associated numerical studies are
covered in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 extends our results to cover random supply processes.
Section 3.8 concludes the chapter with some final observations and generalizations.
3.2 Literature Review
Four papers, in the sixties, addressed dual sourcing periodic review systems, where the two
suppliers charge different prices and their lead times are one period apart (consecutive lead
times): Barankin [1961], Daniel [1963], Neuts [1964] and Fukuda [1964]. Fukuda [1964]
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showed that under linear ordering costs and in the absence of capacity limits or salvage
opportunities, the optimal policy is a dual base-stock policy: the order with the expedited
supplier is governed by a base-stock policy acting on the starting (full) inventory position,
while that with the regular supplier is determined by a second base-stock policy acting
on the augmented inventory position that includes the order placed with the expedited
supplier.
The assumption of consecutive lead times was recognized as restrictive but Whittemore
and Saunders [1977] showed that under non-consecutive lead times, the optimal policy
depends on a vector of inventory measures, the dimension of which is given by the lead
time difference. As a consequence, the subsequent literature focused, largely, on heuristic
policies in Fukuda’s base model, but with general lead times. See Sun and Van Mieghem
[2018] for a recent survey of this literature.
Federgruen et al. [2019] incorporated several practical complications into the base model:
fixed order costs, salvage opportunities and capacity limits. The authors characterize the
structure of an optimal policy under consecutive lead times and design upper and lower
bounds as well as heuristic policies under general lead times; see there for a review of
earlier extensions of the base model. Part of Section 3.5 builds on these results.
An independent literature stream addresses dual and multi-sourcing settings where sup-
pliers experience randomness in their supply processes, but have zero (or identical) lead
times. Several papers assume only a supplier-dependent random fraction of each order ma-
terializes due to supply disruptions or quality control filtering, see Federgruen and Yang
[2011] and the references therein. This stochastic proportionality yield model was gener-
alized by Dada et al. [2007] to cover a broad spectrum of concave relationships between
input and (stochastic) output. Another set of papers consider settings where a supplier’s
aggregate capacity is random, see Chen and Gao [2019] and the references there in. Cachon
[2003] and Tang and Kouvelis [2014] consider settings where the supplier serves multiple
firms and rations orders proportionally when these exceed the full capacity. Feng and Shan-
thikumar [2018] synthesized these various literature streams, developing a general random
supply framework. Our results (Section 3.7) employ this framework. Chen et al. [2018] ad-
dress a dual souring model with random aggregate capacities (but no fixed costs or salvage
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opportunities) and supplier dependent lead times; see also Chen and Gao [2019] and Chen
[2017].
The above literature assumes that all model parameters are perfectly known from the
onset of the planning horizon. The paradigm of Markov-modulated inventory systems was
initiated in seminal periodic review papers by Karlin and Fabens [1960] and Iglehart and
Karlin [1962]. See also Zipkin [2000]. The state-of-the-world at the beginning of each period
determines the period’s demand distribution. Thus Iglehart and Karlin [1960] generalized
the standard paradigm of independent demands. All other model assumptions are standard:
order costs are linear, no capacity limits prevail, stockouts are backlogged and holding and
backlogging costs are proportional with end-of-the-period inventory levels. Iglehart and
Karlin [1960] establish that a state(-of-the-world) dependent base-stock policy is optimal.
Kalymon [1971] generalizes this model, allowing for fixed order costs and a positive
lead time, with the unit procurement cost rate and the demand distribution dependent on
the state-of-the-world. The authors show that a state-dependent (s, S) policy is optimal.
Johnson and Thompson [1975] show that when demands follow an autoregressive time
series process, this can be modeled as a Markov-modulated demand process. The authors
show that, under certain conditions in the parameters, a myopic policy is optimal in each
period. Lovejoy [1990] obtains similar results for i.i.d. demands in which some parameter
of the demand distribution is unknown, with estimates updated in a Bayesian fashion. A
one-dimensional sufficient statistic of the past demand observations serves as the state-of-
the-world.
Song and Zipkin [1993] develop a variant of the Iglehart and Karlin [1960] model in which
the demand process is Poisson with a state-of-the-world dependent rate, where a continuous-
time Markov process governs the state-of-the-world. Orders arrive after a (stochastic) lead
time. The authors show that a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal and provide
a condition on the state-of-the-world’s Markov chain under which the optimal base-stock
levels are monotone in the state-of-the-world. Under fixed order costs, a state-dependent
(r, S) policy is optimal where an order of size S−r is placed whenever the inventory position
drops to the review point r. Sethi and Cheng [1997], similarly, show that a state-dependent
(s, S) policy is optimal in a periodic review model, with general single-period demand
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distributions that depend on the state-of-the-world at the beginning of the period. This
result was conjectured in the seminal paper by Karlin and Fabens [1960]. Beyer et al. [1998]
establish that, under very general order cost and holding cost / backlogging cost structures,
a Markov policy is optimal among all history-dependent policies. Under a Markov policy,
only the current state, i.e., the inventory level and the state-of-the-world at the beginning
of the period, as well as the time index, determine current and future orders.
Song and Zipkin [1996] develop an application of this model where the state-of-the-
world describes the state an underlying facilities-in-series supply process. Finally, Chen
and Song [2001] address a model where the inventory system itself, is a facilities-in-series
system. Under linear ordering costs, an echelon base-stock policy is optimal, i.e., at each
echelon there is a state-of-the-world dependent order-up-to or base-stock level for the echelon
inventory position; the latter is the total inventory at this and all prior echelons or in transit
between them.
To our knowledge, Gong et al. [2014], building on Chao et al. [2008], is the only paper
addressing a Markov-modulated dual sourcing problem, indeed one with random supplies.
Each supplier may be in an “on” or “off” state; the two supplier states evolve according to
two independent two-state Markov chains. The suppliers’ states in a given period become
known only after orders are placed. The model may be viewed as a special case of ours,
without capacity limits, fixed costs or salvage opportunities, lead times le = 0 and lr = 1 and
random but independent supply processes which follow the proportional yield model with
Bernouilli yield distributions. The authors allow for price-dependent demand distributions
with each period’s price chosen by the firm. In our model, we omit this additional inventory
and profit lever, but it could be added with minor adjustments.
3.3 Model and Notation
We index the periods backward from 1 to N . The sequence of events in period n is as
follows: at the beginning of period n, an earlier order may arrive from the expedited or the
regular supplier, or both. Such deliveries are added to the inventory level. The Markovian
state-of-the-world is then revealed. The firm now decides on new order sizes to be placed
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with each of the two suppliers as well as any salvage quantity if it wants to reduce its
inventory position. The inventory adjustments will be realized after their corresponding
lead times. Stochastic demand is then realized and satisfied with on-hand inventory. At
the end of the period, any unsatisfied demand is fully backlogged while leftover inventory
is carried over to the next period.
For period n = N, . . . , 1, let
le, lr, ls = the lead time for ordering from the expedited supplier, regular supplier,
salvaging, respectively, where lr = le + 1 and ls = le;
1
in = the state-of-the-world in period n, in ∈ I := {1, . . . , L};
{in} = a Markov chain with L× L transition matrix P = {pij};
Kin,e,K
i
n,r = fixed cost for any expedited and regular order place in period n, respec-
tively, when in = i;
Cin,e, C
i
n,r = capacity limit for any expedited and regular order placed in period n, re-
spectively, when in = i;
cin,e, c
i
n,r = unit price charged by the expedited and regular suppliers for orders placed









n,v = fixed cost, unit revenue and capacity limit for salvage batches initiated in
period n, respectively, when in = i;
Din = demand in period n when in = i,D
i
n ≥ 0 with known distribution functions;
α = discount factor, α ∈ [0, 1].
We impose the following restrictions on the cost parameters:
Assumption 3.1. In any period, the unit order costs, the unit salvage revenue and back-




Assumption 3.1 (i) precludes the possibility of arbitrage opportunities where goods
are procured from the expedited supplier and sold at a premium via the salvage channel.
1The case ls = lr may be handled analogously.
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Similarly, Assumption 3.1 (ii) precludes the possibility of buying units from the regular
supplier and initiating the sell-off of these units, at a profit, one period later. Let
xn = the inventory position at the beginning of period n
= the beginning inventory level, i.e., on-hand inventory minus backlogs, plus all out-
standing orders from both suppliers, exclusive of this period’s new orders;
qn,e = the order with the expedited supplier in period n, (qn,e ≥ 0);
qn,v = the negative inventory adjustment due to a salvage batch initiated in period n, (qn,v ≤ 0);
qn,r = the size of the order placed with the regular supplier in period n, (qn,r ≥ 0);
δ(x) = the Heaviside function, i.e., δ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise.
It is never optimal to place an order with the expedited supplier and to initiate a salvage
batch in the same period: if the net inventory position adjustment is positive [negative], one
is better off reducing the expedited order [salvage batch] to the level of the net inventory
adjustment and canceling the salvage batch [expedited order]. In Section 3.7, we will see
that this aggregation is not necessarily possible under random supply mechanisms.
The inventory position dynamics are given by
xn−1 = xn + qn,e + qn,v + qn,r −Dinn .
Moreover, the inventory level In−le at the end of period n− le is given by
In−le := xn + qn,e + qn,v −D
in
n,n−le , (3.1)
where Dinn,m is the aggregate demand in the time interval [n,m] with m ≤ n, and the
state-of-the-world in period n is in.
Assume the inventory and backlogging related costs depend on the end-of-period inven-
tory level sizes only. Instead of charging the actual inventory costs that arise at the end
of period m (m = 1, 2, ...) to that period, one obtains an equivalent representation of the
controllable part of the total expected discounted cost by charging its expected value to
period m + le, employing the stochastic identity (3.1). Thus for all n = N, . . . , 1 and all
i ∈ I, let
Lin(xn + qn,e + qn,v) = the expected value of all inventory and backlogging related costs at
the end of period n− le discounted back to period n, when in = i.
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In terms of the expected holding and backlogging cost functions Lin(·), we introduce a
standard assumption:
Assumption 3.2. (a) The functions Lin(·) are strictly convex and continuously differen-
tiable, with derivatives Lin
′
(·) and inverse derivatives (Lin
′
)−1(·). Lin(x) = O(|x|p) and
Lin
′
(x) = O(|x|p) for some p ≥ 1, n = N, . . . , 1, i ∈ I.





(x) < −cin,e − c̄n−1,r/α and limx↑∞ Lin
′
(x) > (−cin,v)+, where c̄n,r :=
maxj{cjn,r}.
Remark 3.1. Thus, while we allow the Lin(·) functions to be super-linear, Assumption 3.2 (a)
ensures that they remain polynomially bounded. If Lin(·) is super-linear as x ↑ ∞ and
x ↓ −∞, limx↓−∞ Lin
′
(x) = −∞ and limx↑∞ Lin
′
(x) =∞ and Assumption 3.2 (c) is clearly
satisfied. In the standard setting with linear holding and backlogging cost rates and demand








Moreover, the first inequality in Assumption 3.2 (c) is without practical loss of generality.
The same holds when a non-negative unit salvage revenue is obtained, i.e., cin,v ≥ 0. The
resulting case has linear holding costs, with a significant net unit salvage cost, i.e., cin,v < 0.
In this case, the requirement hin > (−cin,v)+ may be violated. The purpose of the second
limit in part (c) is to ensure that for large enough inventory positions, it is beneficial to use
the salvage option when it is available; indeed, when cin,v < 0 is sufficiently negative, it may




rhin−r. Only minor adjustments to the analysis are needed to address this
relaxed assumption.
Let
f in(x) = the optimal discounted expected total cost in the last n periods of the planning
horizon, when period n is started with an inventory position x and in = i.
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For any function h : R → R, let h′(·) [h′+(·), h′−(·)] denote its derivative [right-hand
derivative, left-hand derivative]. Similarly, for h : Rm → R with m ≥ 2, ∂+h [∂−h] denotes
the right-hand [left-hand] partial derivative.
3.4 Two Approaches for an Efficient Determination of a
Combined Procurement Strategy
In this section, we derive two alternative approaches for the efficient determination of a
combined ordering and salvaging policy.
3.4.1 The Aggregate Order Approach
Consider each period n = N, . . . , 1 and a state-of-the-world i ∈ I. The first approach is to
project the detailed procurement strategies onto ones dealing with the aggregate inventory
position adjustment Q = qe + qv + qr, considering the expected cost under the optimal
disaggregation of Q among 0 ≤ qe ≤ Cin,e, −Cin,v ≤ qv ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ qr ≤ Cin,r, such that
qe + qv + qr = Q ∈ [−Cin,v, Cin,e + Cin,r]. Note that










{cin,eqe + cin,vqv + cin,rqr
+Kin,eδ(qe) +K
i
n,vδ(−qe) +Kin,rδ(qr) + Lin(x+ qe + qv)}.
(3.2)
In the absence of fixed costs, the solution to (3.2) can be obtained virtually in closed form,
providing much insight into how an “aggregate order” is optimally disaggregated among
the three options, and how the procurement cost rates, capacity levels and the shape of the
inventory/backlogging functions Lin(·) interact with each other in determining the optimal
disaggregation.
Lemma 3.1 (Properties of the function Gin(·, ·)). Fix a period n and a state-of-the-world




n,r = 0, then
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(a) the function Gin(x,Q) is jointly strictly convex in (x,Q);
(b) the function Gin(x,Q) is supermodular in (x,Q).
We now characterize the optimal solution to the disaggregation problem (3.2), in the
absence of fixed costs. See Appendix C.2 for a characterization in the general case, with
fixed costs. In this case, Gin(x,Q) = min{Gin,1(x,Q), Gin,2(x,Q)}, where
Gin,1(x,Q) = min
(Q−Cin,r)+≤qe≤min{Q,Cin,e}
{cin,rQ−∆inqe + Lin(x+ qe)}, (3.3)
Gin,2(x,Q) = min
max{Q−Cin,r,−Cin,v}≤qv≤min{Q,0}
{cin,rQ− ∆̃inqv + Lin(x+ qv)}, (3.4)
with ∆in := c
i
n,r− cin,e, the price difference between the suppliers, and ∆̃in := cin,r− cin,v, the
difference between regular supplier’s price and the unit salvage revenue. The lower bounds
in (3.3) and (3.4) follow from Q− qe = qr ≤ Cin,r and Q− qv = qr ≤ Cin,r, respectively. The
feasible regions are non-empty closed intervals since −Cin,v ≤ Q ≤ Cin,r + Cin,e, so that
Cin,e ≥ (Q− Cin,r)+ and Q ≥ [Q− Cin,r]+. (3.5)
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal order disaggregation between two suppliers). Fix a period n
and a state-of-the-world i. Assume Kin,r = K
i




e) denote the optimal
solution of (3.3) that defines Gin,1(x,Q). Without loss of generality, assume Q ≤ Cin,r+Cin,e









)−1(∆in)− [Q− Cin,r]+ > x∗1.
(a) If x ≤ x∗1:
q∗r = [Q− Cin,e]+, q∗e = min{Q,Cin,e}.
(b) If x∗1 < x < x
∗
2:









(c) If x ≥ x∗2:
q∗r = min{Q,Cin,r}, q∗e = [Q− Cin,r]+.
(d) Gin,1(x,Q) is continuously differentiable with respect to x, and
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Figure 3.1 shows that, for a given aggregate order, q∗r is a piecewise linear increasing
function of x, and q∗e is a piecewise linear decreasing function, both with breakpoints at x
∗
1
and x∗2: If the inventory position is sufficiently low, i.e., x ≤ x∗1, one allocates as much as
possible of the total order Q to the expedited supplier. Similarly, if x ≥ x∗2, one allocates as
much as possible to the regular supplier. In the middle region, x∗1 < x < x
∗
2, neither one of
the suppliers operates at capacity: q∗r increases linearly (with slope +1) from its minimum
level [Q−Cin,e]+ to its maximum level min{Q,Cin,r}, while q∗e decreases linearly (with slope















Figure 3.1: Dependence of q∗r and q
∗
e on the starting inventory position x
Proposition 3.1 also exhibits how various model parameters impact on the optimal
allocation of aggregate orders between the two suppliers. For example, if in a given period
n and state-of-the-world i, the unit price of the regular supplier increases by δ, this will
cause both x∗1 and x
∗




)−1(∆in + δ)− (Lin
′
)−1(∆in).
As a consequence, maximum usage of her competitor (the expedited supplier) is extended
over a larger region, while maximum usage of the regular supplier is curtailed to a smaller
range of starting inventory positions. In the intermediate range, an amount S is shifted
from the order with the regular supplier toward that of the expedited supplier. Corollary 3.1
characterizes the optimal solution of (3.4), which defines Gin,2(x,Q).
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Corollary 3.1 (Optimal order disaggregation between regular supplier and salvaging). Fix









denote the optimal solution of (3.4) that defines Gin,2(x,Q). Without loss of generality,
assume −Cin,v ≤ Q ≤ Cin,r. Let ∆̃in := cin,r − cin,v, x̃1(Q) := (Lin
′





)−1(∆̃in)−max{Q− Cin,r,−Cin,v} > x̃1(Q).
(a) If x ≤ x̃1:
q∗r = max{Q, 0}, q∗v = min{Q, 0}.
(b) If x̃1 < x < x̃2:









(c) If x ≥ x̃2:
q∗r = min{Q+ Cin,v, Cin,r}, q∗e = max{Q− Cin,r,−Cin,v}.
(d) Gin,2(x,Q) is continuously differentiable with respect to x, and



















3.4.2 The Two-Stage Decision Approach
We now describe an alternative approach in which the decision problem in each period
is modeled as a two-stage process: in the first stage, either an order with the expedited
supplier or a salvage quantity is determined, or neither; based on this decision, an order with
the regular supplier is chosen in the second stage. This represents the classical approach
for dual sourcing problems, ever since the seminal paper by Fukuda [1964].
As mentioned, under Assumption 3.1, it is never optimal to place an order with the
expedited supplier along with the initiation of a salvage order. Therefore
f in(x) = min{f in,1(x), f in,2(x)}, (3.6)
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where
f in,1(x) = the minimum total expected cost in the last n periods, when starting with an
inventory position of x units, with in = i, and assuming an expedited order is
preferred over a salvage sale,
f in,2(x) = the minimum total expected cost in the last n periods, when starting with an
inventory position of x units, with in = i, and assuming a salvage sale is preferred
over an expedited order.
These functions satisfy the recursions:




















f in,2(x) = min
qv∈[−Cin,v ,0],qr∈[0,Cin,r]
{









Since (3.7) and (3.8) share the last three terms, by substituting
y = x+ qe + qv
= adjusted inventory position after inclusion of any expedited order or salvage sale quan-
tity,
z = y + qr = x+ qe + qv + qr
= inventory position after inclusion of of all inventory adjustments,
we can rewrite (3.7) and (3.8) as
f in,1(x) = min
y∈[x,x+Cin,e]
{Kin,eδ(y − x) + cin,e(y − x) + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)},
f in,2(x) = min
y∈[x−Cin,v ,x]
{Kin,vδ(x− y) + cin,v(y − x) + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)},
where
f in,r(y) = min
z∈[y,y+Cin,r]







The optimal combined ordering and salvaging policy can be obtained by computing a series
of nested one-dimensional value functions, and this under general parameters and demand
distributions. Specifically, one starts with the evaluation of the function f in,r(·), followed by
that of f in,1(·) and f in,2(·). The ultimate value function f in(·) is obtained as the pointwise
minimum of the functions f in,1(·) and f in,2(·).
3.5 Structural Properties
We first address the general problem in the absence of any fixed costs. In this case, we
can show that the optimal policy has a very simple structure: in each period, the optimal
order with the expedited supplier and the optimal salvage quantity are prescribed by a
double modified base-stock policy with base-stock levels Sin,e < S
i
n,v: whenever the starting
inventory position is below [above] Sin,e [S
i
n,v], it is optimal to bring the inventory position
as close as possible to Sin,e [S
i
n,v]. As to the order with the regular supplier, the optimal
policy is again a modified base-stock policy acting on the adjusted inventory position, i.e.,
there exits a base-stock level Sin,r such that it is optimal to bring the adjusted inventory
position as close as possible to Sin,r.
Table 3.1: Optimal policy structure for systems without fixed costs
(a) Expedited supplier and salvage
xn (−∞, Sin,e) [Sin,e, Sin,v] (Sin,v,∞)
y∗n,i(xn) min{Sin,e, xn + Cin,e} xn max{Sin,v, xn − Cin,v}
(b) Regular supplier
y∗n,i (−∞, Sin,r) [Sin,r,∞)
z∗n,i(y
∗
n,i) min{Sin,r, y∗n,i + Cin,r} y∗n,i
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal policy structure without fixed costs). Assume all terminal value







(x) ≥ 0, while f i0(x) = O(|x|p). Assume all fixed order and salvage costs are





(a) For all n = N, . . . , 1 and i ∈ I, the value functions f in(·) are strictly convex and, there-
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fore, differentiable almost everywhere. The value functions f in,r(·) are strictly convex
for n ≥ 2 and differentiable everywhere, with the possible exception of two points.
Moreover, f in
′
(x) = O(|x|p) while limx↓−∞ f in
′
(x) < −c̄n−1,r/α and limx↑∞ f in
′
(x) ≥ 0.
(b) Fix n = N, . . . , 1 and i ∈ I. The optimal order with the expedited supplier and the
optimal salvage quantity are prescribed by a modified base-stock policy with base-stock
levels Sin,e < S
i





is optimal to place an order with the expedited supplier [to initiate a salvage batch] that
brings the inventory position as close as possible to Sin,e [S
i
n,v]. Similarly, a modified
base-stock policy with base-stock level Sin,r, acting on the adjusted inventory position,
optimally prescribes any order with the regular supplier. See Table 3.1.




v(x) are non-increasing in the starting inventory position x.
In the presence of fixed order or salvage costs, the structure of the optimal policy
becomes significantly more complex. This complexity arises, in particular, because of the
interaction between fixed costs and capacity limits. Indeed, the structure is notoriously
complex, even in the single sourcing model, without any salvaging and without any Markov
modulation of the parameters or demand distributions. More specifically, that model has
been studied by Wijngaard [1972], Chen and Lambrecht [1996], Chen [2004] and Gallego
and Scheller-Wolf [2000]; see also Gallego and Toktay [2004]. All that can be established is
the existence of two threshold values for the starting inventory position in any given period:
below the first threshold, it is optimal to place a maximum size order, and above the second
threshold, it is optimal not to order at all. However, in between the two thresholds, we
may alternate between intervals where it is optimal to order and those where it is optimal
to stay put.
The complexities in the basic single sourcing model notwithstanding, we are able to
provide a characterization of the structure of the optimal policy in our general Markov-
modulated dual sourcing problem with fixed costs, salvage opportunities and capacity limits.
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{cin,e(y − x) + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)},
Ain,1(x) = g̃
i





{cin,v(y − x) + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)},
Ain,2(x) = g̃
i



















Thus, in period n that starts in state-of-the-world i and with an inventory position x,
Ain,1(x) denotes the expected incremental total costs in period n when placing an optimally
sized positive order with the expedited supplier relative to foregoing any such order (or
salvage batch), Ain,2(x) denotes the expected incremental total costs in period n when
initiating an optimally sized salvage batch relative to foregoing any such salvage batch (or
order with the expedited supplier), and Ain,r(y) represents the expected incremental total
costs in period n when placing an optimally sized positive order with the regular supplier
relative to forgoing any such order.
Let
Bin,e(x) = inf{ arg min
y∈[x,x+Cin,e]
{cin,ey + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)}},
Sin(x) = sup{ arg min
y∈[x−Cin,v ,x]
{cin,vy + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)}},












n,r(y), respectively, and define the following
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critical points for period n with in = i:
Bin,e = inf{arg min
y
{cin,ey + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)}}, bin,e = inf{x : Ain,1(x) ≥ 0}, b̄in,e = sup{x : Ain,1(x) < 0},
Sin = sup{arg min
y
{cin,vy + Lin(y) + f in,r(y)}}, sin = sup{x : Ain,2(x) ≥ 0}, ¯s
i
n = inf{x : Ain,2(x) < 0},







n)}}, bin,r = inf{x : Ain,r(x) ≥ 0}, b̄in,r = sup{x : Ain,r(x) < 0}.
The next theorem establishes the structure of the firm’s optimal order and salvage
strategies in the presence of fixed costs.
Theorem 3.2 (Optimal policy structure with fixed costs). Assume all fixed costs are inde-
pendent of the state-of-the-world (hence dropping the superscript). For n = N, ..., 1, i ∈ I,
assume:







(ii) Kn ≥ αKn−1, Kn,v ≥ αKn−1,v;
(iii) maxiC
i
n ≤ miniCin−1, maxiCin,v ≤ miniCin−1,v.
Also assume that f i0(x) = O(|x|p) is convex for i ∈ I. Then:
(a) The critical points are ranked as follows:
bin,e ≤ b̄in,e ≤ ¯s
i
n,e ≤ sin,e, bin,r ≤ b̄in,r, for i ∈ I.




n,i) (see Table 3.2), which
are either uniquely determined or take a value in a bi-valued set {·, ·}.
The theorem applies under a number of important restrictions. First, the two suppliers
share the same capacity in each state-of-the-world. The two suppliers also share the same
fixed order costs, see assumption (i). Moreover, the dependence of the supplier’s capacity
level on the state-of-the-world is restricted by assumption (iii), in particular when capacity
fails to be expanding significantly over time. Finally, assumption (ii) restricting the time-
dependence of the fixed order costs, is standard and required even for the optimality of an
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Table 3.2: Optimal policy structure for systems with fixed costs
(a) Expedited supplier and salvage










n,e(xn) {Bin,e(xn), xn} xn {Sin(xn), xn} Sin(xn)
(b) Regular supplier







n,i) {Bin,r(yin,i), y∗n,i} y∗n,i
(s, S) policy in the single sourcing model without salvage opportunities, capacity limits or
any Markov modulation of the parameters or demand distributions, see Scarf [1960].
The structure of the optimal first stage policy is very specific, except for the second
and fourth region in Table 3.2a. In the second [fourth] region, we may alternate between
intervals in which one orders with the expedited supplier [salvages] and those in which
one stays put. All that can be guaranteed in the second [fourth] interval is that salvaging
[placing an order with the expedited supplier] fails to be optimal. Similarly, the middle
region in Table 3.2b presents the same ambiguity.
However, in our extensive numerical studies, we have never encountered an instance
in which any of the above intermediate regions arises. Indeed, it is immediate that these
regions vanish when the functions Ain,1(·), Ain,2(·) and Ain,r(·) have a single root.
3.6 Comparison Results
In this section, we derive various comparison results between pairs of systems that are
differentiated in terms of the specific way one of the model parameters fluctuates with the
state-of-the-world. We focus, in particular, on the unit procurement cost rates {cin,e} and
{cin,r} as well as the capacity levels {Cin,e} and {Cin,r}.
3.6.1 The Impact of the Cost Rate vs State-of-the-World
Interdependency
In this subsection, we focus on the way the unit cost rates fluctuate with the state-of-the-
world. To start our discussion, consider settings where the unit cost rates for the regular
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suppliers are independent of the state-of-the-world, while those pertaining to the expedited
supplier are state-dependent. The results for the reverse case are analogous.
Our first theorem (Theorem 3.3) compares a world in which the dependence of the cost
rate of the expedited supplier {cin,e}, with respect to the state-of-the-world i, is minimal,
in the limit non-existent, versus one where there is significant fluctuation of {cin,e} as a
function of i. To compare apples with apples, we assume that in the second system, the
expected unit cost rate in every period is identical to the deterministic cost rate in the first
system.
Consider therefore two systems in a general model. In system I (the stable price world)
all unit cost rates {cin,e} are independent of the state-of-the-world {in} progression, i.e.,
cin,e = c
∗
n,e, i ∈ I, n = N, . . . , 1. In system II (the volatile price world), the cost rates
{cin,e} have a general dependence on the state-of-the-world, however with E[cinn,e|c
iN
N,e =
c∗N,e] ≤ c∗n,e, n = N, . . . , 1. Assume, further, that only {cin,e} are dependent on the state-
of-the-world but not the remaining model primitives, in particular the unit cost rates of
the regular supplier, the demand distributions, the Ln(·) functions, or the capacity levels.
In this case, we obtain a strong comparison result between the two systems: under any
demand trajectory, expected total costs are lower in the volatile price world.
Theorem 3.3 (Volatile price world v.s. stable price world). Consider systems I and II as




N,e] ≤ c∗n,e for n = N, . . . , 1.
(a) Fix an arbitrary demand trajectory {dn}. The expected optimal total costs under the
volatile price model is lower than that under the stable price model, for any starting
period n and state of the system (x, i).
(b) In particular, let {f in,I(·)} and {f in,II(·)} denote the value functions in systems I and
II, respectively. f in,II(x) ≤ f in,I(x) for all n = N, . . . , 1, i ∈ I and x ∈ R.
The proof shows that the optimal policy π in system I incurs a lower expected cost in
system II, under any demand trajectory. Clearly, policy π can be improved in several ways:
first, if the expected unit cost rate for the expedited supplier is c∗n,e, there is a set of states-
of-the-world I− in which cin,e < c
∗
n,e and a set I
+ where cin,e > c
∗
n,e. Even without altering
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the total orders placed on any given sample path, by Proposition 3.1, expected costs can
be lowered by assigning a larger [smaller] part of the order to the expedited supplier when
the state-of-the-world is in I− [I+], and the magnitude of the desired shifts depends, quite
intuitively, on the magnitude of c∗n,e − cin,e and hence ∆in, as in Proposition 3.1. Second,
when encountering a favorable [unfavorable] state-of-the-world in ∈ I− [I+], it is, usually,
beneficial to increase [reduce] the total order size as well. (See the discussion following
Theorem 3.4.)




N,e] ≤ c∗n,e for any n can be satisfied by two types
of Markov chains:






≤ c∗n,e for any value of in+1.







Example 3.2. Assume {c∗n,e} is stationary, i.e., c∗n,e = c∗e. Consider a Markov chain where






≤ cin+1n+1,e. Then starting
from ciNN,e = c
∗









We now compare two volatile price worlds, with the same Markov chain determining
the evolution of the state-of-the-world {in, n = N, . . . , 1}. The two systems differ only in
the dependence of the unit cost prices on the state-of-the-world. Variations in these cost
rates, as a function of the state-of-the-world, are less severe in the first system as compared
to the second one. More specifically, let {cin,e} and {c̃in,e} denote the set of cost rates in the
two systems, and assume, without loss of generality, that cost rates are ascending in the
state-of-the-world:
c1n,e ≤ c2n,e ≤ · · · ≤ cLn,e and c̃1n,e ≤ c̃2n,e ≤ · · · c̃Ln,e. (3.10)
Furthermore, assume there exists a state 1 ≤ k ≤ L such that for all n = N, . . . , 1:
c̃in,e ≤ cin,e, for i = 1, . . . , k, and c̃in,e ≥ cin,e, for i = k + 1, . . . , L. (3.11)
Thus, the cost rates in the second, more volatile system span a larger spectrum of values.
An additional assumption is that, in any given period and state-of-the-world, the expected
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cost rate in the next period is at least as large in the first, more stable system as compared







n−1,e|in = i] ≥ E[c̃
in−1






Unlike Theorem 3.3, we allow the state-of-the-world to impact capacity levels, demand
distributions, the regular supplier’s unit cost rates as well as those of the expedited supplier.
To isolate the impact of the latter cost rates, we merely assume the dependence of all other
model primitives and the state-of-the-world as identical in both systems I and II.
Theorem 3.4 (Benefiting from increased price volatility). Consider the “more stable price
model”, system I, and the “more volatile price model”, system II, defined above. In par-
ticular, assume conditions (3.11) and (3.12) apply. Let {f in(·)} and {f̃ in(·)} denote the
value functions in systems I and II, respectively. Let q∗n,e(x, i) denote the optimal order size
with the expedited supplier, in system I, in period n when starting in state (x, i). Assume
{q∗n,e(x, i)} is decreasing in i. If f̃
j
0 (·) = f
j
0 (·) for all j ∈ I, then f̃ in(x) ≤ f in(x) for all
n = N, . . . , 1, i = 1, . . . , k and x ∈ R.
Proof. Let π∗ denote the optimal policy under system I, and π̃∗ the policy in system II
which in period n prescribes the same order decisions as π∗ in state (x, i), but is followed
by the optimal policy for system II in subsequent periods. Since this is a feasible policy in
system II,





n,e(x, i) + q
∗
n,v(x, i) + q
∗
n,r(x, i)−Din)
− f̃ jn−1(x+ q
∗
n,e(x, i) + q
∗
n,v(x, i) + q
∗
n,r(x, i)−Din)], (3.13)




n,r(x, i) denote the order sizes and salvage quantity prescribed
by policy π when (x, i) is the starting state in period n. Since the state in = i ≤ k, the first
term in (3.13) is non-negative. It suffices to show that the second term is non-negative as
well.
Given a starting inventory position xn = x in period n, let {xr : r = n − 1, . . . , 1}
denote the inventory position process under policy π. We prove, by induction, that for all
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r−1(xr−1)] ≥ 0. (3.14)
Since f j0 (·) = f̃
j
0 (·) for all j ∈ I, (3.14) holds for r = 1. Assume it holds for some r =
1, . . . , n− 1. Then
L∑
j=1














































n,e − c̃jn,e] ≥ 0.
The first inequality follows by bounding f̃ jr (xr), in system II, by the expected total (dis-
counted) cost under the feasible policy which, in period r, adopts the order sizes prescribed
by policy π, but follows system II’s optimal policy π̃, thereafter. The second inequality
follows from the induction assumption; and the third inequality from the monotonicity
of {q∗e(xr, j)} in j and (3.11). Finally, the last inequality results from (3.12). We have
completed the induction proof for (3.14), and hence the proof for the theorem.
Theorem 3.4 shows that a more volatile price world may be exploited to the decision
maker’s advantage. In general, supply chains suffer under increased volatility. The funda-
mental difference is that, in our model the decision maker is able to observe the realizations
of the more volatile Markov process governing the evolution of the state-of-the-world. It
allows the decision maker to increase her order with the expedited supplier in low-indexed
states where, in the more volatile price model, the prices charged by the expedited supplier
go down. Conversely, it allows the decision maker to reduce the order sizes to the expected
supplier in high-indexed states where the unit prices increase relative to those in the more
stable price world (system I).
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Remark 3.2. Assumption (3.11) stipulates a single crossing-sate k when comparing the
price vectors {cin,e} and {c̃in,e}. It follows from the proof of Theorem 3.4 that this crossing-
state k may be time-dependent, i.e., k = kn, n = N, . . . , 1.
Remark 3.3. The theorem requires the monotonicity property of the optimal order sizes
{q∗n,e(x, j)} in the state-of-the-world j.
This monotonicity property is intuitive and holds, with great generality. However, it is
sometimes violated, as the following example shows: consider a stationary model without
fixed costs and salvage options, modulated by a 3-state Markov chain: the good, middle and
the bad state as manifested by the expedited supplier’s unit cost rates c1n,e = 15, c
2
n,e = 20
and c3n,e = 80. We normalize the regular supplier’s unit cost rate cn,r = 0, in every state-of-
the-world. The regular [expedited] supplier has a capacity level Cr = 6 [Ce = 3]. The single
period demand is normally distributed with mean µ = 5 and standard deviation σ = 2.
Unit holding and backlogging cost rates are h = 5 and p = 95, respectively. The lead times







In Figure 3.2, below, we display the order quantities q∗e(x) as prescribed by the optimal
policy for a remaining horizon n ≥ 36. Note that when the starting inventory level x is in
the range [16, 19], a larger order is placed with the expedited supplier, in the middle state














Figure 3.2: An example violating the monotonicity assumption in Theorem 3.4
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The intuition behind this at first surprising phenomenon is as follows. When we are
in the good state, we remain there for a geometrically distributed number of periods, on
average (0.2)−1 = 5 periods. But as soon as we land in the middle state, we move in one
single period to the bad state to remain there forever. Thus, when arriving in the middle
state, it pays to increase the order with the expedited supplier (compared to that placed
in the good state) to reduce future cost surges.
However, numerical experiments indicate that violation of the monotonicity of {q∗n,e(x, i)}
in i is very rare. As a consequence, this monotonicity property can be imposed as an upfront
restriction to the class of admissible policies, without significant or any loss of optimality.
Furthermore, these numerical experiments show that even if the monotonicity assumption
on {q∗n,e(x, i)} is violated, the conclusion in Theorem 3.4 typically still holds.
Next we show that under some conditions the value functions are monotone in the state-
of-the-world. We continue to assume that the states-of-the-world I = {1, . . . , L} are ranked
in ascending order of the unit cost rates, i.e., for all n = N, . . . , 1:
c1n,r ≤ · · · ≤ cLn,r; c1n,e ≤ · · · ≤ cLn,e; c1n,v ≤ · · · ≤ cLn,v. (3.15)
If only these cost rates depend on the state-of-the-world, one would expect that all optimal
total expected costs are increasing in the initial state-of-the-world, for any starting period
n and starting inventory position x. This can, indeed, be guaranteed as long as the state-
of-the-world in next period, in−1, is stochastically increasing in the state-of-the-world in
current period, in, i.e.,
(in−1|in = i) ≤st (in−1|in = j), for any pair 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L. (3.16)
See Massey [1987] for a general treatment of stochastically monotone Markov processes.
Song and Zipkin [1993] used the same stochastic monotonicity condition to prove that the
optimal policy thresholds are monotone in the state-of-the-world. In their single sourcing
model without capacity limits and salvage opportunities, the demand process is Poisson
with a rate which depends on the state-of-the-world.
Theorem 3.5 (Optimal cost monotone in state-of-the-world under price fluctuations).
Consider a general Markov-modulated dual sourcing model, in which only the unit cost
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rates {cin,r}, {cin,e} and {cin,v} depend on the state-of-the-world. Assume conditions (3.15)
and (3.16) apply and the terminal value function f j0 (·) is pointwise increasing in j. Then
f jn(x) is increasing in j for all n = N, . . . , 1 and x ∈ R.
We now compare two Markov-modulated dual sourcing models, with I = {1, . . . , L} the
common set of states-of-the-world, and with identical cost parameters, capacity levels and
demand distributions, but different Markov processes for the state-of-the-world. Let {in}
and {̃in} denote these Markov processes in system I and II, respectively. As in Theorem 3.5,
we assume that the capacity limits {Cin,r}, {Cin,e} and {Cin,v} and demand distributions of
the state-of-the-world are independent of the state-of-the-world, and that, in both systems
the state-of-the-world in the next period is stochastically increasing in the current state-of-
the-world, i.e., for any pair of states 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L and all n = N, . . . , 1:
(in−1|in = i) ≤st (in−1|in = j), (̃in−1 |̃in = i) ≤st (̃in−1 |̃in = j). (3.17)
Also, for any state-of-the-world in period n, the state-of-the-world in the next period is
stochastically larger under system I versus system II:
(in−1|in = j) ≥st (̃in−1 |̃in = j) n = N, . . . , 1, j ∈ I. (3.18)
Theorem 3.6 (Comparing different Markov processes under price fluctuations). Consider
two general Markov-modulated dual sourcing models with a common set of states-of-the-
world I = {1, . . . , L} and identical cost parameters, capacity limits and demand distribu-
tions. Moreover, all capacity limits and demand distribution are independent of the state-of-
the-world. Assume all unit procurement cost rates are increasing in the state-of-the-world,
as in (3.15), and the Markov processes {in} and {̃in} satisfy (3.17) and (3.18). Let f in(·)
and f̃ in(·) denote the value functions in systems I and II, respectively. Then, f in(x) ≥ f̃ in(x)
for all n = N, . . . , 1, i ∈ I and x ∈ R, provided f i0(·) ≥ f̃ i0(·) for all i ∈ I.
3.6.2 Markov World Affecting Capacity Limit
Now consider a Markov chain that only affects one of the two suppliers’ capacity, without
loss of generality that of the regular supplier. As in Section 3.6.1, we assume the states-of-
the-world I = {1, . . . , L} are ranked in decreasing order of attractiveness, which, in terms
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of capacity levels, means:
C1n,r ≥ C2n,r · · · ≥ CLn,r. (3.19)
Theorem 3.7 establishes that the value functions are, correspondingly, pointwise increasing
in the state-of-the-world, assuming the state-of-the-world in the next period is stochastically
increasing in the current state-of-the-world. Theorem 3.8 compares two models with the
same cost parameters, demand distribution and capacity levels but driven by two distinct
Markov chains with the same state space I. Assume that for any current state-of-the-world,
the next (period’s) state-of-the-world is stochastically larger in system I as compared to
system II, and the expected optimal total cost, in any period n = N, . . . , 1 and any starting
state (x, i), is larger in system I than system II, as well.
Thus Theorem 3.7 – 3.8 may be viewed as the direct counterparts of Theorem 3.5 – 3.6,
respectively. One might conjecture that Theorem 3.3 – 3.4 have direct counterparts as well,
but numerical examples in Section 3.6.3 show that this fails to be the case.
Theorem 3.7 (Optimal cost monotone in state-of-the-world under capacity fluctuations).
Assume the state-of-the-world affects only the regular supplier’s capacity, as in (3.19), con-
dition (3.16) applies and the terminal value function f j0 (·) is pointwise increasing in j. Then
f jn(x) is increasing in j for all n = N, . . . , 1 and x ∈ R.
Assume, again, that the state-of-the-world affects only the regular supplier’s capacity as
in (3.19). Consider two Markov-modulated models differentiated only by the Markov chain
governing the state-of-the-world.
Theorem 3.8 (Comparing different Markov processes under capacity fluctuations). Con-
sider two general Markov-modulated dual sourcing models with a common set of states-of-
the-world I = {1, . . . , L} and identical cost parameters, capacity limits and demand dis-
tributions. Moreover, all cost parameters, demand distributions and capacity limits of the
expedited supplier are independent of the state-of-the-world. Assume the capacity limits for
the regular supplier are decreasing in the state-of-the-world, as in (3.19), and the Markov
processes {in} and {̃in} satisfy (3.17) and (3.18). Let f in(·) and f̃ in(·) denote the value
functions in systems I and II, respectively. Then, f in(x) ≥ f̃ in(x) for all n = N, . . . , 1, i ∈ I
and x ∈ R, provided f i0(·) ≥ f̃ i0(·) for all i ∈ I.
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3.6.3 Numerical Results
We now present several numerical studies to illustrate and complement the above theoret-
ical results. Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 evaluate the impact of different patterns of Markov-
modulated cost rates, as discussed in Section 3.6.1, while Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4 assess
the impact of different patterns of Markov-modulated capacity limits, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6.2. In all instances, cr is normalized to 0, le = 2, lr = 3, the per-period demand
is Normally distributed with mean 5 and standard deviation 2, the holding and backlog-
ging cost rates are h = 5, p = 95, respectively, and there are no fixed costs or salvage
opportunities.
Table 3.3: Optimal long-run average cost for different Markov-modulated systems
Transition matrix P1 P2 P3
cin,e cost diff
1 cost diff1 cost diff1
{20, (20), 20, (20), 20} 83.84 83.84 83.84
{10, (15), 20, (25), 30} 81.38 -2.9% 75.90 -9.5% 73.01 -12.9%
{0, (10), 20, (30), 40} 76.17 -9.1% 66.27 -21.0% 61.78 -26.3%
{25, (25), 25, (25), 25} 93.84 93.84 93.84
{15, (20), 25, (30), 35} 91.38 -2.6% 85.90 -8.5% 83.01 -11.5%
{5, (15), 25, (35), 45} 86.17 -8.2% 76.27 -18.7% 71.78 -23.5%
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Ce = Cr = 3
1 Relative difference to the (bold) benchmark costs
With Ce = Cr = 3, Table 3.3 compares the optimal long-run average cost for sys-
tems with different Markov chains governing the state-of-the-world and different Markov-
modulated unit costs of the expedited supplier. It is easily verified that the optimal long-run
average cost is a constant, independent of the starting inventory position or state-of-the-
world. There are three Markov chains with transition matrices P1, P2 and P3 specified below
the table, where P1 and P2 have three states and P3 has five states. Under each Markov
system, two sets of expedited costs are evaluated, one centered around cn,e = 20 and the
other around cn,e = 25, namely the “middle states”.
Comparing rows in the upper and lower half of Table 3.3 under each Markov chain,
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we find that the optimal long-run average cost is lower when ce fluctuates more. For
instance, under the three-state Markov chain P1 with equal transition probabilities, com-
pared with the stable price cin,e ∈ {20, 20, 20}, the cost is 2.9% lower under the volatile
price cin,e ∈ {10, 20, 30} and 9.1% lower under the even more volatile price cin,e ∈ {0, 20, 40},
illustrating Theorem 3.3. The fact that the cost vector {0, 20, 40} results in approximately
6% additional cost savings beyond those achieved under vector {10, 20, 30} is an illustration
of Theorem 3.4. The cost savings are even more significant under Markov chains P2 and
P3, as the probabilities of staying in good states are higher, which reflects Theorem 3.6.




















































(d) cin,e ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40}, P3
Note. Cost-to-go in period n = 10, compared with long-run average cost (blue line);
Ce = Cr = 3.
Figure 3.3: Optimal cost-to-go under different states-of-the-world and inventory positions
Figure 3.3 depicts the value function f in(x) under four settings, selected from the 18
instances from Table 3.3, all relating to period n = 10. In each subfigure, it is clear that the
cost-to-go is ranked by the state-of-the-world for any inventory position x, thus illustrating
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Theorem 3.5. The comparisons of subfigures (a) vs (b) and (c) vs (d) both show the value
functions are lower in the “more volatile price world” ((b) and (d)) than in the corresponding
“more stable price world” ((a) and (c)), thus illustrating Theorem 3.4.
Table 3.4: Optimal long-run average cost for different Markov-modulated systems
Transition matrix P1 P2
Cr cost diff
1 cost diff1
{3, 3, 3} 83.84 83.84
{4, 3, 2} 86.38 +3.0% 75.94 -9.4%
{5, 3, 1} 96.59 +15.2% 75.10 -10.4%
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Ce = 3, c
i
n,e = 20, c
i
n,r = 0
1 Relative difference to the (bold) benchmark costs
With Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4, we investigate the impact of vairous patterns by which
capacity limits vary with the state-of-the-world We fix Ce = 3, c
i
n,e = 20 and c
i
n,r = 0
while varying the regular supplier’s capacity limits. Table 3.4 compares the optimal long-
run average cost for systems with different Markov chains and different Markov-modulated
capacity limits for the regular supplier. We consider the two Markov chains P1 and P2
above. Under each Markov system, three sets of capacity limits for the regular supplier are
evaluated, all centered around Cr = 3, the capacity level in the “middle state”.
Comparing rows in Table 3.4 under each Markov chain, we find that the optimal long-
run average cost is increasing when Cr fluctuates more under P1 but the opposite under
P2. This indicates that the impact of increased volatility in the regular supplier’s capacity
depends on the Markov chain: under the equal-transition probability matrix P1, the cost
increases with the volatility of Cr, but it decreases with the volatility of Cr under P2, where
the likelihood of staying in the good state (with high capacity) is 2/3, as opposed to 1/3.
Figure 3.4 shows the value function f in(x) in four instances, selected from those in
Table 3.4, all relating to period n = 10. In each subfigure, it is clear that the cost-to-go
is ranked by the state-of-the-world for any inventory position x, illustrating Theorem 3.7.
The comparisons of subfigures (a) vs (b) and (c) vs (d) both show the value function is

















































(d) Cr ∈ {5, 3, 1}, P2
Note. Cost-to-go in period n = 10, compared with long-run average cost (blue line);
Ce = 3, ce = 20, cr = 0.
Figure 3.4: Optimal cost-to-go under different states-of-the-world and inventory positions
of staying in the good state is higher under P2, thus illustrating Theorem 3.8.
3.7 Random Supply Functions
Thus far, we have assumed that all orders placed with either supplier are delivered, reliably
and in full, after the relevant lead times. However, in many settings, this fails to be the
case. In this section, we extend our results to allow for general random supply mechanisms.
In doing so, we confine ourselves to models without fixed costs.
Sometimes, the supplier’s theoretical capacity level is subject to random shocks, jeopar-
dizing in particular larger orders that come close to requiring all of the supplier’s capacity.
In other settings, all orders may be curtailed because only a random yield fraction comes
through. This applies to agricultural processes, where only a random fraction of the planted
acreage is harvested due to random weather, rain and irrigation conditions. Random yield
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factors also apply due to quality control procedures clearing only a random fraction of the
production batch. Finally, such random yield factors arise due to complete or partial sup-
ply disruptions, themselves the result of strikes, fires, pandemics, etc. A third example is
where the supplier rations its orders when they exceed available capacity: here, the amount
delivered depends on the volume of the orders placed with the supplier by other buyers.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, these various random supply structures have typically
been analyzed in isolation. Feng and Shanthikumar [2018] recently showed that a unified
treatment can be provided for general random supply functions that map an order of size
q into a random variable Y (q), with {Y (q)} a stochastically strictly increasing family of
random variables. Throughout this section, as in most of the literature, we assume that
Y (q) can be represented with a specific functional form involving q and a random variable
Z. This is stated as follows.
Assumption 3.3. Y (q) := φ(q, Z), with φ(·, ·) strictly increasing and continuously differ-
entiable in q almost everywhere, and the random variable Z has a general distribution with
bounded support. Also Y (0) = 0 almost surely.
Often, the analysis is greatly facilitated when representing the random supply as a
function of the expected supply µ ≡ ψ(q) := EY (q) = EZφ(q, Z), rather than the order size
q. Since φ(·, ·) is strictly increasing in its first argument, so is µ = ψ(q) = Eφ(q, Z). This
implies the existence of a (strictly increasing) inverse function q(µ) = ψ−1(µ), such that
µ = Eφ(ψ−1(µ), Z). By the implicit function theorem and the continuous differentiability





(Since Z is of bounded support, the interchange of the expectation and derivative operators
is easily justified, as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.)
Thus, let Ŷ (µ) := Y (q(µ)) = φ(q(µ), Z) denote the random supply as a function of its
mean supply µ. Note, by (3.20) and Assumption 3.3,
{Ŷ (µ)} is a stochastically increasing family of random variables. (3.21)
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Feng and Shanthikumar [2018] showed that dynamic procurement problems can often be
formulated as convex dynamic programs, i.e., dynamic programs with convex value func-
tions, if mean supplies are used as the action variables and provided the random supply
functions Ŷ (·) satisfy the so-called stochastic linearity in midpoint (SLMP) property.
Definition 3.1 (Feng and Shanthikumar [2018]). A family of random variables {Ŷ (µ), µ ∈
U} for some convex set U is stochastically linear in midpoint, written as {Ŷ (µ), µ ∈ U} ∈
SL(mp), if for any µ1, µ2 ∈ U , there exists Ỹ (µ1) and Ỹ (µ2) defined on a common probability
space such that
(i) Ỹ (µi) has the same distribution as Ŷ (µi), i = 1, 2, and
(ii) Ỹ (µ1)+Ỹ (µ2)2 ≤concave Ŷ (
µ1+µ2
2 ).
Feng and Shanthikumar [2018] exhibited several important random supply structures
under which the SLMP property is satisfied, see Theorem 5 in Feng and Shanthikumar
[2018]:
(a) Y (q) = qZ (stochastic proportional yield model) (3.22a)
(b) Y (q) = min{q, Z} (random capacity model) (3.22b)
(c) Y (q) = qZ/(q + αZk) (see Dada et al. [2007]) (3.22c)
(d) Y (q) = [q/(q + Z)]k (rationing model) (3.22d)
Assumption 3.3 is satisfied under all four structures. Feng and Shanthikumar [2018] also
provide more general sufficient conditions for the function φ(q, Z) under which the property
{Ŷ (µ), µ ∈ U} ∈ SL(mp) is guaranteed, in particular for any q1 < q < q2, as Z increases,
the sign of φ(q, Z)−φ(q1, Z) + φ(q2, Z)
2
can change at most once (from positive to negative).
(3.23)
Condition (3.23), in turn, is guaranteed for three times differentiable functions φ(·, ·), where




We first analyze our model under random supply functions, but without fixed costs or
salvage opportunities. Denote by Y in,e(qe) and Y
i






the random supply functions in period n under state-of-the-world i for the expedited supplier
and the regular supplier, respectively, all assumed to satisfy Assumption 3.3. We do not
need to assume that the pair of random variables {Y in,e(qe), Y in,r(qr)} are independent, or
that the pair is independent of the demand Din. We, first, assume that orders to the two
suppliers need to be placed simultaneously. Thereafter, we address the case where the
realization of the random supply by the expedited supplier is revealed before the order with
the regular supplier needs to be placed.
The value functions {f in(·)} now satisfy the recursions:










































where U in,e = [0,Eφ(Cin,e, Z)] and U in,r = [0,Eφ(Cin,r, Z)].
Theorem 3.9 (Random supplies: parallel orders without salvaging). Consider the model
with random supplies but no fixed costs and no salvage options. Assume {Ŷ in,e(µe), µe ∈
U in,e} ∈ SL(mp) and {Ŷ in,r(µr), µr ∈ U in,r} ∈ SL(mp). Assume f i0(·) is convex for all i ∈ I,
then
(a) f in(·) is convex for all n = N, . . . , 1 and i ∈ I.
(b) the functions {f in(·)} are differentiable almost everywhere, f in
′
(x) = O(|x|p), limx↓−∞ f in
′
(x) ≤
−cin,r and limx↑∞ f in
′
(x) > 0.
(c) there exists a critical threshold x∗ for the inventory position such that it is optimal to
place an order with one or both suppliers iff x ≤ x∗.
Proof. (a) By induction. By assumption, the statement holds for n = 0. Suppose f jn−1(·)
is convex for all j ∈ I. Since U in,e and U in,r are simple closed intervals that are
independent of x, to show that f in is convex for all i ∈ I, it suffices, employing
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standard arguments, to show that ELin(x + Ŷ in,e(µe)) is convex in (x, µe) and that
Ef jn−1(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe) + Ŷ in,r(µr)−Din) is convex in (x, µe, µr). We first show the former.
Note that ELin(x + Ŷ in,e(µe)) = EZLin(x + φin,e(qin,e(µe), Z)) is continuous in (x, µe)
as the composition of continuous functions, see Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 and (3.20),
and invoking the bounded convergence theorem. Thus, to show convexity it suffices to


















e))/2 ≤concave (x1 + x2)/2 + Ŷ in,e((µ1e + µ2e)/2).
By the convexity of Lin(·), we have
ELin((x1 + Ŷ in,e(µ1e) + x2 + Ŷ in,e(µ2e))/2) ≥ ELin((x1 + x2)/2 + Ŷ in,e((µ1e + µ2e)/2)).
(3.25)



















e)))/2 ≥ Lin((x1 + Ŷ in,e(µ1e) + x2 + Ŷ in,e(µ2e))/2).
(3.26)
Combining (3.25) and (3.26), we get
(ELin(x1 + Ŷ in,e(µ1e)) + ELin(x2 + Ŷ in,e(µ2e)))/2 ≥ ELin((x1 + x2)/2 + Ŷ in,e((µ1e + µ2e)/2)).
(3.27)
Therefore, we have shown ELin(x + Ŷ in,e(µe)) is convex in (x, µe). It remains to be
shown that Ef jn−1(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe)+ Ŷn,r(µr)−D) is convex in (x, µe, µr). This function is
again continuous in (x, µe, µr) as the composition of continuous functions, employing
the convexity of f jn−1(·) and (3.20), and invoking the dominated convergence theorem.
Midpoint convexity is, therefore, sufficient to establish convexity. It thus suffices to
show that

































for x1, x2 ∈ R, µ1e, µ2e ∈ U in,e and µ1r , µ2r ∈ U in,r. This proof is analogous to that of
(3.27).
(b) The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.1 (a).
(c) Fix a period n. Consider the minimand of (3.24)













and its partial derivatives with respect to µe and µr:
∂F in(x, µe, µr)
∂µe

































∂F in(x, µe, µr)
∂µr




















In particular, employing (3.20),






































By the strict convexity of Lin(·) and the convexity of {f
j
n−1(·)}, as well as φin,e(qe, Ze)




is a strictly increasing function, see Assumption 3.2 and As-














is negative for sufficiently small x and positive for suffi-
ciently large x. (limx↓−∞
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂µe
< cin,e − cin,e − c̄n−1,r/α < 0, by Assumption 3.2
and part (b) of the theorem; similarly, limx↑∞
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂µe
> 0.) This implies the exis-
tence of a threshold value x1, such that
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂µe









< 0 for x < x2 and
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂µr
≥ 0 for x ≥ x2.
Let x∗ = max{x1, x2}. Note that for x ≥ x∗, both partial derivatives are non-negative.
By the joint convexity of F in(x, ·, ·) this implies that (µe = 0, µr = 0) achieves the min-
imum in (3.24), i.e., it is optimal not to place any orders. On the other hand, if x < x∗,
at least one of the two partial derivatives is negative, implying that a non-zero pair
(µe, µr) is optimal.
In the presence of salvage opportunities, the dynamic program recursions in (3.24) need
to be adjusted as follows




















Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.9 (a), we can, inductively, establish that the mini-
mand in (3.29) is, now, jointly convex in (x, qv, µe, µr), which, again, implies that the value
functions {f in(·)} are convex, as long as the terminal value functions {f i0(·)} are. We, thus,
obtain
Proposition 3.2 (Random supplies: parallel orders with salvaging). Consider the model
with random supplies, without fixed costs, but with salvage opportunities. Assume {Ŷ in,e(µe), µe ∈
U in,e} ∈ SL(mp) and {Ŷ in,r(µr), µr ∈ U in,r} ∈ SL(mp), where U in,e = [0,Eφ(Cin,e, Z)] and
U in,r = [0,Eφ(Cin,r, Z)]. Assume f i0(·) is convex for all i ∈ I, then
(a) the value functions {f in(·)} are convex. Moreover, f in(·) is differentiable almost every-
where, with |f in
′
(x)| = O(|x|p), limx↓−∞ f in
′




(b) for all n = N, . . . , 1 and state of the system (x, i), there exists a unique triplet of




r) which optimizes the convex program
(3.29).
Under deterministic supplies, we showed with a very simple argument that it is never
optimal to simultaneously place an order with the expedited supplier, and initiate a salvage
batch. Under random supply functions, this result may not always apply. It can, how-
ever, be guaranteed when the random supply functions φin,e(q, Z) are supermoduar. This
property is satisfied for most random supply structures, in particular for structures (3.22a)
to (3.22c), see the discussion following Theorem 5 in Feng and Shanthikumar [2018]. (The
last structure, (3.22d), corresponding with the rationing model, fails the supermodularity
property)
Proposition 3.3 (Random supplies with parallel orders: no simultaneous salvaging and
expedited orders). Consider problem (3.29). Assume {Ŷ in,e(µ), µ ∈ U in,e} ∈ SL(mp), while
the underlying random supply functions Y in,e(q) = φ
i
n,e(q, Ze) are supermodular and increas-





optimal salvage quantity and expedited order in (3.29), respectively. Then, µ∗e(x)q
∗
v(x) = 0.
Proof. Let F in(x, qv, µe, µr) denote the minimand in (3.29). Using Proposition 3.2 (b),
consider the partial derivatives:
∂F in(x, qv, µe, µr)
∂qv
= cin,v + ELin
′





















∂F in(x, qv, µe, µr)
∂µe






































(The interchange of the expectation and derivative operators can be justified, as in the
proof of Theorem 3.1, since |f jn
′


















creasing in Z, i.e., H(·) is an increasing function, in view of (3.20). Similarly, G(Z) is an
increasing function, since Lin
′
(·) is increasing while φin,e(qin,e(µe), Z) is increasing in Z, by
the assumption in our proposition. By a well-known inequality, due to Harris [1960], see
e.g., Section 2.2 in Grimmett [1999], E[G(Z)H(Z)] ≥ EG(Z)EH(Z) = EG(Z), see (3.20).
Since cin,e > c
i
n,v, by Assumption 3.1, we have that each of the first two terms to the right of
(3.30) is dominated by the corresponding term to the right of (3.32). A similar argument
shows that the third term to the right of (3.30) is dominated by the third term to the right
of (3.32), since f jn−1
′



















If q∗v < 0 is optimal, then since F
i



























The next theorem derives the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal policy
to be a double threshold policy; in any given period n = N, . . . , 1 and state-of-the-world i,
there exist two thresholds xn,i0 > x
n,i
1 such that it is optimal to place an order with one or
both suppliers [salvage] when the starting inventory position is below xn,i1 [above x
n,i
0 ] and
to stay put when the inventory position is in between. Define the following three critical
values:











(x−Din) > 0}, (3.33)







(x−Din) < 0}, (3.34)
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(x−Din) < 0}, (3.35)
with the convention inf R = −∞.
Theorem 3.10 (Random supplies, parallel orders with salvaging: optimality of threshold
policies). Consider the general model without fixed costs. Fix n = N, . . . , 1 and i ∈ I. As-
sume {Ŷ in,e(µ), µ ∈ U in,e} and {Ŷ in,r(µ), µ ∈ U in,r} ∈ SL(mp). The underlying random supply
functions Y in,e(q) = φ
i




n,r(q, Zr) are supermodular and increasing
in (q, Ze) and (q, Zr), respectively. Finally, assume that D
i
n is independent of the supply
shocks (Ze, Zr).
(a) If xn,i0 ≥ x
n,i








(b) If xn,i0 < x
n,i
r , no double threshold policy is optimal.
3.7.1 Orders Placed Sequentially
We now address settings where any orders to the expedited supplier and that to the regular
supplier may be placed sequentially, in that the realization of the random supply generated
by the expedited order becomes known before an order to the regular supplier needs to be
placed. Clearly, the ability to use this information is valuable and results in lower expected
costs. Moreover, we show that, in this setting, the optimal policies have additional structural
properties which the optimal policy under parallel ordering may fail to posses.
Thus, analogous to the two-stage approach in Section 3.4.2, let f in,r(y) be the minimum
total present value of all costs in the last n periods, assuming the state-of-the-world in period
n is i, and that any order with the expedited supplier or salvage quantity determined at
the start of period n has resulted in an adjusted inventory position of y units. Then




n,vqv + ELin(x+ qv + Ŷ in,e(µe))













y + Ŷ in,r(µr)−Din
)}
. (3.37)
Theorem 3.11 (Random supplies: sequential orders). Consider the general random sup-
ply model with sequential ordering, described by the dynamic program recursion (3.36)
and (3.37). Assume the families of random variables satisfy Assumption 3.3 and {Ŷ in,e(µe), µe ∈
U in,e}, {Ŷ in,r(µr), µr ∈ U in,r} ∈ SL(mp).
(a) The value functions f in(·) and f in,r(·) are convex, and hence almost everywhere dif-
ferentiable with |f in
′
(x)| = O(|x|p) and |f in,r
′
















(b) Fix a period n = N, . . . , 1 and state-of-the-world i ∈ I. Let x = x + qv denote the
starting inventory position after a possible salvage reduction, and x∗ is its optimal
value. The optimal expedited order target µ∗e(x) ≥ 0 is decreasing in x, while x∗ is
increasing in x. Similarly, the optimal order target µ∗r(y) ≥ 0 for the regular supplier
is decreasing in y.
(c) Assume, in addition, that the random supply functions φin,e(q, Z) and φ
i
n,r(q, Z) are
supermodular, and increasing in Z (as well as in q). Fix a period n = N, . . . , 1. The
optimal first-stage policy is a double threshold policy, i.e., there exist two thresholds
x∗1, x
∗
2 such that it is optimal to place only an expedited order when x < x
∗
1, to only
salvage when x > x∗2, and to do neither when x
∗
1 ≤ x ≤ x∗2. Similarly, there exists a
threshold y∗, such that it is optimal to place a regular order iff the adjusted inventory
position y (after inclusion of an order with the expedited supplier or salvage quantity)
has y < y∗. (All thresholds are period dependent.)
3.7.2 The Random Capacity Case
We now turn our attention to the first type of random supply functions in (3.22a), i.e.,
the case where the supplier’s capacity level is random, once again assuming that orders
can be placed sequentially (as in Section 3.7.1). Under this very important random supply
structure, the optimality result of threshold policies in Theorem 3.11 can be sharpened: each
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of the order policies as well as the salvaging strategy are (modified) base-stock policies, in
every period and for any given state-of-the-world at the start of the period.
Indeed, in the first stage, it is optimal to elevate [reduce] the inventory position to
come as close to x∗1 [x
∗
2] as possible, with an expedited supplier order [salvage batch], when
the starting inventory position x ≤ x∗1 [x ≥ x∗2]. Similarly, in the second stage, it is
optimal to elevate the adjusted inventory position to come as close as possible to y∗. Thus,
q∗e = (x
∗
1 − x)+, q∗v = min{x∗2 − x, 0} and q∗r = (y∗ − y)+, with the understanding that these
target interventions are capped by the relevant random capacity levels.
We represent the expedited [regular] supplier’s capacity in period n under a state-of-










n,r the expected capacity
levels, while the random noise terms ξin,e, ξ
i
n,r have Eξin,e = Eξin,r = 0 and convex supports
X in,e ⊂ {−Cin,e,∞},X in,r ⊂ {−Cin,r,∞}. Assume, further, that the pairs {ξin,e, ξin,r} are
independent, for each n = N, . . . , 1 and i ∈ I.
The value functions now satisfy the following dynamic program recursions:




cin,e(qe ∧ (Cin,e + ξin,e)) + gin(x+ qe ∧ (Cin,e + ξin,e))
]
,





f in,r(y) = min
qr≥0
E










Let y = x+ qe and z = y + qr. We can rewrite the above problem as








f in,r(y) = min
z≥y
E











Ain,e(x) = {v : v = y ∧ (x+ Cin,e + ξin,e), y ≥ x, ξin,e ∈ X in,e},
Ain,r(y) = {v : v = z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r), z ≥ y, ξin,r ∈ X in,r}.
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Lemma 3.2. The sets Ain,e(x) = [x, ȳ(x)] and Ain,r(y) = [y, z̄(y)] for some ȳ(x) ≤ ∞ and
z̄(y) ≤ ∞.
The next theorem and corollary establish that (in the absence of fixed costs) the optimal
policy is a combination of modified base-stock policies.
Theorem 3.12 (Random aggregate capacities without salvaging: optimality of modified
base-stock policies). Consider the random capacity model with sequential ordering, no fixed











n−1(z−Din). The optimal expedited order size
is (y∗n,i−x)+ when x is the starting inventory position in period n, under state-of-the-world
i. Based on the realized adjusted inventory position y, it is optimal to place a regular order
of size (z∗n,i − y)+.
Remark 3.4. Note that, in any period n = N, . . . , 1, the optimal base-stock levels {z∗n,i}
and {y∗n,i} are entirely independent of that period’s capacity distributions. Through the
shape of the value functions {f jn−1(·)} they do depend on all future capacity distributions.
Corollary 3.2 (Random aggregate capacities with salvaging: optimality of modified base–
stock policies). Consider the random capacity model with sequential ordering and no fixed
costs. Fix a period n = N, . . . , 1. The optimal first-stage policy is a double modified base-
stock policy with two thresholds x∗1 ≤ x∗2 so that it is optimal to place an expedited order
q∗e = x
∗
1 − x when x < x∗1, to initiate a salvage batch q∗v = x∗2 − x when x > x∗2, and to
do neither when x∗1 ≤ x ≤ x∗2. Similarly, the second-stage policy is a modified base-stock
policy with a threshold y∗ so that it is optimal to place a regular order q∗r = (y
∗ − y)+. The
threshold values depend on the period index n and the state-of-the-world i.
3.8 Conclusions and Generalizations
We have proposed and analyzed a very general periodic review model for dual sourcing.
The model addresses a broad spectrum of volatilities encountered in practice. These include
cost structures, capacity levels and demand distributions which fluctuate in general ways
in response to external environmental (economic, political, product life cycle, etc.) factors.
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We also include volatilities in the supply mechanisms, where targeted orders are subject
to random curtailments due to random yields, random aggregate capacities or rationing
schemes, among others.
To our knowledge, this is the first model that addresses the choice between suppliers
who are differentiated by the prices they charge, the reliability of their supply mechanisms
as well as their lead times. The model allows for salvage opportunities, general capacity
limits and fixed order or salvage costs.
We develop two distinct approaches to obtain the optimal strategy in the most general
model in a very efficient manner: the aggregate order approach and the two-stage deci-
sion approach, see Section 3.4. Following the first approach, we also provide qualitative
insights as to how desired aggregate inventory adjustments are optimally allocated among
the suppliers and salvage option, when available.
In the absence of fixed costs, we show that, under deterministic supply mechanisms, the
optimal strategy combines three modified base-stock policies, with time and state-of-the-
world dependent base-stock levels that are easily computed (Theorem 3.1). This remains
valid when the randomness in the supply mechanisms consists of random aggregate capacity
levels (Theorem 3.12). Under different random supply mechanisms, only a more general
policy structure can be guaranteed, i.e., a combination of threshold policies (Theorem 3.9
– 3.11). Here, it is important to distinguish between settings where all orders in a given
period need to be placed simultaneously and those where the determination of the expedited
orders may await the resolution of any uncertainty surrounding the actual delivery by the
regular supplier. In the presence of fixed costs, only a more complex structure can be
guaranteed, even though under some additional conditions, always satisfied in our broad
numerical experience, the optimality of threshold policies prevails, even then (Theorem 3.2).
We have derived various comparison results for systems in which only the suppliers’
prices evolve with the state-of-the-world (Theorem 3.3 – 3.6) and those where only their
capacity levels fluctuate with the latter (Theorem 3.7 – 3.8). Numerical examples illustrate
these comparison results and reject other reasonable conjectures.
We show in particular that, volatilities arising from the fluctuating state-of-the-world,
which leave expected prices or capacity levels unchanged, may be exploited to reduce system-
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wide costs, by reallocating orders along with adjustment of the aggregate orders. This
explains the power of multi-sourcing, especially in volatile world environments.
As explained in the Introduction, the biggest restriction in our work is that it assumes
lead times are consecutive. Under general lead time combinations, fully optimal policies
necessarily depend on a vector of inventory measures, as opposed to single dimensional
inventory measures, here. However, the structural results obtained under consecutive lead
times, along with other practical considerations, motivate using the same classes of optimal
policies (e.g., modified base-stock policies) even under general lead times. This reduces the
challenge to searching for an optimal combination of policy parameters (e.g., base-stock
levels) with simulation optimization, see e.g. Fu [2015].
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Stefan Mirică. Verification Theorems of Dynamic Programming Type in Optimal Control,
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 The MP Algorithm and the PS Process
This appendix contains proofs of the MP algorithm and the PS process.
First we prove Lemma 1.2 (MP tracks accelerated PS). In order to prove Lemma 1.2,
we need the next supporting lemma on MP.
Lemma A.1. We have the following monotonicity properties on MP:
1. If m̂
(t)
j→i =A, then m̂
(t′)




j→i =R, then m̂
(t′)




ij = 1, then I
(t′)




i→j =Y, then m
(t′)




i→j =N, then m
(t′)
i→j =N for all t
′ ≥ t.
The proof of Lemma A.1 is obvious from the MP algorithm and is omitted here. Now
we are ready to prove Lemma 1.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. We will inductively show the following claims hold.
1. (i, j) inspected by t(1) in accelerated PS iff m̂
(t)
j→i =A and I
(t−1)
ij = 1.
2. (i, j) inspected by t(2) in accelerated PS iff m̂
(t)
j→i =A and I
(t)
ij = 1.
3. j is waiting for i at t(1) iff m
(t−1)
i→j =U and m̂
(t)
j→i =A.
4. i is waiting for j at t(2) iff m̂
(t)




It’s easy to check that they are true when t = 0. Suppose they hold for t− 1 and consider
t.
First we show Claim 1. If (i, j) inspected by t(1), then it must be that (1) i sees j as
the best by (t−1)(2) (we’ll show this implies I(t−1)ij = 1) and that (2) j sees i as the best by
t(1) (we’ll show this implies m̂
(t)
j→i = A). First consider condition (1). if i likes j the best
by (t− 1)(2), then it must be true that for all j′ i j, either (i, j′) inspected and failed by
(t− 1)(2), or j′ matched with a better agent than i by (t− 1)(1). By assumption together
with the MP update rule, this implies for all j′ i j, either m̂(t−1)j′→i =A and εij′ = 0, or
m̂
(t−1)
j′→i =R, which again by the MP update rule implies I
(t−1)
ij = 1. Now consider condition
(2). If j likes i the best by t(1), then it must be that for all i′ j i, either (i′, j) inspected
and failed by (t − 1)(2), or (i′, j) inspected and failed during t(1), or i′ matched with a
better opportunity than j by (t − 1)(2). If (i′, j) inspected and failed by (t − 1)(2), then
by assumption and MP update rule this implies m
(t−1)
i′→j =N. If i
′ matched with a better
opportunity than j by (t − 1)(2), then by assumption and MP update rule together with
Lemma A.1 this implies m
(t−1)
i′→j =N. Finally consider the case where (i
′, j) inspected and
failed during t(1), then it must be true that i′ sees j as the best by (t − 1)(2), which we
have already shown implies I
(t−1)
i′j = 1. Also since (i
′, j) inspection failed, it must be true
that εij′ = 0, which by the MP update rule implies m
(t−1)
i′→j =N. Putting it together we have
shown m
(t−1)
i′→j =N for all i
′ j i, which by the MP update rule implies m̂(t)j→i =A.
Now we consider the other direction of Claim 1. If m̂
(t)
j→i = A and I
(t−1)
ij = 1, then it
must be true that (i, j) inspected by t(1). Suppose this is not true, then it must be one of
the following four cases. Case 1: i matched with a better opportunity than j by t(1). Case
2: j matched with a better agent than i by t(1). Case 3: i (still in the market) does not
yet see j as the best by (t− 1)(2). Case 4: j (still in the market) does not yet see i as the
best by t(1). Case 1 cannot be true since by the previous argument this implies m̂
(t)
j′→i =A
and εij′ = 1 for some j
′ i j, which by the MP updated rule implies I(t)ij = 0 and hence by
Lemma A.1 contradicts with I
(t−1)
ij = 1. Similarly, case 2 implies m̂
(t)
j→i′ =A and m
(t−1)
i′→j =Y
for some i′ j i, which by the MP update rule means m̂(t)j→i =R and hence by Lemma A.1
contradicts with m̂
(t)
j→i =A. Case 3 implies i is waiting for some better opportunity than j
at (t − 1)(2), which by assumption implies m̂(t−1)j′→i =W for some j
′ i j, and hence by the
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MP update rule implies I
(t−1)
ij = 0, contradicting with I
(t−1)
ij = 1. Finally, case 4 implies j
is waiting for some better agent i′ than i at t(1), which implies that i′ (still in the market)
does not yet see j as the best by (t − 1)(2). As we just argued, this implies I(t−1)i′j = 0.
Then it must be true that (by the MP update rule) m
(t−1)
i′→j =U, since if it’s not true then




i′j′ = 1 and εi′j′ = 1 for some j
′ i′ j, which by assumption
implies (i′, j′) are matched by (t−1)(2) and hence contracting with i′ still in the market by
(t− 1)(2). Now that we know m(t−1)i′→j = X for some i
′ j i. This contradicts with m̂(t)j→i =A
(see the MP update rule).
Secondly we show Claim 3. If j is waiting for i at t(1), then it must be that j sees i as
the best by t(1) (we already know this implies m̂
(t)
j→i =A) and that i (still in the market)
does not yet see j as the best by (t − 1)(2) (we also know this implies m(t−1)i→j =U from





j→i =A, then it must be that j is waiting for i at t(1). Suppose this is not true, then at
least one of the following cases is true. Case 1: j (still in the market) does not yet see i as
the best by t(1). Case 2: j is matched with a better agent than i by t(1). Case 3: i sees j as
the best by (t−1)(2). Case 4: i matched with a better opportunity than j by (t−1)(2). We
already know that both case 1 and case 2 contradict with m̂
(t)
j→i =A from earlier arguments.
We also know that case 3 implies I
(t−1)
ij = 1 which contradicts with m
(t−1)
i→j =X by the MP
update rule. Lastly, case 4 implies that m̂
(t−1)
j′→i =A and I
(t−1)
ij′ = 1 and εij′ = 1 for some
j′ i j, which by the MP update rule implies m(t−1)i→j =N and hence contracting m
(t−1)
i→j =U.
Next we show Claim 2 and Claim 4. First we show one direction of Claim 2. If (i, j)
inspected by t(2), then it must be that i sees j as the best by t(2) (we’ll show this implies
I
(t)
ij = 1) and that j sees i as the best by t(1) (we already know this implies m̂
(t)
j→i =A). If
i sees j as the best by t(2), then it must be true that for all j′ i j, either (i, j′) inspected
and failed by t(1) (by assumption and the MP update rule, we know this implies m̂
(t)
j′→i =A
and εij′ = 0), or (i, j
′) inspected and failed during t(2), or j′ matched with a better agent
than i by t(1) (by assumption and the MP update rule, we know this implies m̂
(t)
j′→i =R).
If (i, j′) inspected and failed during t(2), then it must be that j′ sees i as the best by t(1)
(which we already know implies m̂
(t)
j′→i =A) and that εij′ = 0. Putting it together, by the




Next we show one direction of Claim 4. If i is waiting for j at t(2), then it must be
that i sees j as the best by t(2) (we already know this implies I
(t)
ij = 1) and that j (still
in the market) does not yet see i as the best by t(1). The latter implies that j is waiting





j→i′ =A. In fact, this also implies m̂
(t)
j→i =W, since if otherwise (m̂
(t)
j→i =R), then for some
i′′ j i, m(t−1)i′′→j =Y and m̂
(t)
j→i′′ =A. If i
′′ j i′, then m̂(t)j→i′ =R by the MP update rule,
which contradicts with m̂
(t)
j→i′ =A. If i
′ j i′′, then by the MP update rule, m(t−1)i′→j =U
contradicts with m̂
(t)
j→i′′ =A. Also it obviously cannot be that i
′ = i′′ since the messages
they receive from j are different.
Now consider the other direction of Claim 2 and Claim 4. First start with Claim 2.
If m̂
(t)
j→i =A and I
(t)
ij = 1, the it must be true that (i, j) inspected by t(2). Suppose this
is not true, then it must be one of the following four cases. Case 1: i matched with a
better opportunity than j by t(2). Case 2: j matched with a better agent than i by t(2).
Case 3: i (still in the market) does not yet see j as the best by t(2). Case 4: j (still in
the market) does not yet see i as the best by t(1). By assumption, case 1 implies there is
some j′ i j such that m̂(t)j′→i =A and εij′ = 1, which contradicts with I
(t)
ij = 1. Case 2
implies (by assumption and the MP update rule) there is some i′ j i such that m̂(t)j→i′ =A
and m
(t)
i′→j =Y, which again by the MP update rule together with Lemma A.1 implies
m̂
(t+1)
j→i =R, hence contradicting m̂
(t)
j→i =A by Lemma A.1. Case 3 implies that i is waiting
for some better opportunity j′ than j by t(2). We have already shown that this implies
m̂
(t)
j′→i =W, which by the MP update rule contradicts with I
(t)
ij = 1. Finally, case 4 implies
j is waiting for some better agent i′ than i by t(1). We have shown this implies m
(t−1)
i′→j =U,
which by the MP update rule contradicts with m̂
(t)
j→i =A.
It now only remains to the other direction of Claim 4. If m̂
(t)
j→i =W and I
(t)
ij = 1, the it
must be that i is waiting for j at t(2). Suppose this is not true. Then at least one of the
following cases must be true. Case 1: i (still in the market) does not yet see j as the best
by t(2). Case 2: i matched with a better opportunity than j by t(2). Case 3: j sees i as the
best by t(1). Case 4: j matched with a better agent than i by t(1). We have shown case
1 and case 2 contradicts with I
(t)
ij = 1. We have also shown that case 3 implies m̂
(t)
j→i =A,
which contradicts with m̂
(t)




which contradicts with m̂
(t)
j→i =W.
Therefore we have completed the proof.
Next we prove Lemma 1.3. To prove this lemma, we first establish the following claim.
Claim A.1. Fix a sequence of times t = tN = ω(1). Then for any L < ∞, the following
holds. For any agent i, we have
lim
N→∞
Pr(NPSt (i) * NAPSL (i)) = 0
Proof. The probability of there being more than tN nodes in the (L + 1)-neighborhood of
agent i is vanishing as N → ∞. (The number of nodes in the (L + 1)-neighborhood has
expectation bounded above by Θ(1) and the assertion follows from Markov’s inequality.)
It suffices to show NPSl(L+1)(i) ⊆ N
APS
L (i), where l(L + 1) is the number of nodes in the
(L + 1)-neighborhood of agent i. Consider a subset of N (i), denoted by ÑL(i), where
we remove from N (i) all neighboring opportunities that are inspected by i but failed as
well as all neighboring opportunities that are matched with a better agent than i during
the first L rounds of APS. If i is matched during the first L rounds of APS then we let
ÑL(i) = ∅. Obviously ÑL(i) ⊆ NAPSL (i). Therefore if we can show NPSl(L+1)(i) ⊆ ÑL(i) then
we are done. If fact, it suffices to show that if (i, j) inspected by L in APS, then (i, j) must
also inspected by l(L + 1) in PS; and to show that if a neighboring opportunity of i, say
j, matched with a better agent i′ than i by L in APS, then (i′, j) must also matched by
l(L+ 1) in PS.
We first show the former. It suffices to show that in order to make the (i, j) inspection
happen by L in APS, all the prerequisite inspections needed are on edges within the (L+1)-
neighborhood of agent i. Suppose this is not true, i.e., we need an inspection on edge (i′, j′)
outside the (L + 1)-neighborhood of agent i to happen as a prerequisite to make the (i, j)





some L′ ≤ L to determine m̂(L)j→i and I
(L)
ij . By the MP rule, this is not true, hence a
contradiction.
Now we only need show the latter. In fact it follows easily from the previous argument.
The claim hence follows.
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Now we are ready to prove Lemma 1.3.
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Take any agent i. Consider her consideration set just after the
first t rounds of PS. We carefully define the sequence t′ as follows. For each L ∈ N, let NL
be the smallest number s.t., for all N ≥ NL, it holds that




By Claim A.1, we know that NL <∞ for all L ∈ N. Note that N2, N3, N4, . . . is a monotone
non-decreasing sequence. For all N , define t′N , max{L : NL ≤ N}. Clearly, t′N = ω(1).
By definition of t′N , in the N -th market we have




Since this holds for all agents, by Markov’s inequality,
Pr






Finally we prove Lemma 1.4 (DE is exact on trees).
Proof of Lemma 1.4. We prove by induction. First consider t = 1. Obviously the mes-
sages all distance-1 opportunities from the root node i receive from their children agent
nodes at time 0 are X. Also, ex-ante, the messages i receive from her neighboring opportu-
nity nodes come from i.i.d. subtrees (by the MP update rule, the message i receives from her
neighboring node j at t only depends on the messages j receives from its other neighboring
agent nodes at t− 1), and hence we only need to show the probability distribution of m̂(1)j→i
is A w.p. a1, R w.p. r1, and W w.p. w1. By the MP update rule, m̂
(1)
j→i can only possibly
be A or W, and m̂
(1)
j→i =A iff j sees i as most fit ex-ante. Conditioning on (i, j) ∈ E , the
probability of the number d of better than i agents for j has distribution Poisson(Ku/α),
where u ∼Uniform[0, 1]. Therefore the probability of j seeing i as most fit ex-ante can be
computed by







One can easily verify that this expression matches with a1 in Definition 1.3, and that r1 = 0
and w1 = 1− a1.
Now we know that Lemma 1.4 is true for t = 1. Next assume it holds for any 1, ..., t− 1
rounds of MP and consider the messages the root node i receives after t rounds of MP. We
start by examine the messages all distance-1 opportunities receive from their children agent
nodes. Take all distance-1 agents and consider the subtrees starting from these agents.
Clearly, ex-ante, these subtree are i.i.d. GW trees with mark, hence by assumption, the
messages each of these distance-1 agent nodes receives from their children are i.i.d. A w.p.
at−1, R w.p. rt−1, and W w.p. wt−1. By the MP update rule, this implies that the messages
all distance-1 opportunities receive from their children agents are i.i.d.. Next we will show
that if we take any opportunity j1 and its child agent i1 that are both of distance-1 to
the root agent node i, then the probability distribution of m
(t−1)
i1→j1 is Y w.p. yt−1, N w.p.
νt−1, and U w.p. ut−1. We first compute the probability of I
(t−1)
i1j1
= 1. From the MP
update rule, we know that I
(t−1)
i1j1
= 1 iff for all j′ i1 j1, either m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 =A and εi1j′ = 0, or
m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 =R. We can also imply from the MP update rule that the message m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 does not
depend on εi1j′ or εi1j′′ for any other j
′′ i1 j1. Therefore we can treat Pr(εi1j′ = 0) = p
for all j′ i1 j1 independently from m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 for all j
′ i1 j1 (note that the probability
distributions of m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 for all j
′ i1 j1 are also independent). Moreover, the probability
distribution of the number d1 of better than j1 opportunities for i1 is Poisson(Ku1), where










for all j′ i1 j1, either m̂
(t−1)























Now, consider the probability of m
(t−1)
i1→j1 =Y and the probability of m
(t−1)
i1→j1 =N. By the MP












= 1 and εi1j1 = 1
)
= qt−1p = yt−1.












= 1 and εi1j1 = 0 or for some j
′ i1 j1, m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 =A and I
(t−1)
i1j′











for some j′ i1 j1, m̂
(t−1)
j′→i1 =A and I
(t−1)
i1j′














= 1 and εi1j′ = 1
∣∣∣d1)]




(at−1(1− p) + rt−1)l−1at−1p
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=qt−1(1− p) + Ed1
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One can also easily verify that ut−1 = 1 − yt−1 − νt−1. Therefore we have shown that,
ex-ante, the probability distribution of the message m
(t−1)
i1→j1 from any distance-1 agent i1 to
her parent opportunity j1 is Y w.p. yt−1, N w.p. νt−1, U w.p. ut−1, and is independent
from all other such pairs.
Now consider m̂
(t)
j1→i (as before, j1 is any distance-1 opportunity from root agent node
i) and its probability distribution ex-ante. We already know that they are i.i.d for all
neighboring opportunities hence it suffices to consider just the pair (i, j1). Denote by d̂ the
number of better than i agents for j1, which is distributed according to Poisson(Kû/α),
















































for some i′ j1 i, m
(t)
i′→j1 =Y, and m
(t−1)








for the lth best agent i′ of j1, m
(t−1)
i′→j1 =Y, and m
(t−1)

















One can also easily verify that wt = 1− at − rt. The lemma follows.
The proof of Corollary 1.1 is straightforward from Lemma 1.4 and Lemma A.1, and is
omitted here.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
We first prove Lemma 1.1 (locally tree-like).
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Note that conditional on the topology of Br(i) and Tr being iden-
tical, we can easily construct a coupling of the preference/fitness rankings and latent in-
spection outcomes such that Br(i) = Tr. Therefore it suffices to show the coupling without
markings, i.e., without preference/fitness rankings and without latent inspection outcomes.
We do a breadth-first search on GN (α,K, p) starting from node i. Put node i into a
queue and then iteratively do the following, starting from s = 1. In FIFO order, take one
node from the queue and count all nodes connected to it that have not been added to the
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queue. Denote this number Zs and add these nodes to the end of the queue in arbitrary
order. Then update s = s+ 1. Repeat until the queue is emptied. Denote by S the number
of total iterations. Take any positive integer l. Consider the first l∧S nodes (including both
agents and opportunities) examined from the queue. Next we show that the probability of
the subgraph (in the original economy) spanned by these nodes not being a tree is bounded
above by Θ( l
2
N ). For integer s ≥ 0, define set Cs that contains all nodes in the queue after
the sth iteration in the above breadth-first search (C0 = {i}). Also let vs be the node
taken out from the queue in the sth iteration (v1 = i). Let Us = {u ∈ Cs : {u, vs+1} ∈
E or {vs+1, u} ∈ E}. Observe that |Us| ∼Binomial(|Cs| − 1,K/(αN)). Therefore,






















where the last step follows from |Cl| = 1 +
∑l
s=1(Zs − 1) and EZs ≤ (K/α) ∧K.
Similarly, we can also conduct a breadth-first search on the tree T (α,K, p) in the same
way as above. Similar to Zs, denote by Z
′
s the number of untouched nodes connected to
the sth node being examined from the queue. Denote by S′ the number of total iterations
before the queue is emptied. Consider the first l ∧ S′ nodes. Next we show that there
exists coupling between Zs and Z
′
s such that P((Z1, ..., Zl∧S) 6= (Z ′1, ..., Z ′l∧S′)) ≤ Θ(
l2
n ).
Define Is and Js to be the set of agent nodes and the set of opportunity nodes, re-
spectively, that have not been added to the queue nor taken out from the queue by
(just after) the sth iteration in the breath-first search in GN (α,K, p) (I0 = I − {i} and
J0 = J ). Clearly we have Zs+1 ∼Binomial(|Is|,K/(αN)) if vs+1 is an agent node, and
Zs+1 ∼Binomial(|Js|,K/(αN)) if vs+1 is an opportunity node. Let ξs+1 be independent
∼Binomial(N −|Is|,K/(αN)) if vs+1 is an agent node, and ∼Binomial(αN −|Js|,K/(αN))
if vs+1 is an opportunity node. Then Zs+1 + ξs+1 is ∼Binomial(N,K/(αN)) if vs+1 is an
agent node, and ∼Binomial(αN,K/(αN)) if vs+1 is an opportunity node. We have































On the other hand, it is known that the total variation distance between Binomial(αN,K/(αN))
and Poisson(K) as well as the total variation distance between (N,K/(αN)) and Poisson(K/α)
are both no bigger than K/(αN). Therefore, by maximal coupling, there exists coupling
between Zss and Z
′
ss such that P((Z1, ..., Zl∧S) 6= (Z ′1, ..., Z ′l∧S′)) ≤ Θ(
l2
n ).
Combine the results above implies that there exists coupling such that the probability
of the subgraph of GN (α,K, p) spanned by the first l ∧ S nodes being different from the
subtree in T (α,K, p) spanned by the first l ∧ S′ nodes is bounded above by Θ( l2n ).
Clearly, the number of breadth-first search iterations on T (α,K, p) up to depth r is |Tr|.
One can check that E(|Tr|) = eCr where C = log(K2/α). Fix any sequence of r = o(logN),
we can find some ∆ = o(N) such that ∆
e2Cr
→ ∞. Define M(r) :=
√
(e2Cr + ∆) so that
P(|Tr| > M(r)) ≤ e
Cr
M(r) → 0 as n→∞. We have the following result:
P(Br(i) 6= Tr)
=P(Br(i) 6= Tr&&|Tr| ≤M(r)) + P(Br(i) 6= Tr&&|Tr| > M(r))
≤P(Br(i) 6= Tr







Take any agent i ∈ GN (α,K, p) and consider the probability of her waiting after t
rounds of accelerated PS. Apply the Message Passing (MP) algorithm on both GN (α,K, p)
and T (α,K, p), Lemma 1.1 together with lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.4 imply the following
corollary.
Corollary A.1. Fix any α, K and p and suppress the notations. Take any agent i ∈ GN
and define λAPSN (t) = Pr(i ∈ IAPSt ), where IAPSt is defined in accelerated PS in Figure
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1.5. Let wt and qt be as defined in Definition 1.3. Then for any sequence of t = o(logN),
|λAPSN (t)−Kwtqt| ≤ o(1).
Proof. Define XGN (t) = 1(i ∈ IAPSt ). Also consider a marked GW tree T (α,K, p) that
satisfies the coupling Pr(Bt(i) 6= Tt) ≤ o(1) in Lemma 1.1. Conduct MP on the tree and
denote by m. By Lemma 1.2 and the MP update rule, we know that the probability of
the root agent node waiting after t rounds of APS is fully determined by Tt. Denote the
indicator function of this event happening by XTN (t). By Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.4, let
d ∼Poisson(K), we can compute
Pr(XTN (t) = 1) = Pr(the root agent node ĩ of Tr is waiting after t rounds of APS)






























P(XGN (t) = 1) = P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) = Tt) + P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) 6= Tt)
= P(XTN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) = Tt) + P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) 6= Tt)
≤ P(XTN (t) = 1) + P(Bt(i) 6= Tt)
≤ Kwtqt + o(1).
On the other hand, we also have
P(XGN (t) = 1) = P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) = Tt) + P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) 6= Tt)
≥ P(XGN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) = Tt)
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= P(XTN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) = Tt)
= P(XTN (t) = 1)− P(XTN (t) = 1&&Bt(i) 6= Tt)
≥ P(XTN (t) = 1)− P(Bt(i) 6= Tt)
≥ Kwtqt − o(1).
The lemma follows.
We also have the following corollary that establishes the local neighborhood of any two
agents in the market is two independent trees.
Corollary A.2. Fix any α, K and p and suppress the notations. Take any two agents v1
and v2 in GN and consider their distance t neighborhood Bt(v1) and Bt(v2), respectively.
Denote this subgraph by Bt(v1, v2). Also denote by T 2 the graph of two independent GW
trees with marks (under primitive (α,K, p)). Then for any sequence of t = o(logN), there
exists a coupling between GN and T 2 such that P(Bt(v1, v2) 6= T 2t ) ≤ o(1).
Proof. Consider the following exploration process. Denote by V = I ∪ J the set of agent




s , Us, Cs which are a
partition of V in each iteration s. Start with V
(1)
0 = {i1}, V
(2)
0 = {i2}, U0 = ∅, C0 =



























s \ {vs} ∪ Is), Us+1 = Us \ Is, Cs+1 = Cs ∪ {vs}. In
fact, in each round s we can define set Vs = V
(1)
s ∪V (2)s , then applying the same technique as
when proving Lemma 1.1, we get a similar result. Take any integer l. There exists coupling
such that the probability of the subgraph of GN spanned by at most the first (according to
the sequence of breath-first search) l nodes in the neighborhood of i1 and at most the first
l nodes in the neighborhood of i2 being different from the subgraph of T 2 spanned by at
most the first l nodes in tree-1 and the first l nodes in tree-2 is bounded above by Θ( l
2
N ).
Now we need to consider the depth-t neighborhood of i1 and i2. Denote by T (1)t and T
(2)
t
the two independent GW trees up to depth-t in T 2. We know that E(|T (1)t |) = E(|T
(2)
t |) =




→ ∞. Define M(t) :=
√
(e2Ct + ∆) so that P(|T (1)t | > M(t)) = P(|T
(2)
t | >
M(t)) ≤ eCtM(t) → 0 as N →∞. We have the following result:
P(Bt(v1, v2) 6= T 2t )




t | ≤M(t)) + P(|T
(1)
t | > M(t)) + P(|T
(2)






Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. We first prove the deadlock-free regime. It is obvious that for
any fixed economy, the number of agents who wait is decreasing over time. Therefore, it
suffices to consider sequence of t = ω(1) that is also o(logN). By Lemma 1.3, there is a
sequence of times t′ = ω(1) (that is also o(logN) since APS obviously proceeds faster than
PS) such that for any δ > 0, we have
Pr
(
|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}| < δN/2
)
≥ 1− o(1). (A.4)
Take any ε > 0. Note that qs ≥ (1 − e−K)/K > 0 for any s ≥ 0 from Definition 1.3.
Therefore if α 6∈ A(K, p), then it must that lim
s→∞
ws = 0, and hence there exists some
finite τ > 0 such that wτ < ε/K. Also by Corollary A.1, for any t
′ = o(logN) we have
|λAPSN (t′)−Kwtqt| → 0 as N →∞, where λAPSN (t′) is the probability of agent i waiting after
t′ rounds of APS. Therefore, for any t′ = ω(1) that is also o(logN), when N is sufficiently
large, we have t′ > τ and hence λAPSN (t
′) < ε+ o(1). Since the choice of ε is arbitrary, this
implies λAPSN (t
′) < o(1). Take any δ > 0. By Markov’s Inequality,





This implies Pr(|{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| < δN/2) ≥ 1 − o(1). Therefore combining Eqs.
(A.4) – (A.5), we get
Pr(ΛtN (α,K, p) ≤ δN)
=Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅}| ≤ δN)
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=Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅ ∧ N PSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}|
+ |{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅ ∧ N PSt (i) ⊆ NAPSt′ (i)}| ≤ δN)
≥Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}|+ |{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| ≤ δN)
≥Pr((|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}| < δN/2) ∧ (|{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| < δN/2))
≥1− o(1).
Since the choice of δ > 0 is arbitrary, we have the desired result.
It now only remains to show the information deadlock regime. If α ∈ A(K, p), then for
any ε > 0, there exists τ such that for any s > τ we have |Kwsqs−λ| ≤ ε. By Corollary A.1,
since t = o(logN), we have |λAPSN (t)−Kwtqt| → 0 as N →∞, where λAPSN (t) is the ex-ante
probability of an agent i waiting after t rounds of APS. Therefore, when N is sufficiently
large, we have t > τ and hence λ− ε− o(1) < λAPSN (t′) < λ+ ε+ o(1). Since the choice of ε
is arbitrary, this implies λ− o(1) < λAPSN (t′) < λ+ o(1).
For any agent i, define XtN (i) to be the indicator function of agent i in GN waiting at




N (i). Then EΛ̃tN = NλAPSN (t). Obviously ΛtN ≥ Λ̃tN (since
the set of waiting agents is decreasing over time and APS proceeds faster than PS). Take
any δ > 0, we have
Pr(ΛtN ≥ λN − δN) ≥ Pr(Λ̃tN ≥ λN − δN)
≥ Pr(|Λ̃tN − λN | ≤ δN)
= Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N + λAPSN (t)N − λN | ≤ δN)
≥ Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N |+ |λAPSN (t)N − λN | ≤ δN)
≥ Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N | ≤ δN/2 ∧ |λAPSN (t)N − λN | ≤ δN/2)
N→∞−−−−→ Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N | ≤ δN/2),
where the last step follows from λ − o(1) < λAPSN (t) < λ + o(1). Therefore, to show the
desired result, it suffices to show Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N | ≤ δN/2) ≥ 1− o(1), or equivalently,
Pr(|Λ̃tN − λAPSN (t)N | > δN/2) ≤ o(1)
Note that EΛ̃tN = λAPSN (t)N . By Chebyshev’s inequality, we have







2 is the variance of Λ̃tN :
σ(Λ̃tN )
2 = Nσ(XtN (1))
2 +N(N − 1)Cov(XtN (i1), XtN (i2)).
It’s easy to check that λ(1−λ)−o(1) < σ(XtN (i1))2 < λ(1−λ) +o(1). Now it only remains
to compute Cov(XtN (i1), X
t




N (i2)) = E[XtN (i1)XtN (i2)] −
EXtN (i1)EXtN (i2), where
E[XtN (i1)XtN (i2)] = Pr
(
XtN (i1) = X
t




XtN (i1) = X
t
N (i2) = 1
∣∣Bt(i1, i2) = T 2r )+ Pr(Bt(i1, i2) 6= T 2r )
= λ2 + o(1).
The last step above follows from Corollary A.2 and the fact that t = ω(1). Now, we can
compute
σ(Λ̃tN )
2 ≤ Nλ(1− λ) +N(N − 1)(λ2 − λ2) + o(N2) = o(N2),
and hence





Therefore we have shown Pr(ΛtN ≥ λN − δN) ≥ 1− o(1).
Next we show Pr(ΛtN ≤ λN + δN) ≥ 1 − o(1). By Lemma 1.3, there is a sequence of
t′ = ω(1) that is also o(logN) such that for any δ > 0, we have
Pr
(




Pr(ΛtN ≤ λN + δN)
=Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅}| ≤ λN + δN)
=Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅ ∧ NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}|
+ |{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) 6= ∅ ∧ NPSt (i) ⊆ NAPSt′ (i)}| ≤ λN + δN)
≥Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}|+ |{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| ≤ λN + δN)
≥Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}| ≤ δN/2) + |{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| ≤ λN + δN/2)
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≥1− Pr(|{i ∈ I : NPSt (i) * NAPSt′ (i)}| > δN/2))− Pr(|{i ∈ I : NAPSt′ (i) 6= ∅}| > λN + δN/2)
≥1− Pr(Λ̃t′N > λN + δN/2)− o(1)
≥1− Pr(|Λ̃t′N − λN | > δN/2)− o(1).
We just showed for t′ = ω(1) that is also o(logN), Pr(|Λ̃t′N − λN | ≤ δN/2) ≥ 1 − o(1).
Therefore, we have the desired result that Pr(ΛtN ≤ λN+δN |) ≥ 1−o(1). Finally, combine
both the lower bound and the upper bound, we get
Pr(|ΛtN − λN | ≤ δN) = Pr(ΛtN ≤ λN + δN ∧ ΛtN ≥ λN − δN) ≥ 1− o(1).
Since the choice of δ > 0 is arbitrary, the theorem follows.
A.3 A Heuristic Derivation of the Giant Component
Regime Using MP
As a simple illustrative example, we now heuristically derive the classical result that for
any c > 1, with high probability (w.h.p.) there is a “giant” connected component involving
Ω(n) nodes in an Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph with edge probability c/n, whereas for any
c < 1, whp there is no giant component: As n → ∞, for any node i, the (random) local
neighborhood of i (up to any fixed depth) converges in distribution to a Galton-Watson
(GW) process with offspring distribution Poisson(c), i.e., a tree rooted at i where i has
Poisson(c) children, each of these children, independently, has Poisson(c) children, and so
on. Hence, one would expect there to be a giant component in the ER graph if and only
if, with positive probability the GW process does not suffer extinction (see Durrett [2007]
for a formalization of this intuition). Whether the GW process suffers extinction can be
captured via the following simple message passing algorithm with binary messages in {0, 1}:
initialize m
(0)
j→k = 1 for all edges (j, k). Thereafter for all t > 0, update the messages as
follows: m
(t)
j→k = 1 if there exists l ∈ N (j)\k such that m
(t−1)
l→j = 1, else m
(t)
j→k = 0. (Note
that m
(t)
j→k does not depend on m
(t−1)
k→j , i.e., the self-exclusion property holds.) Observe that
if k is the parent of j then m
(t)
j→k = 1 if and only if the subtree rooted at j has depth at least
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t; we are interested in limt→∞m
(t)
j→k which is 1 if and only the subtree has infinite depth.
Fixing a node j (and not revealing its subtree), the probability π(t) = Pr(m
(t)
j→k = 1) can be
iteratively computed to be π(0) = 1, and π(t) = probability that j has no children who sent a
1 to it at t−1. Since each child independently sent a 1 with probability π(t−1)), the number
of children who sent it a 1 is Poisson(pπ(t−1)), and we obtain π(t) = 1− exp(−pπ(t−1)). It
easy to verify that π∗ = limt→∞ π
(t) exists and is strictly positive if and only if c > 1. Thus,
if c > 1, the GW process avoids extinction with positive probability π∗, and correspondingly
a giant component of size nearly π∗n occurs in the ER graph. On the other hand if c < 1,
we have π(t) < ct
t→∞−−−→ 0, i.e., the GW process suffers a quick extinction, and w.h.p. there
is no giant component in the ER graph.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
This appendix is for chapter 2, and provides additional proofs and materials in supplement
to it. This appendix is subdivided into 5 sections. In Appendix B.1, we prove results related




−t2dt and its complement erfc(x) = 1− erf(x). These
are used to support and complete the proof of Lemma 2.5 in Chapter 2. Appendices B.2–
B.5 demonstrate robustness of our main findings by analyzing four variations of the Base
model: allowing mixed policies, the reward process being a geometric Brownian motion, the
inclusion of positive switching costs, and alternative hazard rate functions, respectively.
B.1 Properties of the error function
This section provides the proofs for properties 4, 6, 7, 9 – 16 in Lemma 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.5 (Part II). We provide the proofs for properties 4, 6, 7, 9 – 16.




> 0 for all x ∈ R. In fact,
f ′(x) = erf(x). Therefore f(x) is decreasing on the interval (−∞, 0), increasing on the
interval (0,∞), and the minimum value is obtained at x = 0, with f(0) = 1√
π
> 0.




2(1−β) . Since α > 0 and 0 < β < 1, we
have x1 >
α(β−2)+αβ




Hence to show x1 ≥ x0, we only need to show r(x1) ≥ β√π . Since x1 > −α, we can divide
both sides by (x1 + α)e


















α(β − 2) +
√










2(β−1) = α −
1
α . Therefore, g(α) , lim
β→1−
f(β) =






. In fact, g(α) > 0 for all α > 0, since lim
α→0+







> 0. Also, for any α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), obviously

















Therefore f(β) is decreasing on (0, 1) with lim
β→1−
f(β) > 0, and the result follows.




(1 +Cerf(x)), with F ′(x) = ex
2
(2x2 + 1)(1 +
Cerf(x)) + 2Cx√
π
. If C ∈ {0, 1}, then the result trivially holds. If C = −1, F ′(x) ≥ 0 follows
from property 1. It only remains to consider C ∈ (−1, 1) \ {0}. Let f(x) , F ′(x)e−x2 . We
have f ′′(x) = 4Cerf(x) + 4 > 0, lim
x→−∞
f ′(x) = −∞, and lim
x→∞
f ′(x) = ∞ if C ∈ (−1, 1).
Thus f(x) is first decreasing then increasing on R if C ∈ (−1, 1). Consider its global
minimizer x0, with











Also one can check that f ′(0) = 4C√
π
, so that f ′(0) > 0 if C ∈ (0, 1), and f ′(0) < 0 if
C ∈ (−1, 0). Recall that f ′′(x) > 0, hence x0 < 0 if C ∈ (0, 1) and x0 > 0 if C ∈ (−1, 0).




















−x0 . Observe that x
2
0− x0 + 1 > 0, and that C−x0 > 0 from the above
argument. The result follows.
Next we prove 9. We can divide both sides by eq
2
q and show the following inequality
















< 0. In fact, if
a2 − 2 ≤ 0, then since erf(·) is an increasing function and that q > a > a − 1a , F (q) < 0 is




< 0 for any












π (erfc(θ)− erfc(q)). If θ ≤ 0,
then the result easily holds since each term is non-negative. Now consider θ ∈ (0, q). To
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show F (θ) ≥ 0, it is equivalent to show F (θ)
eq2+θ2qθ
≥ 0. In fact, F (θ)
eq2+θ2qθ














θerfc(θ) is decreasing in θ by applying property 5 (i). Therefore f(θ) is decreasing
in θ for θ ∈ (0, q), and the result follows.












One can verify that F (q) = F ′(q) = 0. Since q > θ, we have erf(q) > erf(θ) and hence
F ′′(θ) = −4 − 4eq2q
√
π (erf(q)− erf(θ)) < 0. This implies F ′(θ) > F ′(q) = 0 on (−∞, q).
Therefore F (θ) < F (q) = 0 for θ < q.
Next we prove 12. Denote
F (θ) , θ(1 + 2q2)− eq2−θ2q(1 + 2q2) + 2eq2q(1 + q2)θ
√
π (erf(q)− erf(θ)) .
One can verify that F (q) = 0 and F ′(q) = 1. Since q > θ, we have erf(q) > erf(θ)
and hence F (θ) < 0 on (−∞, 0]. Now consider θ ∈ (0, q). It’s not hard to see that
F ′′(θ) = −2eq2−θ2q
(
3 + 2q2 − 2θ2
)
< 0, which implies F ′(θ) > F ′(q) > 0 for θ < q, and
hence F (θ) < F (q) = 0 for θ ∈ (0, q) as well.
Next we prove 13 – 15. Define
F1(x, a) , 2− 2ax+ 2x2 +
(





F2(x, a) , 2− 2ax+ 2x2 −
(





F3(x, a) , 2− 2ax+ 2x2 +
(





If a > 0 and x ∈ (a− 1a , a), then equivalently a ∈
(
















Obvious that all three functions are linear in a. Consider the partial derivatives:
∂F1
∂a
























Property 1 implies that ∂F2∂a (x, a) ≥ 0 and
∂F3
∂a (x, a) ≤ 0. To prove the results, it then suffices












4 ) > 0
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xerf(x) + 2 > 0. Property 5(iii) implies





















x2 + 4x2 +
√























x2 + 4x2 +
√





x2 + 4x+ 2.





x2 + 4−5x has a single root at 1√
2





5x > 0 on (−∞, 1√
2
) and −2x3 + 2
√
x2 + 4x2 +
√
x2 + 4 − 5x < 0 on ( 1√
2
,∞). Now we
consider the cases separately.
First check that f1(
1√
2
) = 1 > 0 and f3(
1√
2


































x2 + 4x2 +
√
x2 + 4− 5x
)2 > 0.





2 for x <
1√
2















π. This means f1(x) > 0 and
f3(x) > 0 everywhere.
Finally we prove 16. Denote the LHS of the inequality-to-show by F (x). Observe that
F (x) + 2 − 2a2 + 2aθ is quadratic in a. In fact, as we will show next, it is convex in a.

















We will show next that g(θ) , ∂
2G(a,θ,z)
∂a2
≥ 0 for θ ≤ x. One can easily verify that




x(erf(x) − erf(θ)) + 16. When x ≥ 0, it is
obvious that g′′(θ) > 0 for all θ ≤ x. When x < 0, since −erf(·) < 1, property 5(iii) implies
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≥ 0, which then implies that g′(θ) ≤ g′(x) = 0
for θ ≤ x. Therefore, g(θ) ≥ g(x) = 0 for θ ≤ x, and G is convex in a. Recall that we
want to show G(a, θ, x) ≤ 0 for a ∈
[




















4 , θ, x) ≤ 0 for all θ < x.



















π(erf(x)− erf(θ)) + 2e−θ2x
)
. If
x ≥ 0, then obviously ∂
3f1(θ,x)
∂θ3









On the other hand, if x < 0, then for all θ < x < 0, ∂
4f1(θ,x)
∂θ4









erfc(−x) > 0, ∂
3f1(x,x)
∂θ3
= 8x < 0, hence there is a
unique root θ = θ0 of
∂3f1(θ,x)
∂θ3




































We have just showed that ∂
2f1(θ,x)
∂θ2







= 0, and hence f1(θ, x) < f1(x, x) = 0.




























(ax + 1). Observe that since x > a − 1a and a > 0,
we have ax + 1 > a2 > 0, hence ∂
3f2(a,x)
∂x3

















































































f̂2(a) = 0. Since
∂2f2(a,x)
∂x2








= 0, and thus f2(a, x) < f2(a, a− 1a) = 0. Proof complete.
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B.2 Robustness check: Mixed policies
In this appendix, we consider a variant of the Base model where the firm is allowed to mix
between the two service modes. We first setup the model. Then we give comparative statics
regarding the optimal sandwich policy (see Theorem B.2) and numerical evidence about the
optimal sandwich policy outperforming the myopic one. In the last part of this appendix,
we provide proofs of the optimal policy structure in Theorem B.1 and the monotonicity
results in Theorem B.2.
Model setup. At each point in time t ≥ 0, the firm chooses the proportion of the Risky
mode pt ∈ [0, 1] in its service, so that the reward is generated according to
dYt = ((1− pt)µS + ptµR)dt+ ptσRdBt. (B.2)
We restrict attention to µR > µS > 0. This is motivated by the real world application
of an investment manager, where he can mix between assets and where the riskier asset
usually provides better rewards. We also require µS < q as in the Base model to ensure
finite lifetime.
Note that over time, the investor may dynamically adjust the fraction of assets invested
in the stock market. The investment manager, who is paid proportionally to returns, would
prefer the higher-return option — to be fully invested in the stock market at all times —
but is aware that a period of poor returns could cause the customer to leave.
Analogous to the Base model, a policy λ is admissible if the firm’s action process (pt)t≥0
(by following this policy) is adapted to the filtration F, takes value in [0, 1], and is such that
the corresponding happiness processes is an F-adapted semimartingale specified uniquely
in law. We denote the set of admissible policies by Λ.
The optimal value function under the new policy space Λ is given by













We call this model under policy space Λ the Investor model.
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As in the Base model, we expect that there is a stationary Markov optimal policy
λ : R → [0, 1]. Next we show that interval policies, suitably generalized, are a subclass of
stationary Markov policies that are admissible. First we extend the definition of interval
policies to allow mixed policies.
Definition B.1 (Interval policy in Investor model). In the Investor model, a policy λ is an
interval policy if:
• it is stationary Markov, that is, the corresponding action process is given by a mapping
from current happiness to the proportion of the Risky mode, which we denote by
pt = λ(Ht).
• there is a partition of the happiness real line into a countable number of intervals,
such that λ(·) is Lipschitz continuous within each interval, and that there exists some
c > 0 such that λ(x) ∈ {0} ∪ [c, 1] for all x ∈ R.
Interval policies for the Investor model are admissible. The argument is similar to the
proof of Lemma 2.1. Here, the policy may choose an arbitrary blend of the service modes at
different points in the “Risky” pieces as long as the fraction of the Risky mode λ(x) is Lip-
schitz continuous in the happiness level x within each piece, and λ(x) is uniformly bounded
below everywhere on the union of all “Risky” piesces (so that Salins and Spiliopoulos Salins
and Spiliopoulos [2017] still applies on the closure of each “Risky” piece). It turns out (see
Theorem B.1 below) that the optimal policy for the Investor model belongs to the class of
interval policies.
Theorem B.1. Suppose µS < µR and µS < q. Consider the firm’s problem as presented
in Eq. (B.3). Let θI be as defined in Lemma B.1. If θI ≤ q, then the myopic (pure
Risky-everywhere) policy is optimal. If θI > q, then a sandwich policy is optimal, where
the proportion of the Risky mode is λ∗(x) as defined in Lemma B.2 for happiness levels
x ∈ [q, θI ], and λ∗(x) = 1 for x /∈ [q, θI ].
Comparative statics and numerics. Recall in Theorem B.1 the structure of the optimal
sandwich policy in the Investor model: the firm still uses the Risky mode for low and high
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levels of happiness, but instead of using purely the Safe mode for an intermediate happiness
interval, the firm mixes the Risky mode with the Safe mode in [q, θI ], where θI is defined
in Lemma B.1 later in this appendix. We call the interval [q, θI ] the risk-averse region.
Moreover, inside the risk-averse region, the proportion of the Risky mode which the firm
employs at happiness level x is specified by λ∗(x) in Lemma B.2. The next theorem provides
monotonicity results regarding θI and λ
∗(x).
Theorem B.2. Let θI be as defined in Lemma B.1 and λ
∗(·) be as defined in Lemma B.2.
Then, the following properties hold:
1. The threshold θI increases in µS and σR.
2. Assume the optimal policy for a given set of parameters (see Theorem B.1) is a sand-
wich policy. Then, the proportion of the Risky mode λ∗(·) in the risk-averse region
[q, θI ] is strictly increasing with happiness, and the firm strictly mixes at the satisfac-
tion threshold q but not at θI ; that is, we have λ
∗(q) > 0 and λ∗(θI) = 1.
The first part of this theorem simply states that the size of the risk-averse region in the
Investor model possesses the same monotonicities with regard to µS and σR as in the Base
model. The second part of Theorem B.2 states that when the customer happiness level is in
the unsatisfied zone, the firm is more risk averse closer to the happiness threshold q. That
is, the firm prefers a lower risk profile closer to q even though this generates a lower current
reward rate. Note that λ∗(q−) = 1, and λ∗(q+) has a value such that (V I)′ is continuous
at q despite the step in Q(·).
An interesting implication of part 2 of Theorem B.2 is that the optimal policy never
uses the Safe service mode alone. It always mixes the Risky mode with the Safe mode
when it is risk averse. The intuition is that the Risky mode has a higher drift (µR > µS),
and as specified in Eq. (B.2), the variance is only quadratic in λ(·) while the drift is the
λ(·)-weighted convex combination of µR and µS , so it is always beneficial to include at least
a small proportion of Risky.
We give a few numerical examples of the optimal policy in the following graphs (Figures
B.1–B.3). Notice that the model parameters considered here are the same as those in the
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(a) µS = 3 (b) µS = 7 (c) µS = 8
Figure B.1: Optimal policies for the Investor model: µR = 9, σR = 10, q = 10.
(a) µR = 9 (b) µR = 6 (c) µR = 5.5
Figure B.2: Optimal policies for the Investor model: µS = 5, σR = 10, q = 10.
(a) σR = 10 (b) σR = 30 (c) σR = 50
Figure B.3: Optimal policies for the Investor model: µS = 5, µR = 9, q = 10.
Base Model. In comparison, the size of the risk-averse regions here are larger than in the
Base model.
We omit to provide the gap between the optimal policy and the myopic policy (pure
Risky everywhere). Observe that the Investor model expands the policy space, hence in-
creasing optimal CLV. That is, the gap for the Investor model exceeds that under the Base
model (Figure 2.5).
Proof of Theorems B.1 and B.2. To prove Theorem B.1, we first establish two lemmas
that characterize the optimal sandwich threshold θI and the optimal Risky proportion λ
∗(x)
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as a function of the happiness value x inside the risk-averse region [q, θI ]. First we present
and prove the lemma on θI .
















(2θ − µR − µS)− (µR + µS) = 0.
Then, the set ΘI ∩ (µS+µR2 ,∞) contains a single element, which we label θI .











We have α > 0 and 0 < β < 1. Define also










The lemma is equivalent to showing that r(z) has a unique root on (−α2 ,∞). Applying
property 5(ii) in Lemma 2.5, we get that r(z) has a unique root on (−α2 ,∞).
Next we define the proportion λ∗(x) of the Risky mode which the firm employs at
happiness level x inside the risk-averse region [q, θI ].



































, b = µS , g =
2θI
2θI − µS − µR
,
and Γ(s, z) is the upper incomplete gamma function (see Chaudry and Zubair Chaudhry and
Zubair [2001]). Then, the inverse function of function X(·) is properly defined on (µS , θI ]
and is represented by G(·) , X−1(·). Then, on (µS , θI ], the function G(·) is positive, strictly
decreasing, differentiable, and satisfies the following ODE:
(G(x) + 1)2 + 2a(x− b)G(x)G′(x)− 2abG′(x) = 0.
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Finally, define the function
λ∗(x) ,




Then, λ∗ is strictly increasing on [q, θI ] with λ
∗(q) > 0 and λ∗(θI) = 1.
The function G(x) in Lemma B.2 captures the marginal benefit of happiness at x, when
the firm uses the conjectured optimal proportion λ∗(·) of the Risky mode. The function
X(·) is the inverse function of G(·).
Lemmas B.3 and B.4 are key to proving Lemma B.2.




. Moreover, X( µS+µR2θI−µS−µR ) = θI and limy→∞
X(y) = µS.
























= θI and lim
y→∞
X(y) = b. Recall by definition
of θI in Lemma B.1 that θI >
µS+µR
2 > µS . Next we want to show that X




. Compute this derivative:
X ′(y) = 2aye
− 2a


















, we have 2aye
− 2a
y+1 (y + 1)−2(a+1) > 0. Therefore we





. In fact, this is true since






for y ≥ µS+µR2θI−µS−µR > 0 and
F (
µS + µR




g g2a (bg − gθI + θI)
g − 1
< 0,
where the last step follows from g = 2θI2θI−µS−µR > 1 and b = µS <
µS+µR
2 . We have thus
completed the proof.
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Lemma B.4. The function λ∗(x) as defined in Lemma B.2 is strictly increasing on [q, θI ],
and λ∗(q) > 0, λ∗(θI) = 1.
Proof of Lemma B.4. Let p∗(·) be defined as Eq. (B.4), but on the domain (µS , θI ]. Then
on (µS , θI ], we have
p∗(x) =




Also from Lemma B.2, G(x) satisfies
(G(x) + 1)2 + 2a(x− b)G(x)G′(x)− 2abG′(x) = 0.




on (µS , θI ], and thus we can rewrite p
∗(x) as
p∗(x) =
2a(µS − µR)(b− (x− b)G(x))
σ2R(G(x) + 1)
. (B.6)
Since µS < µR, to show p
∗(x) is strictly increasing on (µS , θI ] is equivalent to showing
b−(x−b)G(x)
G(x)+1 is strictly decreasing on (µS , θI ]. Also G(·) is the inverse function of X(·), and
by Lemma B.3, X is strictly decreasing on [g − 1,∞), therefore it is equivalent if we can
show b−y(X(y)−b)y+1 is strictly increasing on [g − 1,∞).
Denote L(y) , b−y(X(y)−b)y+1 . Compute its derivative:
L′(y) = 2ae
− 2a













y+1 (y + 1)2a+1 +K0
(
2ay2 − y − 1
))
.
We want to show that L′(y) > 0 on [g − 1,∞). Consider y sufficiently large such that








y+1 (y + 1)2a+1
2ay2 − y − 1
+K0 > 0.
One can check that f ′(y) = 2ab(y+2)e
2a
y+1 (y+1)2a+1
(−2ay2+y+1)2 > 0. Also





− 2ab(g − 1)e
2a
g g2a+1








2a(g − 1)2(µS − µR) + g(µR + µS)
)
2(g − 1) (2a(g − 1)2 − g)
.
If we can show g is such that 2a(g−1)2−g > 0 (so that −2ay2 +y+1 > 0 for all y ≥ g−1)
and 2a(g−1)2(µS−µR) +g(µR+µS) ≤ 0, then we are done. In fact, we can check that the
second inequality implies the first, therefore we only need to show the second one is true.
Now let α , 12
√
1






, and recall the definition of g , 2θI2θI−µS−µR .
After solving the desired inequality on g, we can get an equivalent desired inequality on θ̂I :
θ̂I ≤
α(β − 2) +
√
α2β2 + 2β(1− β)
2(1− β)
.




apply property 6 in Lemma 2.5, we get that the desired inequality of θ̂I is true. Therefore
we have proved that p∗(x) is strictly increasing on (µS , θI ].
Finally, consider lim
x→µ+S
p∗(x) and p∗(θI). Since G(·) is the inverse function of X(·), then
by Lemma B.3 we know that lim
x→µ+S
G(x) =∞, and G(θI) = µS+µR2θI−µS−µR . Combine with Eq.
(B.6), we get lim
x→µ+S
p∗(x) = 0, and p∗(θI) = 1. Therefore since p
∗(·) = λ∗(·) on [q, θI ] and
q > µS , we have λ
∗(q) = p∗(q) > 0 and λ∗(θI) = p
∗(θI) = 1.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma B.2.
Proof of Lemma B.2. By Lemma B.3, the function X(·) : [g − 1,∞) → (µS , θI ] as
specified in Lemma B.2 is strictly decreasing and differentiable, and X(g − 1) = θI , and
lim
y→∞
X(y) = µS . Therefore, its inverse function G(·) : (µS , θI ]→ [g − 1,∞) is well-defined,
strictly decreasing and differentiable, and G′(x) = 1X′(G(x)) by the inverse function theorem.




X′(y) = 0. Therefore G(·) satiesfies the ODE (G(x) + 1)
2 + 2a(x− b)G(x)G′(x)−
2abG′(x) = 0 on [µS ,∞). Since g− 1 > 0, we have that G(·) is strictly positive on (µS , θI ].
Finally by Lemma B.4, the function λ∗(·) is strictly increasing on [q, θI ], with λ∗(q) > 0
and λ∗(θI) = 1.
Next we establish the full proof of Theorem B.1.
Proof of Theorem B.1. The proof technique is similar to one we used prove Theorem
2.1 (see Section 2.5). Recall that in Section 2.5, we first obtain a candidate value function
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W (·) by solving the HJB equation (2.13), then we prove its optimality by showing that it
satisfies a set of optimality conditions (Conditions 1-6 in Proposition 2.2). Similarly, for













(where p denotes the proportion of the Risky mode to invest in) and then prove its optimality
by showing that W I(·) together with the policy stated in Theorem B.1 satisfies Conditions
1-6, with Condition 4I -5I (see below) replacing Condition 4-5.
4I . the following inequality1 is true for any x ∈ R when p = 0 and for any x ∈ R\E when
p ∈ (0, 1]:




′′(x) + µS + p(µR − µS) ≤ 0;
(B.8)
and
5I . for all x ∈ R and some interval policy (see Definition B.1 in Appendix B.2) λ̄ ∈ Λ such
that λ̄(y) = 0 for all y ∈ E , the process (V̄ (Hx,λ̄t ))t≥0 is an F-adapted semimartingale,
and




′′(x) + µS + λ̄(x)(µR − µS) = 0
(B.9)





1 ) if x < q;
V I2 (x,C
I
2 ) if q ≤ x ≤ θI ;
V3(x,C
I
3 ) if x > max{q, θI};
(B.10)
1When p = 0, we define 1
2
p2σ2RV̄
′′(x) to be zero for any x including x ∈ E .
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3 , where V1 and V3 are as defined in Eqs. (2.19)
























R (1− erf(z − µR
σR
))dz.
V I2 is defined as follows:




where G is as defined in Lemma B.2. Observe that V I2
′
(·, C2) and V ′3(·, C3) are independent




(·) and V ′3(·) to denote the two derivatives, respectively.
















































































R (1− erf( z−µRσR ))dz if θI < q;













R (1− erf( z−µRσR ))dz if θI ≥ q.
(B.14)
To reduce the burden of notation, we define V I1 (·) , V1(·, CI1 ), V I2 (·) , V I2 (·, CI2 ) and
V I3 (·) , V3(·, CI3 ).
Conditions 1, 2, 3, 4I , 5I and 6. Now we have an explicitly defined candidate value
function W I(·) and an explicit stationary Markov policy λ∗(·) (see Lemma B.2). Next we
want to show that W I(·) and λ∗(·) together satisfy Conditions 1-3 (see Proposition 2.2), 4I
and 5I (see (B.8) and (B.9)) and 6 (see Proposition 2.2).
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We start with Condition 1. We want to show that W I(·) ≥ 0. By construction of V1
(see Eq. (2.19)), if CI1 > 0 then V
I
1 (·) > 0. Indeed this is true since G(q) > 0 (see Lemma
B.2). Then, in particular V I1 (q) > 0 and W
I(·) > 0, since W I(·) is continuous everywhere
(see below) including at q and increases on [q,∞), see Eq. (B.10).
Condition 2 requires W I(·) to be continuously differentiable everywhere and twice con-
tinuously differentiable almost everywhere. By construction, W I(·) is continuously differ-
entiable and twice continuously differentiable everywhere except possibly at q and θI (note
that by Lemma B.2, G is differentiable on [q, θI ]). Hence, we only need to show that W
I(·)
is differentiable at q and θI . Equivalently, we want to show
V I1 (q) =

V I3 (q) if θI < q;








(q) if θI < q;
V I2
′
(q) if θI ≥ q,
(B.16)
and if θI ≥ q,










Eq. (B.15) is implied by the definitions of CI2 and C
I
3 (see Eqs. (B.13) and (B.14)). Eq.
(B.16) is implied by the definition of CI1 (see Eq. (B.12)). Eq. (B.17) is implied by the





Condition 3 requires that W I
′
be bounded. Since we have just proved that W I
′
(·) is
continuous in R, to show that W I ′(·) is bounded, it suffices to show
∣∣∣∣ limx→−∞W I ′(x)





∣∣∣ <∞. This is equivalent to showing ∣∣∣∣ limx→−∞V I1 ′(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞ and ∣∣∣ limx→∞V I3 ′(x)∣∣∣ <



































































for z = (x− µR)/σR. By property 2 in Lemma 2.5, the limits above are zero.
Conditions 5I and 4I respectively require W I(·) and λ∗(·) to satisfy









+ µS(1− λ∗(x)) + µRλ∗(x) = 0 (B.19)
and









+ µS(1− p) + µRp ≤ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] (B.20)
for all x ∈ R, except possibly at q and θI . Eq. (B.19) is true by the construction of W I(·)
and λ∗(·). Specifically, V I1 (x) satisfies









(x) + µR = 0 for all x < q;
V I3 (x) satisfies









(x) + µR = 0 for all x ≥ θI ;
and G(x) satisfies (see Lemma B.2)
(G(x) + 1)2 + 2a(x− b)G(x)G′(x)− 2abG′(x) = 0,
which is equivalent to (since G′(·) is nonzero)





+ µS(1− λ∗(x)) + µRλ∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [q, θI ].
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Next we will show Eq. (B.20) to complete Condition 4I . Denote the LHS of Eq. (B.20)
by B(p, x,W I). Then, we need to show B(p, x, V I1 ) ≤ 0 for x < q, B(p, x, V I2 ) ≤ 0 for
x ∈ [q, θI ], and B(p, x, V I3 ) ≤ 0 for x > max{q, θI}; each for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Let us first start with x < q. We already know that B(1, x, V I1 ) = 0. Therefore, to show
B(p, x, V I1 ) ≤ 0 is equivalent to showing B(1, x, V I1 ) − B(p, x, V I1 ) ≥ 0. Rearranging the
terms, we can get
B(1, x, V I1 )−B(p, x, V I1 )
= (1− p)
(







(x) + µR − µS
)
, (B.21)

















































Therefore since p ∈ [0, 1] and µR > µS , following Eq. (B.21), we obtain the desired
inequality B(1, x, V I1 )−B(p, x, V I1 ) ≥ 0, and we have proved Eq. (B.20) for x < q.
Now consider the case x > max{q, θI}. We know that B(1, x, V I3 ) = 0. Therefore, to
show B(p, x, V I3 ) ≤ 0 is equivalent to proving B(1, x, V I3 ) − B(p, x, V I3 ) ≥ 0. Rearranging
the terms, we get
B(1, x, V I3 )−B(p, x, V I3 )
= (1− p)
(







(x) + µR − µS
)
















(−pµR − µS + (p+ 1)x)− pµR − µS .















(x− µR)− µR ≤ 0.
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Therefore, since p ∈ [0, 1], following Eq. (B.22) we have

















(2x− µR − µS)− µR − µS
)
≥ 0 ,
where the last step follows from the definition of θI (see Lemma B.1) and property 5(ii) in
Lemma 2.5.
Now we are only left with x ∈ [q, θI ]. Similar to the argument above, we want to show
B(λ∗(x), x, V I2 )−B(p, x, V I2 ) ≥ 0. Rearranging the terms, we get
B(λ∗(x), x, V I2 )−B(p, x, V I2 )
= (λ∗(x)− p)
(










The second step follows from the definition of λ∗(x) (see Lemma B.2). The last step follows
from the fact that G(·) is nonincreasing (see Lemma B.2). Finally, it remains to be shown
that Condition 6 holds. Condition 6 holds straightforwardly by an application2 of Lemma
2.4.
Finally we prove Theorem B.2.
Proof of Theorem B.2. The monotonicity of λ∗(x) on [q, θI ] and the boundary values
follow from Lemma B.2. It remains to show the monotonicity of θI . Let
F (µS , µR, σR, x) ,

















2Lemma 2.4 applies here as long as the customer lifetime is finite in expectation. Recall the proof of
Proposition 2.1 for finite lifetime. Consider the happiness process under the policy stated in Theorem B.1.
If the initial happiness level is below q, then we are done since happiness process spends positive measure
of time below q. On the other hand, if the initial happiness level is above q, then the first passage time to q
























By Lemma B.1, θI is the only root of F (µS , µR, σR, ·) on (µS+µR2 ,∞). From property
5(i) in Lemma 2.5, we obtain that F (µS , µR, σR, ·) < 0 for all x ∈ (µS+µR2 , θI), and
F (µS , µR, σR, ·) > 0 for all x ∈ (θI ,∞). Hence to prove θI is increasing in µS and σR, it
suffices to show F (·, µR, σR, x) is decreasing and F (µS , µR, ·, x) is decreasing. Equivalently,
we want to show ∂F∂µS (µS , µR, σR, x) < 0, and
∂F
∂σR
(µS , µR, σR, x) < 0 for any µR > µS > 0




























The first result needed, ∂F∂µS (µS , µR, σR, x) < 0, follows from the fact that erfc(·) > 0
everywhere. The second, ∂F∂σR (µS , µR, σR, x) ≤ 0, follows from the fact that x >
µS+µR
2 (so
that a+2y > 0) and using a Chernoff-type bound of the error function (Chang et al. Chang




. This completes the proof.
B.3 Robustness check: Geometric Brownian Motion reward
process
Motivated by an investment problem where a risk-free asset generates returns (interest)
percentage drift µS deterministically and a risky asset generates returns (capital gains and
dividends, with automatic reinvestment of dividends) with percentage drift µR and per-
centage volatility σR, in this appendix, we consider a model that uses geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) reward process instead of arithmetic Brownian motion reward. We will first
define the model. Then we will establish optimality conditions (Proposition B.1), explain
how we numerically solve for the optimal value function, and finish by presenting our nu-
175
merical findings.
Model setup. In this model, under the firm’s choice of service mode ut ∈ {R,S}, the total
reward Ỹt evolves according to a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
dỸt = µut Ỹtdt+ σut ỸtdBt (B.23)
with3 Ỹ0 = 1. We are interested in cases where µR > µS > 0. (However, we do not impose
the restriction µR > µS for our analytical development.) Customer happiness H̃t follows a
stochastic differential equation:
dH̃t = dỸt/Ỹt − H̃tdt, (B.24)
where H̃0 = x is the initial customer happiness. Comparing Eqs. (B.23) and (B.24) with
Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2), we see that under the same action process ut, customer happiness H̃t
follows the same dynamics as Ht does in the Base model. We assume that the hazard rate
of customer churn is still a step function but is positive even for H̃t ≥ q. Specifically,
Q̃(H̃t) , Q11{H̃t < q}+Q21{H̃t ≥ q} (B.25)
with Q1 > Q2 > 0. Then the customer’s survival probability S̃t at time t is given by
S̃t , P
(





Denote by T̃ the customer lifetime:
T̃ , inf
{
t ≥ 0 : e−
∫ t
0 Q̃(H̃s)ds = w
}
, (B.27)
where w is a uniform random variable over [0, 1] independent of filtration F.
We require the next condition on Q1 and Q2 to ensure that the expected CLV (which
will be defined next) is finite4.
Condition B.1. Q1 > Q2 > max{µS , µR}.












4Suppose the hazard rate is Q for all happiness states and the firm always uses the Risky service mode,
then it is not hard to show that the expected CLV is Q
Q−µR
if Q > µR, and ∞ if Q ≤ µR.
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Denote by Π̃ the space of admissible policies that satisfy the usual conditions as in the
Base model, which is that under the policy, the corresponding action process ut should be
adapted to filtration F, takes value in {S,R}, and the corresponding H̃t is an F-adapted
semimartingale uniquely specified in law. For a given starting happiness x and admissible
policy π, let Ỹ x,πt denote the reward gained up to time t and T̃
x,π be the customer lifetime.
Then the CLV is equal to





1{t < T x,π}dỸ x,πt
∣∣∣ H̃0 = x] . (B.28)
The firm’s objective is to maximize the CLV it earns from interacting with the customer.
The optimal CLV given a starting happiness x is given by
Ṽ ∗(x) = sup
π∈Π̃
Ṽ (x, π). (B.29)
Next we establish optimality conditions in order to find the optimal value function.
Optimality conditions. As in the Base model, we present the optimality conditions for
a function W̃ : R→ R to be the optimal value function.
Proposition B.1. Suppose a function W̃ : R→ R satisfies
1. the function value W̃ (x) > 1 for any x ∈ R;
2. the function W̃ is continuously differentiable everywhere on R and twice continuously
differentiable everywhere on R \ E for some countable set E;
3. the function W̃ is bounded;
4. the function W̃ ′ is bounded;
5. for any x ∈ R for i = S and for any x ∈ R \ E for i = R the following holds5:











5For any x ∈ E , we define the term 1
2
σ2SW̃
′′(x) to be zero consistent with σS = 0.
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6. for some interval policy π̃ (see Definition 2.2) such that π̃(y) = S for all y ∈ E, the
process W̃ (H̃t) is an F-adapted semimartingale, and for all x ∈ R it holds that












Then, the function W̃ is the optimal value function Ṽ ∗, and π̃ is an optimal policy.


















for all x ∈ R where Ṽ ′′ exists.
Before we present the proof of Proposition B.1, we want to give an overview of the
remainder of the GBM appendix. Recall from the analysis of the Base model (Section 2.5),
we would like to solve the HJB equation to get a candidate value function such that all
optimality conditions are satisfied. A general solution to the HJB equation (B.31) (for a
single service mode) is of the following form:























under the Risky service mode, and
W̃ (x,C3, S) =
Q̃(x)
Q̃(x)− µS
+ C3(µS − x)µS−Q̃(x)
under the Safe service mode, where C1, C2, C3 are free parameters, and in Eq. (B.32)
H(·, ·) is a Hermite polynomial function, and M(·, ·, ·) is the Kummer confluent hyperge-
ometric function.6 We then numerically find the values of C1, C2 and C3 such that the
optimality conditions in Proposition B.1 are satisfied. Later in this appendix, we describe
how we numerically solve for the optimal policy and value function, and provide our nu-
merical findings, which shows that our main structural results for the Base model also hold




, x2) are the two linearly independent solutions to the Hermite
Differential Equation y′′(x)− 2xy′(x) + 2λy(x) = 0.
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in the GBM setting. We defer the proof of Proposition B.1 to the end of the GBM appendix.
How we numerically solve for the optimal policy and value function. We need
to numerically find the values of C1, C2 and C3 of the following functions (that solves Eq.
(B.30) for the Risky service mode and for the Safe mode, respectively,)























W̃ (x,C3, S) =
Q̃(x)
Q̃(x)− µS
+ C3(µS − x)µS−Q̃(x)
in different happiness regions where the firm chooses different service modes, such that the
optimality conditions in Proposition B.1 are satisfied.
In the above expressions, H(·, ·) is a Hermite Polynomial, and M(·, ·, ·) is the Kummer




two linearly independent solutions to the Hermite Differential Equation y′′(x)− 2xy′(x) +
2λy(x) = 0. One challenge of calculating this W̃ is that, as the happiness value x decreases,
both H() and M() grow exponentially. Since both functions cannot be evaluated to their
exact values, the error in calculation W̃ (which is the difference of two very large numbers)
can get large for negative x with large magnitude. To control for this error, we place a
reflecting boundary at q − B in the unsatisfied zone for some large B > 0 and let the
happiness process only evolve on [q − B,∞). Recall that the happiness process is an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process in the unsatisfied zone, if the firm always utilizes the
Risky service mode there. With a reflecting boundary q − B < q, it becomes a reflected
O-U process. To preserve our insights, we want to choose B large enough that the customer
churns before hitting the reflecting boundary q −B with probability close to 1.
We use the following method to choose the reflecting boundary q − B. Consider a re-
flected O-U process X̃t on (−∞, q] with infinitesimal drift µR − X̃t, infinitesimal volatility
σR, initial value X̃0 = q, and reflecting boundary at the happiness threshold q. Note that
this is an approximation of the happiness process H̃t under the sandwich policy with the
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risk-averse region right above the unsatisfied zone, which we conjecture to be optimal, if
not the myopic policy. Under this policy, the happiness process becomes a delayed reflected
O-U process on (−∞, q] once it hits the unsatisfied zone. Notice the difference between
process X̃t and the happiness process just stated — X̃t has instantaneous reflection at q
while H̃t has delayed reflection at q. Nevertheless, this means that the stationary proba-
bility of X̃∞ < q − B is an overestimation of the stationary probability of H̃∞ < q − B,
and we can bound the latter by bounding Pr{X̃∞ < q − B}. From Ward and Glynn’s










∣∣∣N (µR, σ2R2 ) ≤ q]. Hence we would like to choose B such that this
probability is small.
Numerical findings. Next we give details of how random instances are generated to
compute the optimal policies. We are interested in the regime where q > µS , which implies
that the customer is eventually not satisfied if the firm uses the Safe mode all the time. We
also let µR > µS , so that the Risky asset accumulates higher rewards on average. We solve
for the optimal policy for random instances and make careful use of a reflecting boundary
q−B for some large positive B to ensure numerical stability while ensuring that the effect on
CLV is very small. In particular, in each iteration, the parameters are randomly generated
in the following sequence:
1. randomly generate σR ∼ Uniform[0.2, 1];
2. randomly generate µR ∼ Uniform [0, 0.8];
3. randomly generate µS ∼ Uniform[0, µR];
4. randomly generate q = µS + Uniform[0, 0.8];
5. assign B = q − µR + 5σR;
6. randomly generate Q1 ∼ Uniform[µR, µR + 5];
7. randomly generate Q2 ∼ Uniform[µR, Q1].
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Note that the range of the specifications of µS , µR and σR are chosen to have a similar
magnitude with the GBM drift and volatility estimations from the financial market (for
example, see Schneider et al. Schneider et al. [2014]). Also note that the choice of B is
made to ensure that the second argument
x−µR−σ2R
σR
inside the Hermite Polynomials is always
bounded below on [q −B,∞), in order to ensure numerical stability. We numerically solve
1000 random instances generated by the above procedure, by solving for the free parameters
C1 and C2 in Eq. (B.32) and verify that all the conditions in Proposition B.1 are satisfied. In
each instance, the stationary probability of a reflected O-U process H̃t < q−B is calculated.
In fact, they are all less than 10−8. Therefore we can say that with very high probability,
the customer churns before hitting the boundary q − B, and that placing a boundary at
q − B will very likely not affect the firm’s optimal policy. In fact, we also check this by
perturbing the choice of B within [q − µR + 4σR, q − µR + 5σR] and showing that both
the value function and the sandwich structure are extremely insensitive to the choice of B.
Remarkably, in all the randomly generated instances, the optimal policy is either a myopic
policy (Risky mode everywhere) or a sandwich policy (Safe mode only in an interval just
above q). More details are presented next.
Optimal policy is either myopic or sandwich. As in the Base model (see Theorem
2.1 for the µR > µS case), the optimal policy is either a myopic one or a sandwich policy. In
particular, among all the randomly generated instances, the (numerically solved) optimal
solutions are either a myopic policy that always uses the Risky mode everywhere, or a sand-
wich policy that uses the Risky mode for all happiness states except for some intermediate
happiness range [q, θ̃b] (for some numerically specified θ̃b). It is worth noting that in the
GBM setting, the optimal sandwich policy once again provides substantial CLV increase
over the myopic policy. For example, consider the model primitives µS = 0.12, µR = 0.14,
σR = 0.3, q = 0.13, Q1 = 1.5 and Q2 = 0.5. (Here one may think of 1 time unit in the
model as being a period of about 2 years.) This means the Safe asset’s rate of return is
12% (with continuous compounding), and the Risky asset’s expected rate of return is 14%,
with volatility 30%. Also the customer is not satisfied with a rate of return below 13%,
and his hazard rate of churn increases from 0.5 to 1.5 if he estimates (as quantified by his
happiness) that the rate of return is below 13%. Under this set of model primitives, the
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optimal sandwich policy (see the dotted vertical line in Figure B.4) is to use the Safe mode
for happiness values on [0.13, 0.147], and use the Risky mode elsewhere. The CLV increase
from using the optimal sandwich policy relative to the myopic policy is 7.0%. Though we
do not permit mixed strategies in this section, we briefly observe that the CLV increase
relative to the myopic policy will be even larger if mixed strategies are permitted, since the
myopic strategy remains unaffected.




















Figure B.4: The optimal sandwich policies for different values of µR, under µS = 0.12,
σR = 0.3, q = 0.13, Q1 = 1.5 and Q2 = 0.5. The horizontal axis corresponds to the value
of µR, and the vertical line marks the happiness value. The two curves are the switching
boundaries between the Risky mode and the Safe mode.
Optimal switching threshold exhibits similar monotonicity as in the Base
model. The optimal switching threshold θ̃b shows similar monotonicity in model primitives
as in the Base model (see Theorem 2.2). That is, θ̃b decreases as we increase µR, and
increases as we increase σR. Figure B.4 plots the prescribed optimal sandwich policy for
various model primitives. In particular, we fix µS = 0.12, σR = 0.3, q = 0.13, Q1 = 1.5,
Q2 = 0.5, and vary µR in [0.12, 0.20]. The horizontal axis is µR, and the vertical axis is the
happiness value. The two curves on the plot are the two switching thresholds, separating
the happiness regions where the firm should use different service modes. The white region
represents the risk-averse region where the firm should choose the Safe service mode. Notice
that θ̃b here has the same monotonicity (i.e., decreasing in µR) as the switching threshold
θb in the Base model.
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We end this appendix with the proof of Proposition B.1.
Proof of Proposition B.1. In order to prove Proposition B.1, we first establish the
following lemma:
Lemma B.5. For any admissible policy π ∈ Π̃, any starting happiness x ∈ R and any










where Ỹs is as defined in Eq. (B.23). In other words, the process Ỹ
x,π












Proof. Fix an admissible policy π ∈ Π̃, a starting happiness x ∈ R, and a time t > 0.




































































where the inequality results from the fact that µS < µR and σS < σR. Hence we have





s dBs is a martingale for any t > 0.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition B.1.
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Proof of Proposition B.1. As in the proof of Proposition 2.2, we will show that a func-
tion W̃ as described in Proposition B.1 is an upper bound of the optimal CLV Ṽ ∗, and that
the gap W̃ − Ṽ ∗ is zero.
To show that a function W̃ as described in Proposition B.1 is an upper bound for Ṽ ∗,
it suffices to show W̃ (x) ≥ Ṽ (x, π) for ∀x ∈ R and for any admissible policy π ∈ Π̃. Now
fix any x ∈ R and any π ∈ Π̃. Let ut denote the action process under policy π. Define a
process Xt, t ≥ 0 by




where H̃t is the happiness process under policy π and initial happiness x (see Eq. (B.24)),
Ỹt the corresponding cumulative reward (conditional on no quitting) up to time t (see Eq.
(B.23)), and S̃t is the corresponding customer survival probability at time t (see Eq. (B.26)).
Since π is admissible, the corresponding process H̃t is a semimartingale (and hence Ỹt and
S̃t are also semimartingales). Next we expand Xt in integral form.
Since W̃ is continuously differentiable everywhere on R and twice continuously differen-
tiable everywhere on R \ E for some countable set E (Condition 2 in Proposition B.1), we
can apply the Itô-Tanaka formula to conclude that W̃ (H̃t) is also a semimartingale:
W̃ (H̃t) = W̃ (x) +
∫ t
0














(W̃ ′r(y)− W̃ ′l (y))LH̃(t, y),
(B.34)
where W̃ ′r and W̃
′
l are the right and left derivatives of W̃ , and L
H̃(t, y) is the symmetric
local time of H̃t at y. In fact, we can still apply the results of Lemma 2.6 to the GBM
setting, since the dynamics of the happiness process in GMB setting is the same with the
happiness process in the Base model (if under the same action process). From Lemma
2.6, we know that LH̃(t, y) < ∞ almost surely, and since W̃ is continuously differentiable
everywhere, we have W̃ ′r(y) = W̃
′
l (y) and hence the last term involving the local time in
Eq. B.34 is zero almost surely.
184
Since W̃ (H̃t), Ỹt and S̃t are all semimartingales, we can then apply the multi-dimensional










































Note that by the Martingale property of stochastic integrals, the two stochastic integrals
above have zero expectations if ỸsS̃sW̃
′(H̃s)σus and ỸsS̃sW̃ (H̃s)σus are in the L
2[0, t] space.
This is indeed true since Ỹ x,πs ∈ L2[0, t] (see Lemma B.5), S̃s ∈ [0, 1], W̃ is bounded (see
Condition 3 in Proposition B.1), W̃ ′ is bounded (see Condition 4 in the proposition), and
σus ∈ {0, σR}. Hence we can take expectation on both sides of Eq. (B.35) and remove the
two stochastic integrals, while replacing 1 with 1{H̃s /∈ E}+1{H̃s ∈ E & us = S}+1{H̃s ∈
E & us = R}, and get











































1{H̃s ∈ E & us = R}
]
ds















1{H̃s ∈ E & us = R}ds
= W̃ (x). (B.36)
The inequality in Eq.(B.36) results from applying Condition 5 of Proposition B.1 and the




































W̃ (H̃s) + (µus + σ
2
us − H̃s)W̃ ′(H̃s)
)2
1{H̃s ∈ E & us = R}ds
= 0.
In the last step above, the first squared root term is bounded since Ỹs ∈ L2[0, t] by Lemma
B.5 and S̃s ∈ [0, 1]. The second squared root term above is zero, since
∫ t
0 1{H̃s ∈ E & us =








′(H̃s) is bounded for H̃s in a countable set E . Since Inequality (B.36) holds for any
t ≥ 0, it also holds in the limit:
lim sup
t→∞
EXt ≤ W̃ (x). (B.37)
We will now show lim sup
t→∞
EXt ≥ Ṽ (x, π) to complete the proof of W̃ (x) ≥ Ṽ (x, π). Ob-
serve that since Ỹt > 0, S̃t > 0 for any t > 0 and µR > 0, µS > 0, the integral
∫ t
0 ỸsS̃sµusds is
pathwise monotone increasing in t and hence converges pathwise to
∫∞



































is monotone increasing in t. Note that the stochastic integral has zero expectation since
ỸsS̃sσus ∈ L2[0, t], the same reasoning as before. Then by the Monotone Convergence
Theorem, we have


















where the first equation follows from Eq. (B.28) and replacing 1{t < T} with S̃t by the
tower property of conditional expectation and the applying the definition of S̃t in Eq.
(B.26). With Eq. B.38, we are ready to take expectations on both sides of Eq. (B.33)
and let t → ∞. Apply Itô’s formula on ỸtS̃t, utilize Monotone Convergence Theorem to













































































= Ṽ (x, π). (B.39)
The inequality results from the fact that W̃ (·) > 1 on R (see Condition 1 of Proposition B.1)
and that ỸtS̃t > 0. Combining Eqs. (B.37) and (B.39), we obtain the desired result W̃ (x) ≥
Ṽ (x, π) for ∀x ∈ R and any admissible policy π. Hence W̃ as described in Proposition B.1
is an upper bound for the optimal CLV Ṽ ∗.
Now it remains to show that the gap W̃ − Ṽ ∗ is zero when the policy is chosen to be
π̃, as described in Proposition B.1. Observe in the above analysis that it suffices to show
inequalities (B.36) and (B.39) are tight. Inequality (B.36) is tight follows from Condition
B.30 in Proposition B.1. Hence it only remains to show Inequality (B.39) is tight. In fact,







From definitions of Ỹt and S̃t (see Eqs. (B.23) and (B.26)), we know that (since π̃ is an
interval policy by Condition 6 of Proposition B.1, we use π̃(H̃t) to denote the policy’s choice
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is bounded above by (max{µS , µR} −Q2)t. Hence





















Thus we have proved the desired result.
B.4 Robustness check: Switching Costs
In this appendix we first define the model with switching costs, and then (informally) de-
rive the HJB equations required to numerically find the optimal policy and value function.
Finally we present our numerical findings.
Model with switching costs. Assume that each transition from one mode to the other
incurs a fixed cost, denoted by K, and keep all other assumptions in the Base model
unchanged. In this setting, the decision of which service mode to adopt should not only
depend on the customer’s current happiness level, but should also depend on the firm’s
current mode of service. In other words, the setting is stationary Markov with respect to
a two-variable state which includes both the happiness and the current mode of service,
and so, without loss of optimality, we can restrict attention to stationary Markov policies
with respect to this state. Let π be such a stationary Markov policy, which maps from
R×{S,R} to {S,R}, i.e., π(x, i) prescribes which service mode to use when the customer’s
happiness level is x and the firm’s current service mode is i ∈ {S,R}. Denote by ut the
firm’s service mode prescription at time t. Given an initial happiness H0 = x and initial
service mode u0− = i, under policy π, the firm’s service mode prescription at each time
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t ≥ 0 is ut = π(Ht, ut−). (As before, Ht and ut are defined for all t ≥ 0 independent of the
customer lifetime T .) We restrict attention to policies such that, with probability 1, the
resulting ut process is right-continuous with left limits (cadlag).
The firm’s objective is to find the policy that maximizes the difference between the
expected reward earned during the customer’s lifetime and the total switching cost incurred.
Accordingly, the optimal expected CLV for a starting happiness state x and starting service
mode i ∈ {S,R} is









∣∣∣∣∣ H0 = x, u0− = i
]
,
where τk denotes the time point of the kth switch in service mode in the ut sample path,
and the customer lifetime T is defined as per Eq. (2.6) as before. (Since ut is cadlag under
admissible policy π, the set of time points where ut switches is countable.)
HJB equations. The optimal CLV under switching cost should satisfy the following HJB
equations (derived informally below):
0 = max
{





′′(x) + µR, V
∗
S (x)− V ∗R(x)−K
}





−Q(x)V ∗S (x) + (µS − x)V ∗S
′(x) + µS , V
∗
R(x)− V ∗S (x)−K
}
∀x ∈ R. (B.41)
We now summarize how we obtain these equations: We have two equations in this setting,
each corresponding to one of the two possible service modes (the Risky mode or the Safe
mode) being used currently. In particular, Eq. (B.40) comes from comparing the continua-
tion value of staying with the Risky mode with the value of switching to the Safe mode while
incurring a switching cost K. Similarly, Eq. (B.41) comes from comparing the continuation
value of staying with the Safe mode with the value of switching to the Risky mode while
incurring a switching cost K.
Next, we go over the heuristic steps to obtain the HJB equation.
Consider a starting happiness value at H0 = x and the firm’s current service mode being
the Risky mode. We answer the following question: should the firm stick with the Risky
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mode for a very short time t and then continue optimally, or should the firm immediately
switch to the Safe mode but incur a switching cost of K > 0? In the first option, the total
reward collected is ∫ t
0
1{T > s}(µRds+ σRdBs) + 1{T > t}V ∗R(Ht),
where V ∗i (x) is the continuation value when happiness level starts at x and the firm’s
starting service mode is i ∈ {S,R}. Take expectation of the above expression and apply
Itô’s formula7 on e−
∫ t













































On the other hand, if the firm immediately switches to the Safe mode by incurring a cost of
K, the total reward (minus cost) collected is V ∗S (H0)−K. Since the firm wants to maximize
total reward, we must have

































, V ∗S (H0)−K
}
.
Consider the limit as t→ 0, the above equation reduces to
0 = max
{





′′(x) + µR, V
∗
S (x)− V ∗R(x)−K
}
.
Similarly, if the firm’s current service mode is the Safe mode and the customer’s happiness
value is H0 = x, we have
0 = max
{
−Q(x)V ∗S (x) + (µS − x)V ∗S
′(x) + µS , V
∗
R(x)− V ∗S (x)−K
}
.
7Fix i ∈ {S,R}. Since Ht is a semimartingale, by the Itô-Tanaka formula, if V ∗i (·) is sufficiently
smooth, then V ∗i (Ht) is also a semimartingale. Also e
−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)ds is a semimartingale. Therefore by the
multidimensional Itô formula, e−
∫ t
0 Q(Hs)dsV ∗i (Ht) is also a semimartingle.
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Findings. We focus on the case µR > µS , and numerically solve the HJB equations (B.40)
and (B.41) to find the firm’s optimal policy under switching cost K. In short, we find
that adding a small switching cost results in an optimal policy which is very similar to the
sandwich policy we find to be optimal in the Base model.
Recall our result for the Base model for µR > µS , namely, that in cases where a sandwich
policy is optimal, θb and q are the thresholds separating the happiness values where the firm
should use the Safe service mode from those where the firm should use the Risky service
mode (Figure 2.2). With a small positive switching cost K, our numerics reveal that each
switching threshold is replaced by a buffer interval. Specifically, above and below a buffer
the firm should prefer opposite service modes (as in the Base model, regardless of which
service mode is currently in use), whereas inside a buffer interval the firm should not switch
service modes. (Intuitively, the CLV benefit of having buffers in place of sharp switching
thresholds for K > 0 is to reduce the number of switches between service modes.)
Figure B.5 illustrates the optimal policy as a function of switching cost K. In the plot,
the horizontal coordinate is the switching cost, and the vertical coordinate is the customer’s
current happiness value. All model primitives besides K are held fixed as per µS = 8,
µR = 9, σR = 10, and q = 10. The shaded areas in Figure B.5 represents the buffers of the
optimal policy. Observe that the buffers grow when we increase the switching costs.8 The
special case K = 0 corresponds to the Base model, and leads to an interval optimal policy
as before with sharp thresholds q and θb = 22.10. Consider K = 0.05. The optimal policy
has buffer zones (q, 10.37) = (10, 10.37) and (θb, 28.22) = (22.10, 28.22), corresponding to
the intersection between the K = 0.05 line and the shaded areas in Figure B.5. Outside the
buffer zones, the policy is identical to that in the Base model, i.e., it uses the Risky mode for
happiness values above 28.22 and below q, and it uses the Safe mode for happiness values in
(10.37, 22.10). To illustrate the role of the buffer zones: if the starting service mode is Risky
and the starting happiness is q (or anywhere below 10.37), then the policy prescribes to stay
8In fact, we also find in numerical solutions that as the switching cost K increases to above µR − µS ,
there emerges a threshold θ0 < q, increasing with K, such that for happiness states under this threshold,
the firm should not switch to the Risky mode, if currently using the Safe mode. Here µR − µS is the CLV
difference between the Risky-always policy and Safe-always policy in the limit of initial happiness x→ −∞,
since Q(x′) = 1 ∀x′ < q.
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with Risky until the happiness exceeds 10.37. If the latter occurs, the policy immediately
switches to Safe and stays with Safe until the happiness either exceeds 28.22 or drops below
q = 10, and so on. Despite the positive switching cost, the optimal policy produces a
substantially larger expected CLV than the myopic policy. Specifically, the payoff is nearly
79% larger under the optimal policy
V ∗R(q)
V (q,Myopic) = 1.79, where V (q,Myopic) is the CLV of
using the Risky mode always.

























(a) Small switching costs

























(b) Larger switching costs
Figure B.5: Firm’s optimal policy as a function of switching cost K. We fix µS = 8,
µR = 9, σR = 10, and q = 10. The shaded areas represent the buffers where the optimal
policy retains the current service mode. The white areas represents the regions where the
policy employs a specific service mode, even if this would incur a switching cost. For each K,
the buffers of the optimal policy are given by the intervals where the (horizontal coordinate
= K) vertical line intersects the shaded areas, e.g, the dotted line in the left subfigure gives
the optimal policy for K = 0.05.
In the cases where the myopic (Risky always) policy is optimal under the Base model
(with K = 0), it is clear that the Risky always policy remains optimal even for K > 0,
since the policy does not incur any switching cost.9
Implications for a setting where the firm cannot perfectly measure happiness.
So far we have assumed that the firm is able to perfectly estimate the customer’s current
happiness state. A reader might be concerned about the robustness of our findings to
estimation errors (or delays). We now argue that the results we have obtained under
switching costs suggest that small to medium-sized errors in estimating customer happiness
would not significantly impair the CLV benefits of the optimal policy (relative to the myopic
9There is technical caveat here: if the starting service mode is Safe, then if K > 0 there is a nontrivial
decision regarding whether to switch to Risky and under what conditions. This case has limited practical
relevance, so we avoid discussing it in the interest of space.
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policy). In each case where the optimal policy for the case of switching costs is one where
switching is postponed by a buffer (see Figure B.5), by definition this policy produces higher
CLV than the myopic policy. We can hence conclude this policy also produces higher CLV
than the myopic policy if there were no switching costs (for K = 0, the CLV under the
former policy is even larger whereas under the CLV under the latter policy stays the same).
To give a quantitative example, for K = 0.70 the lower buffer interval of the optimal policy
is (10, 12.03) as per Figure B.5. Thus the policy decisions are loosely similar to those of the
optimal (sandwich) policy under the Base model acting on estimated customer happiness
when there are estimation errors of size similar to the size of the lower buffer interval ∼ 2
(the upper buffer interval plays only a small role since the customer happiness only rarely
rises to that level). The CLV increase from using the optimal (buffer) policy relative to the
myopic policy is 30.0% for K = 0.70, and so the CLV increase from using the same policy
in the absence of switching costs is even larger. This gives us confidence that our proposed
policies still substantially increase the CLV in the face of small to medium-sized errors in
estimating customer happiness. Along similar lines, interpreting the effect of the buffer
intervals as delays in switching, one can argue that (small) delays in estimating customer
happiness are unlikely to erode the benefits of using our proposed policies.
B.5 Robustness check: Alternative Hazard Rate functions
We now provide numerical evidence for our results’ robustness to alternative specifications
of the hazard rate function (recall the original step function in Eq. (2.4)) in the case
µR > µS > 0. The most important takeaway is that, for a variety of hazard rate functions
and different model primitives, the optimal policy is still either myopic or a sandwich policy,
and moreover, the switching thresholds in the optimal sandwich policy are fairly robust to
the shape of hazard rate functions.
First, we consider a variety of different hazard rate specifications in the unsatisfied zone,
while keeping the original assumption of zero hazard rate in the satisfied zone. Let q be
the happiness threshold separating the unsatisfied zone and the satisfied zone. Consider
the following four types of hazard rate functions:
193
(a) constant 0.5 (b) constant 2 (c) constant 10
(d) linear (e) quadratic (f) 4th power
(g) 8th power (h) exponential (i) logit
Figure B.6: Value function and optimal policies for various forms of Q(·); µR = 9, µS = 8,
σR = 10, q = 10. Solid red lines correspond to the Risky service mode, and dashed blue
lines correspond to the Safe service mode.
1. constant k: Q(x) = k1{x < q};
2. nth power: Q(x) = (q − x)n1{x < q};
3. exponential: Q(x) = (eq−x − 1)1{x < q};








The value function and optimal policy associated with each hazard rate functions can be
established by solving the HJB equation (2.13) and checking that the optimality conditions
in Proposition 2.2 are still satisfied. Under all these different choices of the hazard rate
function in the unsatisfied zone (including several different constants, and powers) and
different model primitives with µR > µS , we find that (similar to Theorem 2.1) the optimal
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policy is either myopic or a sandwich policy. Figure B.6 presents the firm’s optimal policy
and the associated CLV for some of the numerical instances.
One interesting observation from Figure B.6 is that the size of the risk-averse region
depends on how fast the hazard rate of leaving increases as the customer happiness level
descends into the unsatisfied zone. In the Base model, the firm switches from Safe to
Risky as soon the customer happiness crosses from the satisfied zone into the unsatisfied
zone. This is not always the case with arbitrary hazard rate functions. When the hazard
rate grows relatively fast as customer happiness goes down, the lower switching threshold
remains at q. However, in the plotted cases where the hazard rate does not grow swiftly
when customer happiness crosses into the unsatisfied zone, the switching point to Risky is
strictly below q. In our numerics, this occurs for the cases of hazard rate functions growing
as the fourth and eighth powers (see Figures B.6(f) and B.6(g)), where the lower boundary
of the risk-averse region is strictly below q.
In Figure B.7, we also show that the gap in CLVs between under the optimal policy and
the myopic policy remains large for different hazard rate functions. In particular, the second
curve from the bottom corresponds to the original step function hazard rate in Eq. (2.4).
The other three curves correspond to the hazard rate function being linear, exponential,

























Safe mode’s drift 𝜇"
Figure B.7: The ratio of CLV under the optimal policy to CLV under the myopic policy
versus µS under different hazard rate functions), for µR = 5, σR = 2, q = 6, and initial
happiness q.
Other than the choice of hazard rate functions listed above, we also numerically exam-
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ined cases where the hazard rate is strictly positive everywhere (including in the satisfied
zone), again in the Base model and restricting µR > µS , and find our main results re-
main intact. In particular, we considered hazard rate functions of the form Q(x) = 1{x <
q} + ε1{x ≥ q} for ε ∈ (0, 1), and various model primitives such that µR > µS , and found
that the optimal policy is still either myopic or a sandwich policy, where (in the optimal
sandwich policy) the upper switching threshold decreases smoothly as we increase the value
of ε. The CLV increase from using the optimal sandwich policy relative to the myopic policy
is still large for small values of ε. We omit more details of this robustness check for brevity.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
We organize the proofs by Lemma, Proposition, Corollary, and Theorem. The (lengthy)
proof of Theorem 3.2 is shown separately in Appendix C.1.5.
C.1.1 Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (a) Note that the objective function in (3.2) is jointly convex in
(x, qe, qv, qr) since L
i
n(·) is convex. Combined with the structure of its feasible region,
a standard argument establishes joint convexity of Gin(x,Q).
(b) Let x′ = U −x, for some arbitrary inventory position benchmark U . Let q̄e = qe + qv.
Gin(U − x′, Q) = min
max{−Cin,v ,Q−Cin,r}≤q̄e≤min{Q,Cin,e}








cin,eq̄e, if q̄e ≥ 0,
cin,v q̄e, if q̄e < 0.
Note that the maximand to the right of (C.1) is supermodular in (x′, Q, q̄e), since L
i
n(·)
is convex. Moreover, the region D = {(q̄e, Q) : −Cin,v ≤ q̄e ≤ Cin,e, Q−Cin,r ≤ q̄e ≤ Q}
is a sublattice of R2: Let (q1e , Q1), (q2e , Q2) ∈ D. Clearly −Cin,v ≤ min{q1e , q2e} ≤ Cin,e.
Also, min{Q1, Q2}−Cin,r = min{Q1−Cin,r, Q2−Cin,r} ≤ min{q1e , q2e} ≤ min{Q1, Q2},
i.e., (q1e , Q
1) ∧ (q2e , Q2) = (min{q1e , q2e},min{Q1, Q2}) ∈ D. The proof that (q1e , Q1) ∨
(q2e , Q
2) ∈ D is analogous.
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It, then, follows from Theorem 2.7.6 in Topkis [1998] that the supermodularity of the
maximand in (C.1) is preserved by the max-operator, i.e., Gin(U−x′, Q) is submodular
in (x′, Q), hence supermodular in (x,Q).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Clearly, x ∈ Ain,e(x) [y ∈ Ain,r(y)] since ξin,e ∈ [−Cin,e,∞) [ξin,r ∈
[−Cin,r,∞)]. It suffices to show that the sets are convex. We prove convexity for the set
Ain,r(y). The proof for the set Ain,e(x) is similar.
Fix any y. Take any two values v1 and v2 in Ain,r(y) and any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since v1, v2 ∈
Ain,r(y), there exists z1, z2 ≥ y and ξ1, ξ2 ∈ X in,r such that v1 = z1 ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξ1) and
v2 = z2 ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξ2). To show λv1 + (1− λ)v2 ∈ Ain,r(y), we need to show there exists
z3 ≥ y and ξ3 ∈ X in,r such that λv1 + (1− λ)v2 = ze ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξ3).
Compute
λv1 + (1− λ)v2 = λz1 ∧ (λy + λCin,r + λξ1) + (1− λ)z2 ∧ ((1− λ)y + (1− λ)Cin,r + (1− λ)ξ2).
Since X in,r is convex, we have λξ1 + (1 − λ)ξ2 ∈ X in,r. It is easy to verify that if z1 ≤
y + Cin,r + ξ1 and z2 ≤ y + Cin,r + ξ2, or if z1 ≥ y + Cin,r + ξ1 and z2 ≥ y + Cin,r + ξ2, then
λv1 + (1 − λ)v2 = (λz1 + (1 − λ)z2) ∧ (y + Cin,r + λξ1 + (1 − λ)ξ2) ∈ Ain,r(y). Suppose
v1 = z1 ≤ y + Cin,r + ξ1 and v2 = y + Cin,r + ξ2 ≤ z2 (the case z1 ≥ y + Cin,r + ξ1 and
z2 ≤ y + Cin,r + ξ2 follows similarly). Define z3 = λz1 + (1 − λ)(y + Cin,r + ξ2) ≥ y. Then
λv1 + (1− λ)v2 = z3 ∧ (y + Cin,r + λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2) ∈ Ain,r(y).
C.1.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Note, first, that x∗2 ≥ x∗1, in view of (3.5).




(x+ min{Q,Cin,e})−∆in ≤ 0, since
Lin(·) is strictly convex, i.e., the derivative of the convex minimand in (3.3) in the
upper bound min{Q,Cin,e} is non-positive, so that q∗e = min{Q,Cin,e} is optimal and
q∗r = Q− q∗e = [Q− Cin,e]+.
(b) The derivative of the convex minimand in (3.3) in q∗e equals zero, verifying that q
∗
e is








(x + [Q − Cin,r]+) − ∆in ≥ 0, i.e.,
the derivative of the convex minimand in (3.3) in the lower bound [Q − Cin,r]+ is
non-negative. Thus q∗e = [Q− Cin,r]+ and q∗r = min{Q,Cin,r}.
(d) The expressions for the partial derivative follow immediately. Continuity on each
of the open intervals (−∞, x∗1(Q)), (x∗1(Q), x∗2(Q)) and (x∗2(Q),∞) is immediate from
the fact that the functions Lin(·) are continuously differentiable, while continuity on
x∗1(Q) and x
∗
2(Q) follows from their definitions. Thus, whenever an aggregate order
Q is increased, both suppliers see their orders (weakly) increase.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.9 (a).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. In the main text.
C.1.3 Proofs of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Fix n = N, . . . , 1 and state-of-the-world i. We provide the proof
for the first-stage policies; the proof for the second-stage policy is analogous. Consider the
threshold level x∗1 identified in Theorem 3.11 (c), and let x ∈ (−∞, x∗1). On this half line,
we can repeat the proof of Theorem 3.12, since for x < x∗1 it is optimal not to salvage.




n,i − x)+. It






1 would imply that q
∗
e = 0 for
y∗n,i < x < x
∗




1 would imply that q
∗
e > 0
for x∗1 < x < y
∗
n,i, contradicting Theorem 3.11 (c) again.
Now consider x ∈ (x∗2,∞). Here, only salvage batches need to be considered by The-
orem 3.11 (c). By argument similar to Theorem 3.12, we identify a threshold y∗∗n,i such
that q∗v = (y
∗∗
n,i − x)−. Moreover, y∗∗n,i = x∗2 since either y∗∗n,i < x∗2 or y∗∗n,i > x∗2 generates a
contradiction with Theorem 3.11 (c).
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C.1.4 Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Parts (a) and (b): Note, first, from (3.6)–(3.9) that in the ab-
sence of fixed costs, the value functions satisfy the recursion:
f in(x) = min
qe∈[0,Cin,e],qv∈[−Cin,v ,0]
{cin,eqe + cin,vqv + Lin(x+ qe + qv) + f in,r(x+ qe + qv)},
(C.2)
f in,r(y) = min
z∈[y,y+Cin,r]














Using standard arguments and the fact that the functions {Lin(·)} are strictly convex, see
Assumption 3.2, one verifies, inductively, that all of the value functions {f in(·)} and {f in,r(·)}
are strictly convex, with the possible exception of {f i1,r(·)} potentially being (weakly) con-
vex, only.
We prove the stated properties of the derivatives {f in
′
(·)} and {f in,r
′
(·)} by induction as
well. By assumption, they hold for n = 0. Assume they hold for n−1, for some n = N, . . . , 1.
Let H in(z) denote the minimand of (C.3). We show that H
i










Since f jn−1(·) is differentiable almost everywhere, and there exists a constant A > 0 such
that |f jn−1
′
(z)| ≤ A|z|p, wherever the derivative exists, we have
E|f jn−1
′







|z|l(Din)p−l = O(|z|p) <∞,
since the p-th moment of Din is finite, by Assumption 3.2. The differentiability of H
i
n(z)
and the interchange of the expectation and differentiation operators is now justified by
a standard result, see e.g. Theorem 9.42 in Rudin [1976]; in particular, (C.4) applies.
Consider, first, the case where n = 1. Since all {f j0 (·)} are continuously differentiable with
f j0
′
(·) increasing and limx↑∞ f j0
′
(x) ≥ 0, there exists a threshold Si1,r ≥ −∞, such that
H i1
′








cin,r − α{maxj c
j
n,r}/α ≤ 0 while limz↑∞H in
′
(z) ≥ cin,r > 0. Along with the strict convexity
of Hn(z) (in view of the strict convexity of f
j
n−1(·)), these properties imply the existence of











n,r −Din), if y < Sin,r − Cin,r,
cin,r(S
i











n−1(y −Din), if y ≥ Sin,r.
This establishes that orders with the regular supplier in period n are optimally governed by
a modified base-stock policy with base-stock level Sin,r, acting on the augmented inventory
position. Moreover, by (C.4), this function f in,r(·) is differentiable everywhere, with the
possible exception of y = Sin,r and y = S
i
n,r − Cin,r. Finally, both for n = 1 and n ≥ 2
|f in,r
′









Now, consider the minimand H̃ in(x, qe, qv) in (C.2). By Assumption 3.2, this function is
differentiable on the entire Euclidean space R3 with the possible exception of the planes
{(x, qe, qv) : x+ qe + qv = Sin,r} and {(x, qe, qv) : x+ qe + qv = Sin,r − Cin,r}.
Moreover, the right hand side partial derivatives exist everywhere, with
∂+H̃ in(x, 0, 0)
∂qe




(x) + f in,r
′+
(x). (C.5)
Since Lin(·) is strictly convex and f in,r(·) convex, this is a strictly increasing function of x,
with, by Assumption 3.2,
lim
x↓−∞
∂+H̃ in(x, 0, 0)
∂qe
< cin,e − cin,e − c̄n−1,r/α < 0 and lim
x↑∞




−∞ < Sin,e := inf{x : cin,e + Lin
′
(x) + f in,r
′+
(x) > 0} <∞.
Similarly,
∂−H̃ in(x, 0, 0)
∂qv












∂−H̃ in(x, 0, 0)
∂qv
< cin,v − cin,e < 0 and lim
x↑∞
∂−H̃ in(x, 0, 0)
∂qv
> cin,v + (−cin,v)+ ≥ 0,
by Assumption 3.1 and 3.2. Thus,
−∞ < Sin,v := sup{x : cin,v + Lin
′
(x) + f ′−n,r(x) < 0} <∞.
Moreover, by Assumption 3.1 (i) and f in,r
′−
(x) ≤ f in,r
′+
(x), the function to the right of
(C.6) is pointwise strictly below the function to the right of (C.5), so that Sin,e < S
i
n,v.
We now prove that for every period n and state-of-the-world i, a modified base-stock
policy with base-stock level Sin,e prescribes an optimal order with the expedited supplier.
The proof that a modified base-stock policy with base-stock level Sin,v is optimal to prescribe
salvage quantities for every state-of-the-world i in period n is analogous.
First, if x ≥ Sin,e, we show that q∗e > 0 cannot be optimal. If it were optimal, q∗v = 0,
but, by the definition of Sin,e and since x+ q
∗













(x+ q∗e) > 0,
which violates the KKT optimality condition. Next, if Sin,e−Cin,e ≤ x < Sin,e, we show that
it is optimal to set q∗e = S
i









































This proves the optimality of the suggested pair (q∗e , q
∗
v). Finally, if x < S
i
n,e−Cin,e, we show
that it is optimal to place a maximum size order with the expedited supplier, i.e., q∗e = C
i
n,e











































(x) > cin,v + (−cin,v)+ ≥ 0.
Part (c): q∗e(x) and q
∗
v(x) are non-increasing in x, in view of the optimality of modified











n,e − Cin,e ≤ x ≤ Sin,e,





n,v ≤ x < Sin,v + Cin,v,
x− Cin,v, if x ≥ Sin,v + Cin,v.
Since the optimal order with the regular supplier is governed by a modified base-stock policy,
as well, q∗r (y) is non-increasing, which shows that q
∗




Proof of Theorem 3.3. (a) Consider the stable price world’s optimal policy π. Apply
this policy to system II, i.e., the volatile price world. Under policy π, the order
quantities do not depend on the state-of-the-world. It is obvious that π is a feasible
policy in system II. It suffices to show that π incurs the same expected costs in system
II, as in system I, under any given demand trajectory.
Fix a starting inventory position xN and a demand trajectory; under policy π, the
inventory position trajectory {xn : n = N, . . . , 1} in system II is the same as in
system I. Therefore we incur the same total expected cost except, possibly, for the
total expected ordering cost from the expedited supplier. Since the state-of-the-world
Markov chain evolves independently from the demands, we can calculate the expected
ordering cost rate from the expedited supplier in period n, which is bounded from
above by c∗n, by the theorem’s assumption, and hence, identical to the unit cost rate
in the stable price world. Therefore, the total expected (discounted) ordering cost
from the expedited supplier is also identical in both worlds.
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(b) This part is an immediate corollary of part (a).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. In the main text.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By induction. The statement holds, by assumption, for n = 0.
Assume it holds for some period n−1 ≥ 0. Select a pair of states-of-the-world 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L




n,r(x) denote the optimal order and salvage quantities in period
n, in state (x, j). Since the capacity levels are independent of the state-of-the-world, these
decisions are also feasible when i is the state-of-the-world in period n. Thus,





























where the second inequality follows from the unit cost rankings (3.15) and the stochastic
ordering of [in−1|in] in (3.16), combined with the induction assumption guaranteeing that
the value functions f jn−1(·) are increasing in j.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. By induction. The claim holds for n = 0. Assume it holds for
some n < N . Fix a state-of-the-world i ∈ I and x ∈ R. Let q∗r , q∗e and q∗v denote the optimal
order sizes and salvage batch in system I in period n + 1 where (i, x) is the state of the
system. Then






































By Theorem 3.5, f jn(·) is pointwise increasing in j, since (3.15) is satisfied and {in} satisfy
(3.17). This implies that EDin+1f
j




r −Din+1) is also increasing in j. Thus,
since (in|in+1 = i) ≥st (̃in |̃in+1 = i), we get:






























where the second inequality follows from f in(·) ≥ f̃ in(·) by the induction assumption, and




v) is feasible but possibly
suboptimal in system II. This completes the induction proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. By induction. By assumption, the result is true for period n = 0.
Assume it holds for some period n−1. Fix some inventory position x in period n. Consider
any two state l ≤ j. By the capacity rankings in (3.19), the optimal decisions {q∗jn,r, q∗jn,e, q∗jn,v}
in state (x, j) remain feasible in (x, l). The remainder of the proof is analogous to that of
Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Analogous to that of Theorem 3.6.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. In the main text.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. We first establish that the three critical values xn,i0 , x
n,i
e and







n−1(x−Din), which is strictly convex by Assumption 3.2
and Proposition 3.2 (a) establishing the convexity and almost everywhere differentiability
of the functions {f jn−1(·)}.
This shows that the function H(·) is differentiable (everywhere), where the interchange
of the expectation and derivative operators is justified as in Theorem 3.1. Together with
the convexity of H(·), this implies that H ′(·), the function to the left of (3.33), is strictly
increasing since H(·) is strictly convex. Moreover,
lim
x↓−∞








(x) < 0, (C.7)
lim
x↑∞




(x) > cin,v + (−cin,v)+ ≥ 0, (C.8)
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where the first inequalities in (C.7) and (C.8) follow from Proposition 3.2 (a) and the second
inequality in (C.7) follows from Assumption 3.1 (i). The last inequality in (C.7) and the
second inequality in (C.8) both follow from Assumption 3.2 (c). These properties ensure
that function H ′(·) has a unique value −∞ < xn,i0 < ∞ such that H ′(x) < 0 [H ′(x) > 0]
for x < xn,i0 [x > x
n,i
0 ]. We call x
n,i
0 the unique “root” of the function H
′(·).
The proof that (3.34) has a unique finite root −∞ < xn,ie <∞ is analogous. (Note the
middle inequality in (C.7)) Moreover, the function to the left of (3.33) is pointwise smaller
than that to the left of (3.34) since, by Assumption 3.1, cin,v ≤ cin,e. This implies that the















(x−Din), which is strictly increasing,
and by Proposition 3.2 (a) positive for x sufficiently large. Thus, xn,ir is either the unique
root of H̃(x) = 0, or H̃(x) > 0 for all x, and xn,ir = −∞.
(a) We first show that for any x > xn,i0 , it is optimal to place a salvage order q
∗
v(x) =
(xn,i0 − x) ∨ (−Cin,v) and place no expedited/regular orders, i.e., µ∗e(x) = µ∗r(x) = 0.








































































































































































































































≤ 0, if x ≤ xn,i0 + C
i
n,v.




r) satisfies the KKT conditions, and is, therefore,
optimal in the convex program.
For x ∈ [max{xn,ir , xn,ie }, xn,i0 ), it is optimal not to take any action, i.e., the triplet
(q∗v = 0, µ
∗
e = 0, µ
∗
r = 0) is optimal in (3.29). This follows immediately from the
definitions of the threshold values so that
∂F in(x, 0, 0, 0)
∂qv










∂F in(x, 0, 0, 0)
∂µe










∂F in(x, 0, 0, 0)
∂µr







Thus the triplet (q∗v = 0, µ
∗
e = 0, µ
∗
r = 0) again satisfies the KKT conditions.
The final case has x < max{xn,ie , xn,ir }. We show that the optimal policy is to place no





From part (a), we know that q∗vµ
∗
e = 0. Suppose q
∗
v < 0. Then µ
∗
e = 0, and hence


















(x+q∗v−Din) which is negative since x < x
n,i
0 . This contradicts
optimality. Therefore (under the assumption that q∗v < 0) it must be that µ
∗
e = 0 and
µ∗r > 0. Let {yt}∞t=1 ↑ x
n,i
0 with yt > x
n,i
r . Then
∂F in(yt, 0, 0, 0)
∂qv













∂F in(yt, 0, 0, 0)
∂qv









(yt −Din) ≤ 0.
At the same time,
∂F in(yt, 0, 0, 0)
∂µr









∂F in(yt, 0, 0, 0)
∂µr






(yt −Din) ≥ 0.









cin,r for any x < x
n,i












































































where the second equality follows from the independence of Zr and D
i
n, and the










contradicts the optimality of q∗v < 0. Therefore, q
∗
v = 0. It only remains to be
shown that µ∗e + µ
∗




r = 0. Then since





















contradicts µ∗e = µ
∗
r = 0.
(b) We will show that, if xn,i0 < x
n,i
r , a double threshold policy is not optimal. In partic-
ular, we show that for any x ∈ (xn,i0 , x
n,i
r ), it is optimal to have q∗v < 0 and µ
∗
r > 0 at




r) is such that q
∗




































a contradiction. (The first inequality follows from the KKT conditions, the second
inequality follows from {Ŷ in,e(µ)} and {Ŷ in,r(µ)} being stochastically increasing in µ
(see (3.21)), and Lin
′
(·) and all f jn−1
′
(·) being increasing functions, the former strictly
increasing. The last inequality follows from x > xn,i0 . Therefore, it must be that
q∗v < 0 and hence µ
∗
e = 0, by Proposition 3.3.














(x+ q∗v −Din) < 0,
since x+q∗v < x
n,i
r and since x
n,i
r is the unique “root” of the increasing function to the










< 0 violates the optimality conditions, thus showing




Proof of Theorem 3.11. (a) Analogous to the proof of parts (a) and (b) of Theo-
rem 3.9.
(b) We first prove that µ∗r(·) is a decreasing function. For an arbitrary inventory position
reference value U , let y′ ≡ U − y. Then







U − y′ + Ŷ in,r(µr)−Din
) . (C.9)
In view of part (a), the functions {−f jn−1(·)} are concave. We will show that this
implies that the maximand in (C.9) is supermodular in (y′, µr), so that, by Theorem
2.3 in Vives [1999], µ∗r is increasing in y
′, and hence decreasing in y. It suffices to show
the supermodularity of one of the terms −Ef jn−1
(
U − y′ + Ŷ in,r(µr)−Din
)
. Note that
its partial derivative with respect to y′ is given by
Ef jn−1
′ (




U − y′ + φn,r(qin,r(µr), Z)−Din
)
,




(·) is increasing by part (a), φin,r(·, Z)
is increasing in its first argument and qin,r(·) is increasing.
To prove the monotonicity properties of the first stage, rewrite (3.36) as






+ ELin(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe)) + Ef in,r(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe))
}
. (C.10)
Applying a change of both the state variable x and the action variable x to x′ = U−x
and x̄ = U − x, respectively, (C.10) is rewritten as






′ − cin,vx̄+ ELin(U − x̄+ Ŷ in,e(µe))





− cin,eµe − cin,vx′ + cin,vx̄− ELin(U − x̄+ Ŷ in,e(µe))
− Ef in,r(U − x̄+ Ŷ in,e(µe))
}
. (C.11)
By the same argument, used above, to show the supermodularity of the maximand
in (C.10), we obtain that the maximand in (C.11) is supermodular in (x̄, µe). Since
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the action sets {(x̄, µe) : x′ ≤ x̄ ≤ x′ + Cin,v, µe ∈ U in,e} are increasing sets in x′,
it follows from Theorem 2.3 in Vives [1999], combined with Remark 1, ibid, that
(x̄∗, µ∗e) is increasing in x
′, hence decreasing in x. In particular, µ∗e(x) is decreasing,
while U − x∗ is decreasing in x, so that x∗ is increasing in x.
(c) We prove the optimality of the double threshold policy in the first stage problem. The
proof of the single threshold policy in the second stage problem is analogous. By an
analogous proof to that of Proposition 3.3, we have
µ∗e(x)q
∗
v(x) = 0 (C.12)
for all x. Consider the minimand F in(x, qv, µe) of (3.36), and note that
∂F in(x, qv, µe)
∂µe
= cin,e + ELin
′


























∂F in(x, qv, 0)
∂µe









By Assumption 3.2 and part (a), this is a strictly increasing function of x and qv.
Moreover, again by Assumption 3.2 and part (a), we have
lim
x↓−∞
∂F in(x, 0, 0)
∂µe




∂F in(x, 0, 0)
∂µe
> cin,e > 0.













< 0 for any qv ≤ 0, so that the pair (q∗v , µ∗e = 0) fails
to be optimal. This implies that µ∗e > 0. By Eq. (C.12), this implies that for x < x
∗
1,
q∗v = 0. Similarly,
∂F in(x, 0, µe)
∂qv
= cin,v + ELin
′
(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe)) + Ef in,r
′
(x+ Ŷ in,e(µe))
≥ cin,v + ELin
′
(x) + Ef in,r
′
(x) =




where the inequality follows from {Ŷ in,e(µ)} being stochastically increasing in µ (see
(3.21)), and Lin
′
(·) and f in,r
′
(·) being increasing functions. By the above argument,
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂qv




cin,e − c̄n−1,r/α < 0. Similarly, limx↑∞
∂F in(x,0,0)
∂qv
> cin,v + (−cin,v)+ ≥ 0. This implies













for all x, so that x∗2 > x
∗













> 0, so that the pair (q∗v = 0, µ
∗
e) cannot be optimal, hence
q∗v < 0. By Eq. (C.12), we have µ
∗
e = 0. Finally, for x
∗
1 ≤ x ≤ x∗2, q∗v = µ∗e = 0 since
(q∗v = 0, µ
∗
e = 0) satisfies the KKT conditions.
Proof of Theorem 3.12. We show that the optimal regular order size in period n is
(z∗n,i − y)+. Consider the optimization problem
f in,r(y) = min
z≥y
E













n−1,1(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)−Din)
− cin,ry.
Note that, without loss of optimality, the minimization may be confined to the interval
[y, z̄(y)] = Ain,r(y), see Lemma 3.2.
Recall the set Ain,r(y) is convex by Lemma 3.2. Define the function








which is strictly convex by Theorem 3.11, with unique global minimizer z∗n,i. Let z
i
n,r(y)
be the unique minimizer of the strictly convex function F in,r(·) on the convex set Ain,r(y).
Next we show that




F in,r(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r))
]








Fix any y and consider any z ≥ y. It suffices to show F in,r(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)) ≥
F in,r(z
i
n,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)) for any ξin,r ∈ X in,r. Since F in,r(·) is convex and zin,r(y) is
its minimizer on the convex one-dimensional set Ain,r(y), the function F in,r(·) is decreasing
on (y, zin,r(y)) and increasing on (z
i
n,r(y), z̄(y)). Take any ξ
i
n,r ∈ X in,r. If z ∧ (y + Cin,r +
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ξin,r) ≥ zin,r(y), then y + Cin,r + ξin,r ≥ zin,r(y), and hence z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r) ≥ zin,r(y) =
zin,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r). Since F in,r(·) is increasing on (zin,r(y), z̄(y)), this implies that
F in,r(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)) ≥ F in,r(zin,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)). On the other hand, if z ∧




n,r(y), since z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r) ≤ y + Cin,r + ξin,r, so we have
z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r) ≤ zin,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r) ≤ zin,r(y). Since F in,r(·) decreases on
(y, zin,r), this implies that F
i
n,r(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)) ≥ F in,r(zin,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)).
Therefore we have F in,r(z∧ (y+Cin,r + ξin,r)) ≥ F in,r(zin,r(y)∧ (y+Cin,r + ξin,r)) for any z ≥ y
and ξin,r ∈ X in,r, and hence zin,r(y) achieves the minimum in (C.13). Therefore, for all z ≥ y,
EF in,r(z ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)) ≥ EF in,r(zin,r(y) ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r)), proving (C.13).
Next we argue that zin,r(y) = max{z∗n,i, y}. First, observe that the value z∗n,i does not
depend on y. If y ≥ z∗n,i, then, since the minimand in (C.13) is an increasing function
on [z∗n,i,∞), zin,r(y) = y, i.e., the optimal regular order size is 0. On the other hand,
if y < z∗n,i, and if furthermore z̄(y) ≤ z∗n,i, then zin,r(y) = z̄(y). This means the optimal
regular order size is z̄(y)−y. Note that z̄(y) ≥ y+Cin,r+ξin,r, hence z̄(y)∧(y+Cin,r+ξin,r) =
z∗n,i ∧ (y + Cin,r + ξin,r) for any ξin,r ∈ X in,r, the optimal regular order size is equivalently
z∗n,i− y. In the last case, if z∗n,i ∈ (y, z̄(y)), then z∗n,i ∈ A∗n,r(y) and hence zin,r(y) = z∗n,i, i.e.,
the optimal regular order size is z∗n,i − y.
The proof for the expedited order size is similar and is omitted here.
C.1.5 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In the presence of fixed costs, the value functions fail to be convex. However, we show that
they satisfy a generalized convexity property identified in Federgruen et al. [2020], when the
terminal value functions f i0(·)’s convexity assumption is relaxed to satisfy this generalized
convexity:
DEFINITION 1 ((C1K1, C2K2)-CONVEXITY). Given non-negative constants C1,K1
and C2,K2, a real-valued continuous function f is called strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex if
for any x ≥ y, a ∈ [0, C1] and b ∈ (0, C2],
f(x+ a) +K1 ≥ f(x) +
a
b
(f(y)− f(y − b)−K2).
Denote SCC1K1,C2K2 as the set of all strongly (C1K1, C2K2)-convex functions.
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We first show that all value functions {f in(·)}, n = N, . . . , 1, i ∈ I satisfy the strong
(C1K1, C2K2)-convexity property, assuming the terminal value function f
i
0(·) does for all
i ∈ I.
Lemma C.1. Assume f i0(x) ∈ SCCi0Ki0,Ci0,vKi0,v and f
i
0(x) = O(|x|p) for some integer p ≥ 1
and all i ∈ I. Then f in(x) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v and f
i
n(x) = O(|x|p) for n = N, . . . , 1 and all
i ∈ I.
Proof. We prove by induction. By assumption, the result holds for n = 0. Suppose the
result holds for period n− 1, i.e., f in−1(·) ∈ SCCin−1Kin−1,Cin−1,vKin−1,v and f
i
n−1(x) = O(|x|p)
for all i ∈ I. We first prove that f in(x) = O(|x|p) for all i ∈ I. Fix any i ∈ I. Since
f jn−1(x) = O(|x|p) for all j ∈ I and since I is a finite set, there exists a constant A > 0 such
that |f jn−1(x)| ≤ A|x|p for all j ∈ I, so that |Ef
j









E(Din)p−l|z|l ≤ Bmax{|z|p, 1} for all j ∈ I for some constant B > 0. Let
z∗(y) achieve the minimum in (3.9), then |f in,r(y)| ≤ Kin + cin,rCin + α
∑L
j=1 pijBmax{|y +





n are all O(|x|p).
We then prove that f in(x) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v for all i ∈ I. Fix any i ∈ I. Since
f jn−1(·) ∈ SCCjn−1Kjn−1,Cjn−1,vKjn−1,v for all j ∈ I, by Lemma 1 (ii) - (iv) in Federgruen et al.






n) ∈ SCmink∈I Ckn−1(αmaxk∈I Kkn−1),mink∈I Ckn−1,v(αmaxk∈I Kkn−1,v)
⊂ SCCinKin,Cin,v ,Kin,v . (C.14)
It then follows from Proposition 4 in Federgruen et al. [2020] and assumptions (i)—(iii) in
Theorem 3.2 that f in,r(y) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v . Since L
i




n,r(y) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v (C.15)
by Lemma 1 (iii) in Federgruen et al. [2020]. Finally by Proposition 4 in Federgruen et al.




n(x) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v .
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. bin,r ≤ b̄in,r is immediate from their definitions. To prove the
remainder of Theorem 3.2, note that in each period n with in = i, the value functions
f in,1(·), f in,2(·), f in(·) satisfy, respectively, the following three identities for suitable values of







{K1δ(y − x) + β1(y − x) + g(y)},
g2(x) = min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{K2δ(x− y) + β2(y − x) + g(y)},
g0(x) = min{g1(x), g2(x)},
Define auxiliary functions
g̃1(x) = K1 + min
y∈[x,x+C1]
{β1(y − x) + g(y)},
g̃2(x) = K2 + min
y∈[x−C2,x]
{β2(y − x) + g(y)},
as counterparts of g1(x) and g2(x), under definitive inventory adjustment, i.e., definitively
incurring fixed costs of ordering or salvaging, respectively, and let Ai(x) = g̃i(x)− g(x) be
the increase in minimal cost if forced to order (for i = 1) or salvage (for i = 2) compared
to staying put.
We define the following critical points with the convention that the infimum (supremum)
of an empty set is ∞ (−∞).
DEFINITION 2 (Critical Points). For a continuous function g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2 and
any β1, β2, define
B = inf{arg min
y
{β1y + g(y)}}, b = inf{x : A1(x) ≥ 0}, b̄ = sup{x : A1(x) < 0},
S = sup{arg min
y
{β2y + g(y)}}, s = sup{x : A2(x) ≥ 0},
¯
s = inf{x : A2(x) < 0}.
These critical points play important roles in the structure of the optimal strategy. By
definition, B is the smallest global minimizer of g̃1(x) if C1 = ∞, i.e., the smallest order-
up-to level for sufficiently small x if ordering is better than staying put. Similarly, S is
the largest global minimizer of g̃2(x) if C2 = ∞, .i.e., the biggest salvage-down-to level
for sufficiently large x if salvaging is better than staying put; b is the smallest among
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all inventory levels where ordering is not better than staying put; b̄ is the largest among
all inventory levels where ordering is better than staying put; s is the largest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is not better than staying put;
¯
s is the smallest among all
inventory levels where salvaging is better than staying put.
Note that by definition we have
g1(x) = min{g(x), g̃1(x)}, A1(x) < 0 ∀x < b, A1(x) ≥ 0 ∀x > b̄,
g2(x) = min{g(x), g̃2(x)}, A2(x) < 0 ∀x > s, A2(x) ≥ 0 ∀x <
¯
s.
The lemma below which follows from Proposition 2 in Federgruen et al. [2020], characterizes
the ranking of the critical points.
Lemma C.2 (Critical Points). Assume β1 ≥ β2 and g(·) ∈ SCC1K1,C2K2, then
1. −∞ ≤ b ≤ b̄ ≤
¯
s ≤ s ≤ ∞;
2. −∞ ≤ b ≤ B ≤ S ≤ s ≤ ∞;
3. If C2 =∞ and K1 ≥ K2, then b̄ ≤ B; if C1 =∞ and K1 ≤ K2, then S ≤ s;
4. if C1 = ∞ and K2 = 0, then b = b̄; if C2 = ∞ and K1 = 0, then
¯
s = s. If
C1 = C2 =∞ and K1 = K2 = 0, then b = b̄ = B,S =
¯
s = s.
In this lemma, (1) ranks four critical points. (2) ranks and locates the global minimizers
B and S between b and s. (3) and (4) lead to simple policy structures, in certain special
cases. In particular (13) follows from Lemma C.2 (1).
By Assumption 3.1, cin,e ≥ cin,v. By (C.15) in the proof of Lemma C.1, gin(y) ∈
SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v . Applying Theorem 2 in Federgruen et al. [2020] with properly defined
critical points, we immediately obtain the optimal policy structure for ordering with the





n−1(z −Din) ∈ SCCinKin,Cin,vKin,v by (C.14) in the proof of Lemma C.1, we can
apply Theorem 2 in Federgruen et al. [2020] again and use Corollary 2 in Federgruen et al.
[2020] to obtain the optimal policy structure given by Table 3.2b.
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C.2 Extension of Proposition 3.1 with Fixed Cost
In this appendix, we present and prove an extension of Proposition 3.1 which includes fixed
costs.
Consider the following optimization problem:











s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ Cin,r (C.16b)
0 ≤ qe ≤ Cin,e (C.16c)
qe + qr = Q. (C.16d)










where ∆in = c
i
n,r − cin,e is the price differential between the suppliers. The feasible region
for qe is a non-empty, closed interval.
Proposition C.1 (Optimal disaggregation of aggregate orders with fixed costs). Fix a pe-
riod n and a state-of-the-world i. Let (q∗r , q
∗
e) denote the optimal solution of the mathematical
program (C.16) that defines Gin,1(x,Q). Without loss of generality, assume Q ≤ Cin,e+Cin,r









)−1(∆in)− [Q− Cin,r]+ > x∗1.
(a) If Q > max{Cin,e, Cin,r}, then (q∗r , q∗e) is the same as defined in Proposition 3.1.
(b) If Cin,r < Q ≤ max{Cin,e, Cin,r} and x ≤ x∗1:
q∗r = [Q− Cin,e]+, q∗e = min{Q,Cin,e}.
(c) If Q ≤ Cin,r and x ≤ x∗1: compare Kin,r + cin,rQ + Lin(x) with Kin,e + Kin,rδ([Q −
Cin,e]
+) + cin,rQ−∆in min{Q,Cin,e}+ Lin(x+ min{Q,Cin,e}):




n(x) ≤ Kin,e+Kin,rδ([Q−Cin,e]+)+ cin,rQ−∆in min{Q,Cin,e}+
Lin(x+ min{Q,Cin,e}):














q∗r = [Q− Cin,e]+, q∗e = min{Q,Cin,e}.



















































































)−1(∆in)− x) + Lin((Lin
′
)−1(∆in)):
q∗r = 0, q
∗
e = Q.

















)−1(∆in)− x) + Lin((Lin
′
)−1(∆in)):



























)−1(∆in)− x) + Lin((Lin
′
)−1(∆in)):




n(x) is the smallest:








n(x+Q) is the smallest:
























(g) If Cin,e < Q ≤ max{Cin,e, Cin,r} and x ≥ x∗2:
q∗r = min{Q,Cin,r}, q∗e = [Q− Cin,r]+.
(h) if Q ≤ Cin,e and x ≥ x∗2: compare Kin,e + cin,eQ + Lin(x + Q) with Kin,r + Kin,eδ([Q −
Cin,r]
+) + cin,rQ−∆in([Q− Cin,r]+) + Lin(x+ [Q− Cin,r]+):




n(x + Q) ≤ Kin,r + Kin,eδ([Q − Cin,r]+) + cin,rQ − ∆in([Q −
Cin,r]
+) + Lin(x+ [Q− Cin,r]+):
q∗r = 0, q
∗
e = Q.








n,eδ([Q − Cin,r]+) + cin,rQ − ∆in([Q −
Cin,r]
+) + Lin(x+ [Q− Cin,r]+):
q∗r = min{Q,Cin,r}, q∗e = [Q− Cin,r]+.
Proof. Note, first, that x∗2 ≥ x∗1, in view of (3.5). Also, by Assumption 3.2, we know that
the mathematical program (C.17), if without fixed costs, is a convex program.
(a) If Q > max{Cin,e, Cin,r}, then it must be that q∗r > 0, q∗e > 0. Therefore, the mathe-
matical program (C.16) reduces to (3.3). The result follows.
(b) In this case, Cin,r < Q ≤ Cin,e, Q = min{Q,Cin,e} and q∗e > 0. Therefore we are
















. From Proposition 3.1, we know when x ≤ x∗, the optimizer to
the latter mathematical program is Q. Then obviously the result follows.
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(c) Since the optimizer to program (C.17) when x ≤ x∗1, if without fixed costs, is q∗e =
min{Q,Cin,e} at the boundary (see Proposition 3.1), we have that the program (C.17)
with fixed costs must take its optimal value at either q∗e = min{Q,Cin,e} or the other
boundary value, i.e, q∗e = 0 (since in this case q ≤ Cin,r). Therefore the result follows.
(d) If x∗1 < x < x
∗







x. We should compare the value of the objective function in Eq. (C.17) evaluated
at this point, with its value evaluated at the left boundary, i.e., when qe = 0 (since
Cin,r ≤ Q ≤ Cin,e). The result hence follows.
(e) Analogous to part (d).
(f) Analogous to part (d).
(g) If x ≥ x∗2, we know from Proposition 3.1 that the optimizer of program (3.3) is
q∗e = [Q − Cin,r]+ at the left boundary. Also since Cin,e < Q ≤ Cin,r, we must have
q∗r > 0. Therefore the result follows.
(h) The optimizer of program (3.3), when x ≥ x∗2, is q∗e = [Q−Cin,r]+ at the left boundary
(see Proposition 3.1). Since Q ≤ Cin,e, q∗e might also take value at the right boundary
Q. The result hence follows.
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